Understanding the Dynamics of Innovation in Urban Transit by Adler, Sy
Portland State University
PDXScholar
Center for Urban Studies Publications and Reports Center for Urban Studies
6-1986
Understanding the Dynamics of Innovation in Urban Transit
Sy Adler
Portland State University, d3sa@pdx.edu
Let us know how access to this document benefits you.
Follow this and additional works at: http://pdxscholar.library.pdx.edu/cus_pubs
Part of the Transportation Commons, and the Urban Studies and Planning Commons
This Report is brought to you for free and open access. It has been accepted for inclusion in Center for Urban Studies Publications and Reports by an
authorized administrator of PDXScholar. For more information, please contact pdxscholar@pdx.edu.
Citation Details
Adler, Sy, "Understanding the Dynamics of Innovation in Urban Transit" (1986). Center for Urban Studies Publications and Reports.
Paper 88.
http://pdxscholar.library.pdx.edu/cus_pubs/88
Report No. Ul"IT A-OR-1 1-003-86-1 
UNDERSTANDING THE DYNAMICS OF 
INNOVATION IN URBAN TRANSIT 
Sy Adler 
Assistant Professor 
Center for Transit Research and Management Development 
Portland State University 
Portland, Oregon 
June 1986 
FINAL REPORT 
PREPARED FOR 
U.S. )£PARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 
URSAN MASS TRANSPORTATlONADMINISTRATION 
010ce of T echnica 1 Assistar:ce 
University RP.Search and Training Program 
Washingtoo, D.C. 20590 
T•i:hni,ol lhport Doi::um~l\lo tlo" Page 
L Repct 1 No. '2 . Go ... e•~fl\e11 • A ct !'!i •O" t-Jo . 
I IJMI'A-OR-11-003-86-1 
) , R eport De ·~ 
June 1996 j~~:~~~;~g the Oynarnic.s of Innovation in Urban Transit 
r !__-~---~--~~---~ 
I' -:---,--,---,--,------------- --- ------------l ,3 P e ,. #01"'~ "13 0•9ur, . .1a, ,'l)fl R<:P'"'' t ~~o. 1 h;.,,:ler 
I ~. P::: O;~:·~;~m~~~;;:'~"· 
I Portland State univcrslty 
F
?.O. Ebx 751 
Pox;:tland. OR 97207 
Soo.t\1or1~ A9•"C.Y N!l""~ ond A.Jcba l \ .. 
U. s. uept , or Transportatrnn, UMI'A 
. Of fi::e of Technical Assis Lance 
I University Research and Training Program 
Washington, O.C. 20 '.>90 
10. Wo1k Un•• No. 'T RAI!>} 
11. Cvn1to:;1 <>< C n:rn t No. 
Urban lr81'\&it i<.; lhl' m11jor Ur•iled Slabs examJ>l& of s private indusl;y thal failed Md was lake-n over 
oy the puollc sector. nre rtcenl re-emet~~ or tt1e l)"lvate 5ee:tor tr11.1rb1m transit, and Dri'ltl le 
si.stlor-Hke lrehavior !n l.l'le Dublit. seclor, raises a n11mber of inlereslin9 t.he~relical and h\si.oricol 
Issues and policy questions . This r~port devtloos a concept us\ model to explain this recent ti ls lory and 
oullines likely paths of tral'ls!I. service and instituliorial inMvation . The model has l h!"ee componel)ls: I) 
lhe ooliliC!ll and ecc.Mmic roles ()furban lrarisporl fac\lilies ·1 r1 lhe laod rleveiopmenl. process , 2l the 
nature of lhe p(iliUcel process through which transit became ii oubllc s1:i:l.or acl1v ty: and :.sJ the poli tics 
or Sfl i11d1;slry whl)se orosoects are the joint pro~d of oaUona!. stale and local actior•s. 
The ba~lc 'fealure o.f lhe l.Jn\led Slates melroPOlilan dev~looment process i~ cvrnoetiUon to maintain .sM 
eltracl tapital inveslmenl . Comp~tflive pressures operate between rull{ wilhk1 melrooolilan ar~s, 
Place-bound coalitions of industry. politcial and tectll'licsl activisls forrfl lo defend and <idva"c~ their 
t6.N'Horlal inleresls. These coaltllons 11re par-licularly concerned wllh lransp~·rl s•mply for lwo 
reasons: 1 l transport facilities inevitably create location e0vanla9es for somt places and relatively 
dis.'lcivanlage olhers; and 2) transport facilities 1ippear lo offer 9realer leverage over th& loca\iof\ 
decisions of ln'.!e'Stors than other oollllcally feasible lf1lerventlons. 
Compellllon between places causes coaliUons lo lhin~, about alt aspects of tr ansporl s;mpty, 1n::ludtn-;i 
l~tmoloqy, facility locetlori, design, finandng and control, in slrsleglc lerrns . Coalll1on5 , therefore, 
~ lo deploy specific kinds of traMIJOrt lnvesltfleflls in cr-der- lo gain loc6tlon aMnt~ge . . I he t ore 
elemenl \fl localiM advantage is increasing receplion capacity . Since place advantage Is Ille key 
objective, facility locattoo and related choices - not ceinntcls between rnod~s ,:;r t.rm1sport - ~re I.he 
rovst ful\damenlal d!me11sior1s (If rnelr~lilzm lr.ensoorl Polilits . 
Transit., lnnovation, Transit Agencies, 
Political Economy, Urban Transit, 
Governmentalization, Transi.t Manager 
18. Ci •lll bu lion ~tolomonl 
i 
i 
~-~l~?-~ S_.-c~~-··_·-v~-C-l~o-•-•~·-l-.~io~l~1-h-,~, ·•~D~o-·-•_l~~~~~~~~l~-~-·~s-·-o~c-u_•_·-•_y~-C~lu~•~•-· '_--l~o-i~•-h~·~~p~o~9-•_l-~~~~~~~:~2-1~. ~~-· -_a_l_P_•_o•_·~.- n •·-~ 
:-orm DOT F 1700.7 iB-m 
EXECUTJ:VE SUMMARY 
Ur'::>an transit is the major United Stab:!s example of -:i once' 
private industry that failed and was taken over by the public 
sector. Therefore, t !1e recent re-emergence of the pr i vu te s:-~c tor 
in ucban transit, as well as private sector-like behavior in 1  
public sector. raises a number of interesting theoretical a n a 
b i. st.orical issues and poses a relatc~d set of lr.tµorL a n t policy 
c:iuestions. The specific questions addressed in this repor t a re : 
1· h y are t.h ese activities emerging when u nd whe r~ t. hey ar ~, and 
w h y a r e th e y t a k i n g th e f o r m s t h e y a r e ? w h a t a r e L 11 "-' 
i n s t i t u t. i on a_ l s t r u c t u r e s t h a t f a c i l i_ t a t e.:: a n d h J.. n tie r th e :- L -
eme~qence? What institutional changes are likely to t a ke pla ce~ 
This report develops ci conceptual model t11ot. helps to 
expla i n the recent h1story of transit policy ilnd out.line>; lil\.ely 
paths of transit service and institutional innovation. The mooel 
has three components: (1) the political and economi.c n>l e s of 
"'J .rban transpor-t facilities in the land development proces s : ( 2) 
t h e nature of the political process through which transit becom e 
a p ublic sector ~ct~vity; and (3) the politics of an lndustry 
whose prospects are the joint product of national, state ~nLl 
local govern~ent ~ctions. 
';'i1e basic feature of c.he rnet.ropol i.tan develop11ir,:11t process in 
the Un i ted s·tates is competition to maintain and uttral..!t capi_tu_) 
investl:lent. Competitive 1n:-essures operate bot!1 betweed ,-,nu 
w·i t.b in roetropolitiln areas. Place-based coalitions of industry, 
po l 1t. i cal d n d t c.chnica l act1vi5ts form to det:cnd dnd advan,·::r• 
th e i..r territorial intere .sts. '1'11ese coalitions ace par.t.ic:ul ori y 
conc @cned wit 11 t:canspor t. supply for t. wo reasons: ( 1) transport 
facil i ties inevitably crea~c l ocation advantages for some place s 
and n~l~tive 1 y disadvantage ot1wrs; an<l (2) tra1isport fac-:.lit ic s 
a r.>p e ar to offer gt-•':,:n .. er leverage over. the loc<it!.on decisions o f 
i nvestors tha n other politically f~asible interventions. 
Comp~tition between plac~s - spatial competitiun - caus~s 
coalition s to think about all. aspects of transport ;:;upply, 
including technology, facility location, design, financing an,:l 
control, in strateg i c terms , Coalitions, thert~for'2., st:ek t o 
deploy t5pecific kinds of transport investments in order to yain 
location ad v an.t.a9e. 'f)1e core el.e 111 e nt in locatio11 advantage lS 
tncreasing recep tion capac.i ty. Since place advantaye is tl 1e key 
object i ve, facility locat.ion and related choices - ratli(!r th a n 
conflicts between modes of transport - ar-e the most fundarnent l 
dimensions 0£ metropolitan Lransport politics. 
One al Liance, ·~omposed of two S€~ts of coalition pat tnt:::-~_;, 
n a s h :i__ s to r i ca l l y b <=' e n c c n t r t\l i ~1 t h e u e: v c lop in en t o f u r t; c:~ ri 
t :r a n ~ ,t t : c e n t r a l L) u s i n e :::> s J. .i s t. r i c l ( C IJ D ) g i- o u p s 21 n cJ l h o s ·~ 
involved in suburban residential development. The post-Wor .1d · war 
Two suburban boom plunged CBD coalitions into crisis. Those 
feeling the stiffest competition responded with extensive 
transport investment programs in or-<.ler to maintain downtown's 
historic position. These investment programs were variaticns on 
one basic theme: the need for transport facilities that would 
enable people and vehicles to speedily traverse long dist.=inces, 
while increasing downtown reception capacity. 
The size arid modal composition of trans :)ort investment:. 
progr~ms varied according to the nature of the relationship 
between a CBD and its outlying cornpeti.tors, as indicated .l.n '!'able 
1: 
Table l 
'l' h e Rel a t ion s h i p o f M e t r op o l i ta n S t. ): u c tu r e t o '1' r ;l n s :i.. t 
Irirjovation 
~eri.od I: 
!·ietropoli :.:.an 
Structure 
Governmen-
t.a 1 ization 
Process 
Ideology 
.1 nve s uoen L 
Program 
Inst.itutional 
outcome 
Innovations 
FROM PRIVATE TO ?UBLIC 
Cl3D DOMINA.•~'!' 
Cl3D-led 
Hierarchical 
Strong Core 
Specialized 
Int.erccpen.dent 
Downtown/ 
r<:1.dial 
Powerful; 
relatively 
autonomous 
Extensive rail 
transit/express 
bus service in 
ar1uition to ex-
i :;L i.nq servic.:t: 
COMPC'l'ITIVE 
CBD-led; sub-
urban opposition 
Self-Contained 
Multi-Cent-ered 
Non-!Tierarch .ica l 
Downt.own/radial 
vs. outlying 
cent.er orienta-
tion 
Financially and 
spatially con-
strained 
some express 
buses; limited 
rail transit in 
a<ldit.ion to ex-
i fJ l L 119 !h'l"V ic.:~ 
CBD WEAi< 
Limited to 
central city; 
Suburban-led 
[\)On-Centrality 
outl.yinL_J center 
or ten tat.ion 
r~ a rg i n.:il 
social welfare 
service; locally-
oriented sub-
urban sc•rvu.:<:' 
Cf:D <lo::>mi 11ants had .Larger sea.le, more var :Led, and mort! e)(pensive 
proi;iosals, while the other two cat.e~ori~s had corrt!spondi11::;.Ly 
i;ior~ restricted and restrained agendas. From t.he dow:-.r_o-.-111 
co a 1 i L ion po i n t o f v i e w , how e" e r , th e spa t. i a l co n t i '::] u r a t .:. 0 n ;_; r 
transport. i!'lvestment WClS the s<lme in a.l l cases: a cont1nuat.ion 
and extension of existin~ downtown/radial networks. At different 
points in time they all faced the sAme constraint: t\11.~ pr J.Vat.~ly 
c.::wned t.ransit companies the,1 in existence were t.:ina.ncially uneible 
to play their necessary role in the investment program. 
'l'he rrivate companl-es were part i.c\.1la.rly un.3ble to provide 
Frecisely that k1rnj of transit service CED co~l itions must W<t.ntc <! 
t.o see: pea)c JJ~L·iou xap1d transit or e}::_)rcss S-~rv .~ce rum thos~ 
rt!p dly qrow.ir1g outlying areas to d Qi, . ir, town. 'This kin d of ::;e rvii.:~ 
wa.s the On;'! seen LI:.; crucial to the ability of down t own to 1t1cet 
the competi.tioi'1 of sL:burban business centers. Thls \\1 a.s olso .:in 
e;: tr. ~mr~l.y costly service t.o provide. 'J'he i.nab:ility cf transit 
companies to !Jlay their histo.rically progressive rolu i n th~ C ~·>­
ori.:.-nted metropolitan developr.Hmt process gclvani;;-.(~d ni!)v~?!~; ~1-it:.s _u 
crP.-ate regi.on-wide public institutions to ,replace thern. 
Tile particular 1.<Jay in which transit became a public sector 
i n d u s t r y g en e r a t e d f :i. s ca l c r i s i s . 'l' h e ~, a tu r e o f th e f i s c d l 
en sis was th.is: downt-.O\l/n alliances in metropol 1ta11 a reu of Cl..\O 
do rn i. n an c e a n d i n a r e i1 s o t i n t. e n s e bus in es s c c n t e r c ,-, 1~ r, , ~ t 1 t. i. o n 
sou9ht arid secured the kiHds of transit service - luny d :LSt3nce, 
p 2-" k ~' ;~ r i od , cl o t..i n tow .n / r a c1 i .~ l - that we re e x tr e !7' t' i. ·1 cc:;; t '._ y 1:. u 
I-·z:i.'.•vJ.dt:.:-, and µx:-iced these at well bi!low mar~1J..nal c ost.. 7\:_ t.;•e 
sar;;c~ ti;-i1e, tra11sit labor was able t o :..;ectue vJ ugc g ai n s ·~'nabl in ·~1 
the1n to keep pJ.cc with worker-sin otn~ r .\ocal g •.)Ve ."r"nment s~c.:t.ocs 
during a very inflationary period, as well as limit rnanag0ment ' s 
a b i l i t y t o m a k e w o r k. r u l ~ c Ii a n g e s th a t w o Li l d so f t e n t h e 
consequences of the continuing concentration of patronage in ~ne 
peaks. Since ~he new !;.erv.i.ces often c.:lrri.ed r.elut.ively lit;1ht. 
l oads, the consequences were c:i drama tic dee line in p.rod uc t.l vi ty 
and escalating financial difficulties. The crisis w~s political 
.:J. S '''ell. as financial. outlying business center coa l itions 
increasingly saw needs for locally-responsive tran.sport g oilly 
u nmet while the downtown alliance program absorbed evermore 
5!.IbSidy. 
Public sector trRnsit crisis h~s generated rno··1 €:;;,ents to 
restructure, rationaiize ar.d privatize bnt..h industri:il anrl 
i ristitutiona1 ar-rangements. 7hese. efforts are the innovat ui:s o f 
the current period. •rab! e 2 provides a "::iummary, 
Perioa 11: 
Metropolitan 
St:ruct.ure 
Rationaliza-
tion 
Privatization 
Iristitut.ional 
Changes 
Table 2 
RESPONSES TO PUBLIC SECTOR FISCAL CRISrs 
CBD DOMINANT 
Substitute 
capital for 
labor: wag.: 
discipline and 
work rule 
chan<1es; some 
load sheddJ.nlj 
Pt"ivotely oper-
ated downtown/ 
radial express 
buses; some 
contracting 
out; som<~ ern-
ployer-ba sed 
ridesharing 
COMP.f.TI'T'I\18 
Sarne as CHD-
Domi nan t "'ith 
more loud 
shedding; sub-
urban trans i t 
centers and 
yrid systems 
Muc h contracting 
out by loca l gov-
ernments; ext.en-
sive subscription 
bus service and 
private express 
buses; muL.:h ero-
ployer-based 
ride sharing 
Regional tax 
base sharing : 
activist employ-
er-based tr-i n s-
porta tion man-
agement associ-
at.ions; broker:/ 
facilitator at. 
metropolitan 
level: nuinerous 
public agencies 
lvithi11 rnetr0-
pol i tan area 
cno h'.SAK 
Efficiency-or i-
e n ted fa. :.-e J?Ol i-
c i es J s~all vehi-
c l e, <lem;1nd-
r~sponsivc 
syst~ins 
Com: rac t.eu-ou t. 
s mall vei\icl~ 
syst ems 
Broker/fac1lit0 -
tor at me t ropo ll -
t au level; s u b-
LI rban-d<)mi na t erJ 
pu hl i c aq '~ ncy 
P r i v a t i z a t i o n a n d i n s t i t. u t i o n a :_ !? r e s s u r e s t o w a r d 
fragmentation are concentrated i.n those metropol.i_t.an areas 
char.:~ cter ized by .lntense compet.i tion be tween a l ea.ding downtowu 
alliance and growing out.lying business centers. In terms of 
institutional change, the leading innov3tion is a form of 
regional tax base sharing, in which a portion of tax r,\ oni.::s 
formerly allocated t.o a regional transit agency is divid ed a mor;g 
metropolitan are<:i local governments. The loc;_.. ls may S tJl:nd t..h e i. !" 
transit dollars as th~y see fit... The inno1.·ations c i:1arc1 (·tcristic 
of Cl30 doll'.inant areas give way to: tr-ans1t services dt•1 il 0 y c d ; ,y 
lV 
numerous outly1ng business centers ~ach ri0signed to promote 
locally-oriented development; and .t.nstitutional structur»~ ~'3 
des.l.yned to reflect local growth concerns. ?rivat i.zati.011 occ r.s 
primarily in outlying business centers, in the abs ence of pub l 1c 
sector transit s~rvice. 
As population and employment continue to d8centr <l lize, 
creating an increasingly pluralistic, competitive metropolica n 
landsca,?e, privatization and fragmentatlO!'i become attract,iv e 
strategies for legi.sla't.ive bo<lit:s at.t emp ting to r e solve f i. sc l. 
and political c:r is es, Pr iva t. i z.at ion, fac i lit.a ted by appropriate 
instit.utional structures, a1Jpears to be a relat.tvely ch e a p , 
efficient way of containing competing claims. Whether a once-
dominant CBD now confronts numerous compet1ng places, or ;1 weak 
<: !-j D s t a g e s a co me b a c k , £ u tu r e d y n a in i c s w i. 11 r '~ f le c t:. t h e f u l l 
political and economic maturation of outlying off ice-commer cial 
centers. 
DisaggregaLed institutional structur~s will dramat 1cally 
increase the already extreme pressures bearin g on organ1 z8d 
t r: a n s i t l ab or . •p he n e w 1 y e m pow e red o u t 1 y i n g c en t e r co .:i l :_ t i o n s 
will strongly resist the commitments and protec~ions, as well as 
the work rules secured by transit labor when the industry becaDe 
public. Disaggregation will also greatly complicate the p rocess 
of allianee formation so crucial for t.he constructi on and 
maintenance of regional scale facilit.ies and services. 
case studl.es illuminating the dyna;~£ics 0£ 
institutional innovation within each uf the various 
contexts are presented and unalyzed. 
v 
s~rv1cQ a nd 
r.<e trope I 1 c:. ~n 
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6.3 
I N1' RODUC'rIOtJ 
Urban transit is tlie majo:c United States e x ample of ~! o nce 
private industry that fail.eel and was take11 ove r L>y the t >u o l ic 
sccto:r. Therefore, the 1ecent re-emerqence of the p r ivate s e c t. or 
i n u r bc.n trClnsit, as w~ll as private sector-l ike b211avio r~ n : U! e 
p u bl i c sector, raises a number of interesting th,eore t i ca. l <'.1 1.d 
h i storical issuas und poses a related set of i mpor t an t po l i cy 
qu2stions. '!'he kinds of activities emerging i n clu ;_,P- : ( l) tr1 ~ 
g row th o f private l y - ow r• e d a n ct op c r a t e d b Ll s s c:? c v J c e , p r i rn a r i 1 y 
commuter express service: (2) contracting out 1p rovis i t;n o f 
t.ran:>i'..:-related servi.ces to private firms, both by p ~i bli c t. ra ns1 t 
agencies and by local governments; and (3) in t ~nse ma na g er .i..al 
c oncern with e£ficiency-e n i1 a·ncinc3 act1o r1s. 1' 1H~ specif..Lc 
t heoretical and histurical questions addressed a r e : t~11y ur e 
these a•.:tiv .1 t i es emerging when ~J nd where they a·ce , arl d 'v1 .1.1 ar e 
t h e y t a king the forms they are? What ar-ec t "h e .lr1st i t 1.1 tio'."lcil 
s tr u c t r e s that facil.1.tat.e and hinder the re- e1-:-1 e n.Jen c e ? 1·.1 ho r. 
1 r1s t t ut i onal changes are 1 ikely to ta.J.~<? pldce? 'I'hese quest 1. <..ms 
a r.e err bedcled in a set of mor e 9coeral concer n s: (l ) the r.atut'e 
o f pol.icyrnnking in a public sector indust r y; a no ( 2 ) the 
r e lationsh i p of investment irr urban t:-ansport to t n e proc ~> G s o f 
met ropolitan development. 
T l1 J. s report develops a conceptual model th a t he l p g t.o 
ex p lain the recent history of transit policy and outlines li ~uly 
pat hs of t.ransit. servic.:e a:ld instit1Jtion.al ln1)ovation. Th~ 11:od.::l 
ha s t. hr e e comp on e n ts : ( l } t ·he po 1 .i -.:. ii: a l and econ o m · c r o L e s o f 
urban transport fac i l i c ies in the land develc-p1!H:nt process i ( 2) 
t e m:1ture of the pol i t ical process through which transit b e came 
a j'.)11b l ic se.::tor act i v i ty; and (3) t;:.he: pol.it.ics of an in du s t r. y 
whose prospects are the joint product of hational, sta ~e a nd 
loca l governnen t. a '(: l. i ,cms. -Zach c;>f thr:: ~e model - t e me n t s w i ll be 
x p lained: their individual an collective implicat i o n s for 
u d erst.anding re·cent pol icy .history a11d lik.el y fut u re s e rv i c e and 
institutional changes will the n be discussed. 
'fRA\ 'SPORT Fl\CILI'I'lt:S AND D£VE:LOf' t-'1EN'T' STl?NrGGIES 
The basic featur e of the metropo lican Jevelopn1ent proc ess i n 
th~ United Stat(n:i l:::. competition. to maint.a in and attract c p i t al 
i nvest.ment. Competitive pressures operate both betwe e n Rnd 
wi thi n 1netropolit a.n <=1r~as. Place-based coal1tions of in<.1ust ry, 
p olitical .:.r:<l technical activists .form to defend and a 1d vanc.:e 
t he ir ten:.L~orial interests. These coaliti.ons are pa.rt.i.c u larl.y 
c once rned with transport supply for two reaso~s: (l) t r an s ~ort 
f a c J.lities inevitably create location ()dva.ntage s for sorn ~~ t=i l ac~s 
and r el at.ive!y disauvantage others; cj: 1C1 (2) transrort. £a cil. i t:."i»~: 
arpear ;:.o offer greater leverag~ over t..he loca t i on d e ci s ions o L 
investors t.han other politically feasible int.erventiong . 
C <J 1;; p !:.:? t it i On be t w c l.! n j- lac~ ,c; 
1..' 0'l l i l.1 n11 ::; t t> th i.nk .::i h uu L •. I l 
.l 
- spa.ti a l comp ti ... Lor1 
;.i s p e c L s e> r L r u o !': p t > 1:- L 
- C fl LI :'e :; 
Si i l{ ) y , 
i n c l u d i n g t e c h n o l o g y , f a c i l i. t y 1 o ca t i o n , d e s 1 g n , f i n a n c i n l) c.1 : 1 cJ 
control, in s t.ra te9 ic terms. Coalitions, the re fore, s r~ t:k t:u 
deµloy specific kinds of transport investments in order to gatn 
location advanta9es. The core element in locational adva1·1t u;;1 ~ 1..5 
increasing reception capacity. which is a volumE'! notion - the 
total number of workersjconsum~rs and tl~eir vehicles th .:•t can 
reach and occupy a place - rather than a [low notion, speediny 
people and vehicles past a point. Focusing on reception capaci~y 
provid~s a different way of understanding efforts to deal wi c h 
congest.ion, as well as a different slant on the funduinentC1l 
issues of transport politics. 
Since place advantage i..s the key OOJective, facility 
location and related choices - rather than conflicts between 
modes of transport - are the most fundamental dimensions of 
1n~tropolitan transport politics. Location decisions are 
con·;;.ested when onl.y one t.runsport mode is involv~d. •°'l .S well as 
when a number of modes are possible. Place-based coaljtior.s are 
embrolled in location controversies regardless of t h e shifting 
politics of external effects, such as residc!1tia1 displacement, 
a1~ pollution and energy consumption. 
Indeed, spatial competition and the. result.in~ st.rategi.c 
nature of tr: ans port investment unites the poli t.ical history of 
nineteenth centucy canal and rai 1 road bu1ldin ~~ with the 
contemporary hisc.ory of multi-billion dollar rail r~p.ld transit 
systems. The efforts of Baltimore, Philadelphia and Boston in 
response to the location advantage gained by New Yt=>rk wit.11 the 
construction of the Erie Canal were ~choed by Chicago, St. LOUl.S 
and Cincinnati as they competed for posit.ion in relation t.u 
westward expansion.l Th~ protracted stalemate in Con9r~ss 
regarding the location of the Eirst transcont.I.nental rai)_roacJ, 2 
and the protracted stalemate rJur-ing the early history of the 13i\l<.'I' 
project. and through dccaues of rail transit polit.Lcs i11 Los 
Angeles are under-standable in µrecisely tl1e same terms.3 
One alliance, composed of two sets of coalition partners, 
h a s h i s t . o r i c a l l y be e n c e n t r a l i n th e a e v e l op m en t o f u r ba n 
transit.: central business distr1c~ (C3D) groups <lnd those 
involved in suburban residential development. In the early days 
of transit build.in<J, through the micl-l920s, facility supply onct 
land development were often integr.at.ed in the same privat~ [trm, 
or set of fir~s. 4 When extraordinary capital investment was 
required in order to open up new territories for developmenc, 
including tunneling underground or through r.tOUfltains, thnn 
various metl,ods of government intervention and finance were 
employed.5 The i_ntegrated transit/real estate firms were 
primarily interested in the land development portion of the 
business, which 91:2ne rated t.he profits. The downtown coal i ·t ions 
sought the simul t.aneous areal expansion of the.il:" hinter land:s and 
L11e increase ln crm reception capacity cr~at.ed uy transit 
investment. 
This alliance led the transit. building movement throu~?,hout 
the early period, when spaUal competition WO.$ rn<'lrufest pt::irn<Hily 
2 
..i.n inter-, ro.ther than :in;:ra-rnetropolitan form. Tht.: move111c11l'$ 
r:1 a .L n l e g a c y w a s a r a i l t r a n s i t r o u t e n et w o r k t h ci t w a s L .J r g e l y 
downtown-radial tn structure. The metropoLitati l a ndscape be<:; an 
to dramatically alter l n t.he post. World War Ono era, however ., a s 
motor vehicle-based suburbanization produc e d outcroppir.gs ot 
in t. ra-metropol it.an spatial competition as well. The Depress i on 
and World Ivar Two slowed the decentralizing forc e E3 . f«:::>w 1~v et·, .in 
Lhe later 1940s the lorge CBDs of the northeast~ midwest a nd west 
increc.singl y experienced the full forces of s u burbarl pop•Jla t i o n 
growth and competitive office-commercial development. 
The postwar suburban boom plunged CBD coalitions in to 
cris i s. They responded with extensive transport inve s tme n t 
pro gra ms in order to maintain downtov1n's historic Jo s i.ti ori . 
Thes e investment programs were variations on one bas i c cheme: 
the need £or transpor~ facilities that would e nable peop l e and 
ve h J.cles to speedily tr-averse long distances, wh i le inc r eas i n•J 
down town reception capacity. 
During t.he ~orlier wave of suburbanizatloo J.n the l ~) 2 lJ 's, 
c i t y and county governments had undertaken extensive r-o <·~t~ 
bu il.ding programs that were locdl property-·serving in d2 s ign. 
'I'nese w~re widely pecceived as functionally obsolete in re:. a t ion 
t o the new need fo ·r long distance, through tr av e 1 . . 6 Wi th t h i: 
e xc e ption of the few cities that had subways a n d/or elev a t - d 
l ines, the street.-runninc:i railway systems ~hat. were t.he domina n t 
u r b an t !:"an s i t mo a e e x p e r i e n c e d l e n gt It en in g t. rave l t. i .n: c s , 
e s p ecial l y for longer distance t.rips. Transit.. t ravel was 
i n c reasingly slowed by street traffic congestion in and around 
downtown as well 3S by intersecting traff i.c in outlying a r eas . 
. pocalyptic cries of ''strangulation" were ra i.sed throughou t. the 
a nd. 7 
Postwar transport investment programs va·r ied accord · n g to 
t ' e nature of the relationsh1p be~weon a CBD and its ou lyinq 
c om p eti to.rs. There were three basic types: ( 1) CBD domina 11 t ~ 
( 2 ) CBD first amOn<:J u. number of relatively autonomous, develo pe d 
b u s iness c enters~ and (3) CBD seriously declining relative t o 
i t s out l ying competitot·s. A. dorrtinant CGD maint a ined a near 
mv nopoly in some spheres of activity, typically o f (ice-based 
f i n anc.tal, administrative and related concerns , but faced 
i ncr:eusing competition Erom smaller business c en t. e r s 1, n the 
c c rnmercial sphere . A sub$et of this cat.e<3ory is t.h e. I orld Ci t y 
phenomenon, where COD activities are cl~sely integrated with 
g lobal economic trends, .Lar9ely based in multinational corpor-a t e 
h ead yuarters, finance, and related business service funct :ion ~;. 8 
The compet i tion between business centers is more ad v anced i n th~ 
second ca t e9ory t han in the first, althouLh the CBD continues to 
attract a stable share uf investment in ic~ historic lines of 
activity. In the finul cateqory the Cl3D is losin•J market sh .::i r0 
.l. h i t.s historic sphe-res; or, it was in:i. t ia l ly sn1.u.11 at th<! ou t set 
of the suburban boom ner~od~ 
'rhe size and r.1odal cornpos~tion of transport. 1r: ves ;:.r;1ent 
p r og rams '-' <.1r.1ed accorcli.nq to met'C~·> po litan context, C!'.ri rJundnant s 
J 
hat..: larger scale, more varied, and more expensive proposals, 
while the other two categories had correspondi ngly mor-e 
r e s t ;:- i ct e d a n d mo r e r e s t r a i n e d a g e n d a s . I? r o m t b <.! do w n t o \" t 1 
cnalition point of view, however, the spa.tia1 config ur .,:i t i on o f 
transport investment. was the same in all cases: a conti n u at ion 
and extension of existing downtown/radial net.wor-ks. J\t d.i u; ~~r-en t 
points in time ttiey all faced the same constraint: t h e 
privately owned t.ransit companies then in existence were 
financially u11able to play their necessary role in the inve stmert t 
program. 
From the m ld-19 20 's until the second \</or ld \var transit 
companies experienced protracted financial difficulties, wit :1 
many pru9erties being thrown into receivership. As was typica l 
of railroad ~nterprises, transit firms responded t.o fisca l 
distress by deferring maintenance on rolling stock and rail 
rights-of-way, and by deferring i nvestment in new equiprr e n t. 
Federal legislation requiring public utilities to divest elect ic 
.street railway companies during \:..ht~ miu-1930 1 s also depn v;.~d inany 
f i r ms of access to traditional sources of i nvestment capital . On 
t h e eve of the war street railway syste ms were i n v~ ~Y poo r 
phys1cal shape. Pa-cronage soared durin g the wa r , 21. nd the 
industry was able to accumulate some cash. However, wa~t i me 
prioriti.es regarding materials and skil led lauor prt:.'V ent.ecl 
exp-endit.ures aimed at iinprovi.ng operating conditions. Th e 
patronage surge, therefore. exac.erba tea the process of p \1ys i c i1 l 
deterioration. At. war's end transit systems across the c oun t r y 
were physically devastated, and fac::ed enorrr1ous oi.lt l t'l'}' ~ for 
rehabilitation. Moreover, the indust ry 1 s financial out look was 
pessimistic in the extreme. Transit f inns forecast a re t.orn t0 
pre-war pa~ronage levels as the economy reconverted to p e 8 cet i me 
production.9 
The private companies were p articularly unable :.o provide 
precisely that kind of transit service CBD coalitions n1ost w n Led 
to see: peak pe ri.o<l rapid transit or express service f rom t:hose 
rap1dly growing outlying areas to downtown. This kind of servict? 
was the one see:11 as crucial to the obilit.y o f do w ntown t0 meet. 
tl1e cornpet.ition of suburban business centers. 'i'hi ~:; was also an 
extremely costly service to provide. The inabil i ty of transit 
companies to play their historically progressive role in the CUD-
Driented metropolitdn development process galvanized muv ements to 
create region-wide public institutions to replace t hem. 
Those suburban jurisdictions in which residential 
development conc:erns predominated joined "the downtown- l ed 
mov~ments. In these cases an updated version of the his~orLc 
transit-building al U . .:lnce was reconstituted. Howeve r , c o mpet i ng 
outlying office-commercial centers had a .fLlndamentally dif f e ren t 
?erspective on the nature of t.he necessary transport inves t ment 
package. Seeking to advance tileir own development aspirations, 
outlying business centers sought transport facilities that would 
connect ther.l with areas they saw as rightfully their own 
.tesident.iu.l hint.erlahds. Downtown/rad i uls were an;) t L e n il, 
concretely symbolizing t.he i r.i perial. bond s from which su b ur ba n 
lH>::;Lness centers .;uught l i bl?rati.cn. 
THE NATUHE OF THE GOV!::~RHMEl\''I'ALI'ZA.TION PROCt:SS 
covernmentalizati.on is on ziw}<wa.rd term, !Jowev~r. Lt 
c x p r- e s s e s th e co m pl e x r ea 1 i t y o f t h e .Pub l i c s e ct o r t r c:i n o i t 
industry in a. way that municipalization or. nationalization uo 
not. Loe al gov er nm en ts of various k i ncls own an,rj operate tr .ans it 
agencies. Many state governments provide signi:f ica:nt. o.m0unt..s of 
ope rati:-ig funds, as well as some furids for cap 1t.al inv estm en t. 
T r e national government is the primary source of mont:?y £o r-
cap.i.tal investment, and also subsidizes opera.tions. All levels 
o f government ace involved in service, i1·1:>titutional and labor 
r ela tions questions. Complexity rcflet:cs bo t h the h.i..s t or 1~ c.i .;11.:i 
p ol it ics of individual metropolitan areas an.d the nacur0 nf the 
u.~J . systelll of fede::~1l lsr.1, 
The-ce were three bas.i.c types of 9overnm<.?nta liz ation 
processes, correspondiny t.o the three k1-nds. oE metrOp' l:i:_t an 
:s.t. r.l!ctures outlined above. Each type hus two dimensio n s : (a) the 
s trengtr, of the cno alliance in celation to lts cor,1pe~i t o r s: .:i,r, J 
(b ) t h e number and kind of ideologies of desirable metropo l1 t un 
fo r.r.i. '::'hese dimensions combine to prod u· c -2 particular sort. s of 
g ver nrnent.al transit agencies. ( l) t'\n act i vist, domi nant C13D -
l f! ci d l l i a n c e a d v o ca t e s .:i n d n1 b i t i o us do.,., n tu w n / r ;:id i a l t .i: a n s i L 
dev e lopment pcogcarn. The alliance asst=rts t he nat.ural ness a. nil 
supel'.iority of o functi.onally speciralized, int 1t.rdcp~n l t::Ot. 
11 1 ~ t ropoli tan area f ocu sec:J on a high density central c cr t: . ...1'he 
result is a relatively au~onornous and powerful transit a ency. 
n t ra-metropolitan compe~it.ion is sufficiently st.rong , t Jt u gh , to 
1 i mi t the reg ion al extent 0£ the new govern men ta 1 power. ( 2 ) /\.. 
1-=ading CBO. wi.th an investment. program sl.m1lar to thn t 'J.n (1), 
con fronts a number of established competitors. Intense political 
con flict ensues. 'I'her;-e are compet.ing ideologif~s of desir-abl~ 
J e tropolitan form. The notions of hierarchy arid intt.~n:.lep•:... denc2 
.arC' countered with the virtues of ll multi-centeccd, more s e l f -
c on ta .i n e d pa t t e r n of g r u w th . Govern rn e 11 ta l t r an s l t. a g enc i c= s 
r es ult that are far more constru.ined than those i n (l) in their 
ab ility to implement the downtown al.liance'c; pro(Jt'E~F'.1. H! (.3) h 
W€ak CJ3. l) al liaince, in un ar~a where the ornni n<-rnt lc..1eolo9y 1i. S noo-
cen tra lity, produces a weak gov~rnruental agency limi ted to a 
i nima l, central c1ty-based program of what is basic.:l'll.y a 8 oc l..a l 
we l fa r e service. Alternatively, a suburban-led movement pr-educes 
a strong, efficiency-oriented ag~ncy that. incot·porat~s the 
central city, yet is focused on outlying area concerl)s. 
In addition t.o the relationship of governme:ntal.1.zction 
proce s.ses to metropolitan structures, t.here are three other 
important aspects to the cre(.lt.iun of new l)ubl ic St:lct..or c<JPncies: 
()) the role uf orga11ized labor; (2) the rt-1':1.t1onsilip between 
t h e .new l?ubl i c age 11ci es and f>.t: i va te ca pi ta .l market u1 st 'Lt •J.t ions; 
and (3) relations bctwec:n locally-1.:ieneratcd a0encie!5 u.nd state 
·".i n d national governi1;ent..c1l authorl.tics. 
Thece were two main ways J..l'l which governmental t:r;ansit 
agencies were legally created: a vote of the citizenry in the 
local area or through an act of the state legislut u r c direcLiy 
~stablishing the agency. Even in the first c s e, state 
legislative action was necessary in the form of an e nabling act. 
The very fact of legislative and/or electoral action enhanc Ad the 
political power of organized transit labor, in the same 1•h1y that 
the growth of state and local governments throughout the ptjstw.ir 
period enhancc<l the position of pu.bl l.c sector unions generally. 
While a private business, transit was regulated by state ar.d /ur 
lac.al public utility bodies, 111hich provided a forum in ·which 
labor interests could be expressed. liowev~r, because these 
rt:gulat.ory bodies \vere generally insulated fror:i electoral 
politics, and primarily concerned with r:'laintainl.ng the fi :i.Jncial 
viability of the regulated firms, organized lcibor influence was 
rnut.ed. Once the governmentalizatiori process .....,as underw~y, 
however, downtown coalitions and their state 1egisla~ive 
representatives had to come to terms with a labor 1:"1ovement that 
was often quite active and influential at the local electordl 
level. various ~rot.ections tor transit labor werr::, therefore, 
written into law.li 
A related issue concerning electoral deJnocracy involved Li i ·.: 
choice of governmental forrr1 and associ;.1t,2d transit ir 1 vc ~;::1lH· u L 
f:!_nance mechanisws. Transit movement activists prefc't"re d al\ 
inst.i t.ution that would be able to issue revenue bonds tu f innnc'~ 
canst.ruction and acquisition without. h<'lving to have c)ec:.: o raJ 
approval. This was typically an authot· ity. Mor eover, tl 1is forn 
wu_s thought t.o facilitate a "business" a p preach to tr.anG i. l 
sut)ply, rath~r than a "political" one, in whic11 q overnrnent would 
be overly responsive to labor .:111<1 cons1.u,1er d1~mand s, c:s well a:.; to 
demands r:iade by co1':1peting pluce-co alitions. Financial reill.iti·~s, 
however, usually dictated the cho i c o f ~ nothec type, typicall.y a 
district, because revenue bon<l f i1v1nci HJ woulJ not be sufficient 
to implement an ambitious inve s t me nt progra m. The µrivate 
capital market would generally no longer accept transit 
construction bonds back~Ll solely by farebox receipts because 
oper.atin<J revenu.:s would not likely covec ca p ital as well as 
operuLi119 co5t.s. Tax subsl.dies wo11ld, tr.erefor-c, be required. 
This Deant that a £orm of government that could sell. tax-
supported general obligation bonds was required. ':' hi.s type, 
tnougn. had to seek electo!'.'al approval to issu~ bonds, \,,ih i~ h 
further sensitized gover11mencalizing coalitions to electo ral 
con s iderations.12 
Government~lization produced agencies with ~reater oc £awer 
fina i: cial possibili.ti~s. Securing funds to finance investment 
pro jects, even with g0vernment guarantees, became increasin91y 
difficult, however. The Ray Area Rapid Transit project, approve<l 
by the electorate in 1062, was the first and last r.1ajor postwur 
new construction project primarily financed through the sale of 
bonds on the private capital m~rket. As the transit industry 
continued to decline through the 1CJ40s, 1950s and 1960s, private 
capital sources wer-e unwil l in9 to invest. Moreover, during tld s 
sa r;1e pt::::-.iod, most state gov~rnment.s w\-:re l.JU\Yil li n g to c u m •111 t 
stata reaources to metropolitan are.a transit projects. staLe 
l eg1slatu::es would enable creai:.ion of m~tro pwlitan tr an s1t 
u. g 2 n c l e s i f lo c a l a l l i a n c es e rn t:? r- q .; d to .r;; u Jl po r t 
government.alization. !Wwever, these same l e0islatures 1 in wl i ch 
r ef) resentatives of agricultu1·<ll and suburban cireas v..i ~r e 
poli tically dominant, we:re quite reluctant tu financ e C P.D -
or2 ented transit µroject.s. Indeed, their reluctanc e was 
re 1J1 .t.: Orced by t.he preseace of locutional cofl f lict eit the .Loc,)l 
le vel. Higher-level legislatures, themselves 1.ar·-:iely compused of 
lo ca l coalition repres.e.ntatives, were extremely )_oathe tu 
:::-esolve local level controversies. Higher-level b ou i es mu.ch 
p referred the locals to resolve their differe nc s or that an 
a 1 1 i ;i n c € e m e r g e t r i u m p h a n t b e f o re b e i n g a p p i:-- o a c h '=:: ci . •r h e 
critically important point. to note i.s that st.ate legisl at ive 
a ct ions r:e spec ted 1.oca l autonomy, ref l ;~c ti n•3 and e rn Qody UHJ 
h)cal. level con:fllcts, rather than transforwln9 them in swell u 
way as to reshape the contours of the local po li t cal land s cape. 
Th e national government emerges .:is lhe rnuin source of tr ansit 
inv estment. funds, b e cJinning in the 1960s, bccuuse p ri vate (_a p i al 
t)a s v i rt·..1ally <le .se rt.ed the indust1~y, and bt.~·:<lus e of th e poli t i<.::al 
o b s tac les dowotown .:i 11 iances confronted in s ta tE: cat-Ji to l s. 
The following set of case studies illuruinat~ var1ous a s p ~t 9 
o f gove r nmentalization and regionalization J.n d·.tff <.:!re nt: 
met ro po l i tan contexts. The first of this set ~naly:.:: '2s t.he 
cr e at ion of three of the earliest ni.etropolitd.n ~ scalc g o v e cn me n t.:11 
trc:insit institutions in the post ~~·o('ld War Twu f.>G r l. ot~: t he 
:-\.Jameda-Contra Costa Transit Distcict (ACTD) and the f:H:iy Acea 
Rapid Transit IJistrict (BARTO) in the Sun ~ronc1sco Bay Area; and 
the Los Angeles Metropolitan Tr~nsit Authority (LANTA). 
/\s the California economy boomed during and aft.er the w.:i.r, 
a nd motor vehicle traffic soar-ed 1 the Oakiand, St:In J?ranci- c o a cl 
Lo s Angeles centrcil business d.i.stricts con fronted t.he ful l force 
o f automobile-led su,burban development. Downtown coalition s in 
c<Jch of these cities seized t;le initi<ttive to crc '-'l te lin/(a9 i:. s 
b e;tW8(~ 1> the COD and mushroomintd resident ia 1 zones, d!j wel 1 a s t 
me t t.l1c compet.iLjve challenge of outl..yirig area of fi cc-c.xira n: ..-.;rcic:il 
gr ow h. 
·r h e p c o c e s s e s a n d o u t c o m e s d i f f e .c e d . T he n a y l\ 'C e <J 
.illu1strat.es the dynar:iics .i..n a CBD-dorninant metropoli ta n c:untr?xt. 
tn the e~i:l y post.,,Jar years the San. Francisco CBD - "\'/ a ll Street. 
of the \'i•:::st" - clearly maintained i.ts histo:ric posit.ion in th e 
r egional political economy and aspired to \vorld clt.y status. Tlie 
do wntown Oakland coalition, aware of its subordin~te position in 
r:e~ i onal teri:·1s, nevertheless sough t to µrot.ect .Jnd adva nce it s 
l eadi ng office-coinmercial position i n the E:ast L!ay sub-r e giona l 
s 1,her ~. 'l'he case study ·nigh L~ g ht s the cor.ipet _i_ ti on bet ·~ ee n ;_; .:in 
l" r a n c i s co a n d O a k l a n d C B D co a l i t i o n s , a nu t 1~ i m pa c t o : t I Li s 
competi. t.ion on the governrnentalizatl.on process. }, key puint is 
the capacity of each compecitor to protect its :in te rests ci- th ~ 
s t <Cl t e l e v e l . rr h C;! c a 1 i £ u t' fl l a l e ':::l i !;.l ,'l t u r e w d s LJ n \v' : 1 l i I! g t 0 
intervene in such a way ~s to determine ~he o u lc o~e . 
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The re fOl..'e, the Bay Area r..api d 'l'ra n sit p:co j ~ct, 11n ti.a 11 y ;.:>ro!":iu te<.i 
hy <:he San Francisco CilD coalition, was stalemated until an 
alliance between the San t'rancisco and Oakland could be 
constructed. Facility design plans thr.it allowed the all..i<:ince 
partners to jointly pur:-sue their ambi !:ions wet·e. the basis for 
this alliance. 
During the time it took to concretize the San Francisco -
Oal<lc1n<l .:\lliance, however, o number of out.tying office-comme rcial. 
centers hau taken root and flourished, Thes~ outlying centers 
were promoted by co a 1 i t. ions w i th auto no rn o us ::level.op r1i c n t 
aspirations. The permissive state legislative context allowed 
these coalitions to withdraw from cnn-led regional pro jects, 
eventually producing governmental trar1sit agencies - J\C:TD in ti1e 
East Bay and 13AR'rD - that. were not as areal Ly exti::nsive as WdS 
soug~1t by the downtown coalitions. 
A co1npL.lrison of t1H:~~t:: two ag~nci.es refl~ct.s tne relcxtive 
political strength of their leading supporters. i~i'\R'\"'C was created 
b _{ a n a c t o f th t! st a t. e l e g i s l a t u t" e , w it h a 8 oar d o f Di r e c tor s 
uppointed by local officials. Uy way of contrast, ACTD was 
c r e a t e d b y ;-~ v o t e o f th e p e op 1 e , w i t h a n e l e c t e d 13 o a r J o f 
Directors. 'r'hese differences illustrate the moz:e controversial 
na t u ·e of the lJARTD project, and the greatet· politi.Cul weight and 
s e 1 f - con f i d e n c e o f th e cl o w n to \!J :i O a }.: l a n d l ea n e r sh i__ l, i n i t s s u b-
r es ion al sphere. In addition, ACTD possessed greater financiol 
power ana fle-,:ibility and more au.tonorny w.i.thin its jurisdiction 
than ilid BARTO. The µosit.ion of organized 1:.ransit lnbor in t'ne 
governme11tali7..:!tion process was st.rengthenecl as a result. of tha 
loc~l electo.ral dimension of govecnmentaliza.tion. Acr 1_i'::; 
e n u b 1 i n g l e g .l s l a t i o n c on t u i n e d s e v e r a l p i o n f'. e : i n g J_ a Li o r 
p co v i s :i. on s , s .. ~ c u r i. 11 g t r a n s J. t w <..:> r k er s up po r t f o r t -;1 e 
governmentalizin~ coalition. 
The Los Angeles are.:.i ill ust.ra tes the dy:nam ics of an in:: ensc l y 
comr eti tive metropolitan area, the first. such in the United 
States. l~n L./\.. CBD - initiated ru.pid transit inve~:>t::H~nt program 
similar ~o that developed by its San Francisco count~rpar~ was 
vehemently opposed by the numerous outlying business cent.e cs 
al.reuJ.y ~xisting in t.he region. J\lliance possibili.tics were 
lir.u.ted by the t~chnical. desiyn aspects of t.hc downtown coalition 
plan, Moreover, given tha.t the many competing places we!'."C 
d i s tr i but e d th r o u g ho u t the C i t y as w e 11 as in Los ;\ n LJ ~ le s 
Cuurity, the disaggresiation that produced powerful, though ar~c.lly 
1 j rn it ea yo v er nm en ta l tr a n s i t age t1 c i es in the Bay Are a w i:1 s n ' t 
possible. LAMTA was created .by the state legislature, with a 
noard of Di rectors appointed by the gov er nor. Thi~ t: c f J.ec ted a 
more controversial birth than the µrecess thnt led to an 
appointed BART)) Board of Directors. r.;patial cor:ipetit.1on in the 
Los Angeles area produced protracted stala1oat.e on the :cail rapl<i 
transit quest iori that persisted for a genera t.:i...ori. 
The Politics of Rail Rapid Transit Plann£ng in the Los Angeles 
and San Francisco~ropolitan Areas, 1945-1957 
In 1954 Ralph Herritt, general manager of the r.os 7\tHJE:les 
Metropolitan Trans1-t. .1\uthority (LAt!TA), told a Califorr;~a state 
leqislative cor.1mittee: "Every wetropolita:1 area in t..he c_:._vilized 
world has some form of surface-free mass rapid transit ex~ept Los 
Angel es and San Francisco." 13 In order to remedy th is de [ic iency 
well-organized movements calling foe extensive, publj_cly-£inancc~.J 
rail rapid transit systems developed in both metropolitan areas, 
emerging first in Los Angeles in the months followiny the end uf 
the war . The s e mo v em en t s w ere composed of and led b '/ th e s a me 
kinds 0£ _people, representing similar interests in and theociGos 
of the relationship between the supply of tt""a.nsport f .aci i 1 ti c s 
and the pattern of metropolitan development. The sirnilcrit.J.es 
went beyond movement theory and practice, though; the nat c. c e of 
the conflicts t.hey generated, and the. OpJ?oSit.ion thQy fac -r"d Nere 
also essentially the sarne. By 1954, howev<Jr, while t h e Sa r, 
.Francisco Oay Area was ap;:iarently on the express track to worl d-
c 1a ss stat us, rolling toward joining Ne\.; York, London, f'a r is and 
,\1osc0w, the Los Angeles rapid transit. movement was on a. sp wr 
line, chugging toward oblivion. It is necessary to say 
" a p µa r e n t l y '' b e c a u s e t h e s a m e co n f l i c t s th a t de r .:i i l e cl t h e Los 
A;1~_:eLes effort later produced a severly truncat>~d 13/\RT syster.i, 
when compared wit\1 the original proposal. Inde~d, tbe Ha.y J\r:ea 
movenient. nearly went the L.A. route. 
Rail Rapid Transit in the LOs l\r:igeles Area 
'I' h e Lo !5 l\ n g e 1 e s :a t c r y h a s t h r e e rt1 a j o r , r e l ,,,_ t. i:c 0. 
dimensions: (1) construction oft.he metropolitan area ix-ee,.,·ay 
!let.work which, durin<J the early period, consist.ed p:::J.1i1arily uf 
cJ ow n town L . A. rad i a l r o u t e s ; ( 2 ) the t cans for 1 :1 d. t i on o f the 
1:·..=-.ci f.ic Glee tr ic f\a L 1 way Company (PE), the world-renowned gia..nt 
of the .interurban electric railway industry, from a fJTeU.o;,,)ri.crntty 
rail syst-ern to a mostly bus oper0tion: and (3) the rlse and 
decl.i ne of U1e L.A. rail rapid tr-ans it movement. 
oownt.own Los l\ngeles business and property 0roups, 
representing primarily Leading b~nks and associated bu31ness 
se.rv ices, and larg~ retail firms, ·organized thernse l. ves in to the 
Central Business District Association, the Downtown Busin~~s 
Men's Association and the L.A. Chambec of Commerce. These groups 
had historically sponsored a number of rail rapid transit studies 
an<l proposals, including efforts. in the mi.d-1920'~, the e=Jrly 
1930's, and a study/proposal presented in 1939. All of these had 
i n co m m on e x t e n s i v e r a i 1 r a p i d. tr a n s .-L t s y s t em ~_; i n a (J ow n t o w n -
radial configuration. (!owever, the 1939 pror>osal added a new 
twis~. This report of the Transit Engineerin~ Uoard relled 
heavily on technical work done by the New York-based engineering 
firm of Madi.gan-Hylan<l, w)1ich was closel.y assoc Lated with C-t1to: 
h 19hway bu i ldi nq act i vi.ties of Robe> rt Moses. Intercr: ting l.y, u·,.-~ 
)~~pcii:- L Ci•) lt..'d fur; .10 ex LC'f'l;J i V<..•' \!IOS l I y uowni,,1)vU)- lr_ld ~,:_i l :·r ,.,_ .... ,.,j 
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system, with rapid transit lines incorporated within the niedi<:1n 
st.rips of several proposed radial freeways (and a 1Jilshit'c 
Boulevard rail rapid transit line which is currently being 
en g i n e e r e d ) . The r e po r t a r g u ea t h <.1 t t h e p u r c ha s e o f a b i t Ill or e 
right-of-way at the time of initial construction would be [Qr 
less costly than later separate DUrchase, and would vastly 
increase the people-carrying capacity of the new met.ropol i tan-
sca led facili ties.14 
The war, of cours~, forced the proposal off the political 
agenda, but the wartime boom, with its explosion. in traffjc 
volumes and resultant street congestion, enhanced interest in the 
subject. In late 1Y45, L.J\. city officials sponsored a Traffic 
c 1 i n i c vJ he r e s e v e r a 1 o f the n a t ion ' s l e al.~ i n g t r a n s po r t d t i on 
consulta~ts, including DeLeuw-Cather, addressed local husiness 
and civic leaders. The consultants endorsed the 193') cur..uine<l 
freewu.y/transit concept. The clinic led to the ory-.:in i z a tion uf d 
citizens. group to give. further study to the sitcrntion onu to 
recoinmend action. 'rhi:a group, the LO.S Angeles Chamber of 
Commerce's Metropolitan •rra ff ic and Transit Comrni t tee, formed, in. 
turn, the Rapid ~ransit Action Group (RTAG). 
R'I'AG wa ~ led by two of the most i nportant transportation 
activists int.he state, t-reil Petree and James Beebe. Petree, a 
leading downtown furniture merchant, served variously (oft.en 
sii'lultaneously) as head of the downtown business groups, head of 
the L.A. and state Cho.mbers of Commerce, arid as an 7\uto Cl ub 
director. Beebe was municipal bond expert at O':.ielveny and 
Myers, southern California's most prestigious corpor.::.te law firrn. 
RT AG '" o r k e d a s s i d u o u s 1 y th r o ugh 1 9 4 7 a n d ea r l y 1 9 4 8 
bringing together, accoroing to Petree, " ... t;1e best. en9ine~:c; ring 
and financial brai.ns in this area ... " '":"'he group called a meetin~J 
i n February, 1948, to which AOO business, civic and politic~\ 
l eaders \vere invited, to unveil ;;ail Rapid Transit-NO\-J! 
RTAG's $310 million proposal had t.wo principal 
components: (l) the 1939 concept of rail r~'tpid transit lines in 
the median strips of several downtown-radial freeways; and (2) 
upgr.:i.ding several existing Pc iines to rail rapid tt"ansit. st.atus. 
Th~ first idea was based on the notion of the enormous increase 
in capacity thnt could be had at relatively little additional 
co s. t . The s e c..: on d w u s n e c e s s a r y be ca u s e Pr.: ' s i n t ,.~ i- u r b a ri l i n c 1~ 
were subject to crossings at grade at more and more points in 
outlying areas, and were forced to wallow in the mire of severely 
congested downtown street traff~c. The conse~uence was th~t 
longer distance trips weC"e inct·easingly time consu1,1i~g. Tun n~l 
construction in the CUD would provide terminal facilit~es fur 
both freeway and P8 right-of-way trains. 
The ideologicu l underpinnin9s of the R1'l\G µroposal 
: x p l i c .i. t 1 y r e f l e c t e d t h e b a s i s o f th e r a p i d t r a 11 ::; po r t mo v ~~ rri en L 
and the critical way in which rapid transit facilities resonated 
with the political-economic st-ructure of postwar- metro~•oJitrtn 
d<1velop1:1cnt. RTAG argued: "Our peorle must have rail rapiJ. 
HJ 
L.cansit t.o .:.ake full advantage of U1e s~.ill limitless ar~u where 
w e make our- homes. l'L is ~very man's desire t:o have a :·l or_ o[ 
gro und free from t.he grina of factory and office. He w;.:.o:..s to 
ma k e his family secure. He wants time to plny and he huU:i pr i de 
in his own fireside ... . our peol)le need not huu.Jle in the sh ad o\...i 
o f office buildings nor gather close to the factories. Rai l 
l.'"apid transit will make it _possible for us t.o live where \·J ·= LiK.e 
anJ work where we please."15"' 
RTAG concel.ved of r·apid t.1:ansport invest.merit o i> U k 
minimum sufficient plaJ)oing intervention t.ha.t would suµporL tne 
con tinuin9 mobility of capital and labor. It would a.lso support: 
thu continued construe ti on of detached sing le- family P~' tr .t ::i rcha l 
·) p V<.:~ns in a heart.less world. R1'1\C appealed to both w li it e co ll ax 
und illdustrial workers, even though all of the propos 0C. r a 1 l 
-apid transit lines are downtown-radi~l~. 
1~ a i l Rapid Tran s i t was i s s u e d '•J i th <"l sense o f u r.· ') c n c ; : 
~OH l If rails were to oe pl.aceu in the freeway 1~ecli a ns >1e11 
action was urgently required to create a governmental age ~icy - <1 
t ransit ~ii strict - that v.•ould be able to issue tax exempt b ' nds. 
Th ~ proceeds from the sale of these bonds would be us ~d to 
p urchase the add1tiona 1 rights-of-way. Construction on a :-i u mber 
o f freeways was already underway, especially or'\ the lloll y w o o1_! 
F reeway, _ so transit financing could not be lon g d e l y e a . 
Inte restingly; RT/\G's i->a:i.-ent group, the Metcopolitdn "l't affi c 1~nd 
T r~nsit Committee, had sponsored a bill duri ng t he 1947 s ta t @ 
legislative session that woula have per-rnittea th e c·a liforni a 
Division of Highways to use gasoline L.ax funds. which wotl ld later 
be replaced, to purchase freeway median transit rights-o f -w a y . 
Howe ver, evel'1 ti)OU':Jh the Committee, led by Petree and !)eebe , t1ad 
~ ; l ayed the central rol .l.n securi n g the cornprom.Lse 1947 gasol i;,0;.::. 
t.ax increas e that l o. unched t• c massive Califo.rnia f r e ewr.i.y 
b ilding program, it wa s unable to secure passage of the t r a nsit-
:rel.a ted bill. Henc e , the urgent c1ecessit.y of o s µc cial 
<listr.ict. 16 
Rail Rapid Tru.t '.1sit play~d t o mix~d rev .ie .. '>'s. '.f'l\e l l.l t~ s 
o E c o 11 f l i c t t h a t ,.,. e r e d r a w n i n e r l y l 9 4 8, "" o u 1 d ch o r act e r i z e 
r.:ipiu transit politics tl1ereafter. In favor oft.h e RTAG p r ;;Jµosal 
\'t'~re: ·:..he L.A. COD business anu p!:'operty-relat.e d groups w- i t.h 
t h e i r F>Olitical, t~chnical and media .alli ·e s: and, resl.lit:?nti<'J l 
developers in those outl y ing portions of the CLty and count y t hat 
ha d not yet seen si<Jnificant of Ei ce/commercial deve o p r:ie n t. 
Opposed were business and ~roperty-related groups in those pl a ces 
that ha.d already established subst.a nt 'al cf[i c e/com me tc: ic1l 
c e 11 t e r s . I n d e ea , t. h e e x i s t e n c e o f n u m e r o IJ s o u t 1 y i 1) g c e n t. e r .s , 
many of which ~rew up decades earli er a r o und s tre e t ra ilWilY 
11. ncs, is the most import~ nt gcopolit.i c a fact i n t he Los ~ n geles 
s ory. A n\Jn1bEr of t.hese centers ha d even crea ted t h eir ow n 
publicly owned transit agencies by the lg-20's to provi de l oc:ally-
orientE:?d service. The :....1\. CBD re mained tr·ie single larg e st cen t er 
in the region. It \•J<:·S, however, f i.rst among manyl all o( w~11 ch 
had similar, i.f more modest. aspirations and coiicerns. 'l' h~ is~ues 
a t s tu k t· were; c 1 eax to t.h..:: oppos i 1: ion is ts. They were ex n~ ' r 1e l y 
l 1_ 
u P s e t w l.. t. h the L. A . C B D -or i en t e d con fig u ration , see i n g- UH~ HT 1\ G 
plan as a barely concea.l.ed effort by downtown Los Angeles to use 
the rai.:. syste:rn to divert trdff.i.c from their own areas. They 
were equally concerne<l that the City of Los Angel.es, since il 
was by far the lar~est municipality, would dominate the 'J'ransit 
District, enabling it to adopt investment and operating policies 
contrary to outlying business center interes~s. In addition, 
taxpayer protection groups, which oft.en over l apped \'Ill th pl.acE:·· 
based opposition interests, opposed govern111ent cwnersl~ip of 
trans~t. RTAG's argument that a District would have to have 
access to the tax base in order to support a bond issue 
heightened the fears of such groups that. never-ending taxpayer 
subsidy ~ould be involved~ 
Coalitions of place interests were possible, however, if 
a system configuration wo1.1ld enable two or more to jointly p1,;rs,1~ 
their ambitions. The most important example of such a coa_ition 
was that involving L.A. CDD qroups a.nd their counterparts in 
Ho.l lywood. Proposed alignments of the !iollywood Freeway a1)d a 
related rail rapid transit line would enable both to penet~ate 
the booming San Fernando Valley. 
Since the California legislature, which would h.'.\ve to 
pass District-enabling legislation, was not in regular session 
during 1948, Los Angeles would tia.ve to petition the governor to 
include the transit. issue in a c;pecial session call. Gover.nor 
Earl ~~arr~n indicated he would be receptive to suci\ .J pet.it.ion 
should it be forthcoming. In March, the L.A. County dele9CJ.tion 
to the state legislat.ure, representing the conflicting .int.erests 
of the many competing places, voted 15-14 against. petitionin~ the 
9over11or. The L.l\.. Chamber of Cornmerc~-led movemant had b ee n 
dealt. a stunnii19 setb<:ick. They quickly went back on t ~ie 
offensive, however, pre.paring legislatioo for sub1:1ission at. t he 
1949 regular session.17 L.A. would be joined there by the San 
Francisco Bay Area. 
The two major pt·ivately-0\>1ned transit compnr;ies, PE and 
t:~e Los Angeles Transit Lines (LATL), became increasingly 
concerned as the district creation move~ent once again gathered 
s t ea m . LA. 'l' L w a s con t r o l l e d by Na. t i on .a l C .i t y L i n e s ( NC[, ) , w h l c h 
was Lilen embroiled with the federal government in a massive anti-
trust su1t that also involved General Motors, Firestone Tirl? and 
Hubber, Philips Pet.roleur:i, and Standard Oil of Califor11ia. trCL's 
strategy at t..his point in time was to sell its t..r.;.nsit properties 
to public agencies, then continue to operate them for a fee. 
LATL and NCL worried that competition from a publicly-subsidized 
cart"ie'C .,.,oul<l depress the value of LATL's assets. 18 PE was 
concerned about potential competition, but i11 relation to another 
t::;Ll~s ti on. 
The RTAG proposal called for upgrading several PE lines to 
rapid tran5it status. PE carried freight on several of tbest.! 
L i rt c s a s a w l 1 o l l y - o \<J n (.. d s u b s i d i u. r y o f s o u t n e r n P ci c i £ i c 
'T':-ansportation Company (SP). SP had acquired PI:: from .lenry 
uunt.ini]ton primarily foJ: the important connect.ions PE might 
l 2 
afford for its freight business. Since SP's acquisi t ion of rv. 
be fore W::n· ld War One PE' s passenge·r trains had r:10st 1 y lost money. 
w it h a few except i o o s i n the ea r l y ye a rs a n d d u r i n 11 \.~ o t' l d ·,~a r 
Two. Following the war passenger losses increased r apidly, wh i l~ 
PE faced very large expenditures for railway-re ated 1na ' n ten n~e 
a!ld modernization~ Dy way of con tr as t, PE' s f r e ight bus ir-1e:-;s i..1a s 
increasingly lucr<'li:.ive, becom1-ng extremely important to S P d ur ing 
t.'ne war anci aftt'r. Indeed, the California Public t_;til i t i s 
Co ii~ m i s s i o r i ( CPU C ) , w h .i. ch r e <J 'i..l l a t e d p r iv a t t:? tr a ;-, s F o r t a t i o n 
comp anies, regularly criticized PE duriny 1947 for giv i n g 
('reference to freights on joint passenger- .freJ..ght trad<s i thereb y 
d elaying and disrupting passenger s~rvice . 
one of tlie standard measures advocnte<.J to r~ J uce 
.. assenger rail-related opt;!ra t. i n g costs was cot1s idere<l beyond th~ 
p a le by PE: massive substitur.ion of one-man for t.wo-man o pL r ated 
street railway cars. cruc had been badgerina Pe to sub s~ it.~t ~ 
f or years. PE, with the exception of one rou t e , r ef used. 
u ecause of the combined passenger/ £?:'eight nature of PF.'s syst~ t , 
PE workers were organize<..I into rai lroa<..1 unions, whi<..:h lia rJ a m - rG 
r:1iiitant tradition than the transit work e£ u11io1 s t h o t h ;;id 
· r ga. ni:lecJ other pcopi=rties. PE was concern<..:d t hei t an etfort to 
sub stitute one-man for th10-man cars wou u both en gen t..ler: labu1:-
o ppos i ti.on that. woul<..l disrl1pt freight tra f fic and re v e nue3, and, 
... ,ould f a i.l. to stem passelH_;er rail losses. 
S i n c e t h f:! f .r e i g h t b u s i n e s s w a. s PF. ' s a n (f .i! ' ' s t o !'J 
pr ioi:.- i ti' i rr1a nagemen t saw d bus substitution strate r:iy 3S the mor e 
,,. i. a bl..e long run approu.ch. SP d~clar~d its un'Wi l l iny n es s t.o 
continue to subs.idiz.~ f.'S passenger rail losses. Sl' ' s s t ratet•y 
wi..i.s to ~ ubst it.ti t,;· bu i>es foC" t.ra i n:s in or: dee to a voi 1..l p r o spsc t i v e 
rail rehabilitation/modernization expenses, an~·1 t o 9 e t. t he money-
l os i r. 9 ]:) a~.sen gt!r trains out of t11e way J[ 1·1e p I" Ofi t.ab le 
f rei gh ts. l (.J H'l'AG' s rropuBal to upqrade severu.i fr e i •:Jht-ca.-r r y i n :_; 
L~ne :::> anJ. d ra ~a tic a 1 ly l/11 prov~ th~ level ,;:i nd s ua LI. t y of' t a s se11 90 :r 
t.rain st!rvicc constit..uted, therefore, a direct cho.ll e.n 9 e t ( ~-:> r 's 
s t r a L L lJ y . The i_) r i v a t ~ tr an 5 i. t c u 1 i1 pa rt i e ~ , t 110 n , we cc - .-:; t i v e 
members of the opposit.ion. 
l~'TJ\G r::lc..1de one:? ma jo r tact.ical cha:1~e. howev e r. !'>~tr ,. 
Oeebe and others insist.ec t hat. the system out.lirv2d in Ra i l Ra i.l · u 
r a n s i t was not a n e c e s s a r y par t o f c r ~ Cl t i r. ~ a d i s t :r 1 :: t . 'T' :i e 
l~TAG p la n was put f o rw .:. rd as o ne poss i blity; other ro u tes ' . ...rerl! 
c e r ._ a i n l y po s s i b 1 e . He g <i. rd l es s o f · w h-:i t RT i\ G h a. d p rop o :; e j , t 1 e 
first order of business for a new public a~en cy w o ul J be ~ 
c o r.1pre: he nsive s ·t.udy$.,. .· by indepenu(;!nt engineers, witho ut a ny 
t~ ceconcei ved not ions."~) 
i 1any Of>pLJsitiorii:.= t s wet·e not convinced. 'I'he dir·::ctors of 
the Los Angeles County Di ·vision of the L ague of Califor .1t a 
Cities adopted a resolu:ion to unqualifi ed ly o~pose the RT AG -
sponsored 1949 legislation. The smaller cities f ea red dominnLion 
b y the County giant. Tl ~ Long Oeach City Cou n c · l un rJ nimousl y 
opposed the l e~ i:.>ldtion. Long 13.each Council ma n Ra 1sey , t he 
leading opponent., sa i d , " ... local s l1or-:i.)ers woulc t rav e l. t o T ..r..1:,; 
nngeles 'to b uy a spoo l 0£ thre a d if t his high speed r ail l ine 
sliould be operated.'" •rhe mayor o f Claremont, spea k ing f o r t.hc 
Pomot1a Vall ~ y (in the easter n portion of L . A. Cuu n ty) s aid 
citizens ·ther~. '' . . . have no fnith in Los Angeles .•. " 'l'lie 
Milnhattan Beach mayor (in the southwester n c orner) said there is 
a " ... growing resent ment . . . " by peopl e of surround in9 citit:s 
agai nst Los An<:ieles. The Santa Mo n ica E v~~~ Ollt loo~ 
ed i tor i alized , "It is desi9ned to save the dotvn town shopping 
district o f Los l\nge le:s a t the expense of other dist ricts ~nd at 
t er rific cos t to all ta~payers. No real economic n eeJ fo r it 
e x i sts beyond the need of downtown Los Angeles me rchancs to 
reverse a 25 year old trend ... 21 
Within L .A. City there was i ntense controversy. rhe Los 
Angeles Realty Board, basec.1 in the \H lshire District (on e of the 
c ity 's leadin g non-cen t ral of flee/comme rcial c enters ), vehement ly 
o p p osed the District b il l. None of RTAG 1s proposed rai l rapid 
tt"ansi t routes served this par t of the city. The i1oar d i'\ttack~a 
the v ery a p plicability o f ra i l rapid transit in an are a (L . ~ . ) 
thil t was far less dense than oth e r a reas that. h a d rui l systems . 
Since New York, Chicago and rhiladelphia r ail proper ties were 
losi ny larqe su ms of money, the Board fo recast a yri m fu ture of 
never-ending property tax subsid izat ion fo r a Los Angeles 
network . Indeed, th e Realty Board attacked t he PTAG r:·l a tt as 
"socialist ic ,'' a label that both shocked a nd offended Petree , 
Beebe and their L . /\. Chamber brethre n. The Cham be r pres.idC:!nt 
r e sponded with n blast at the Rea lty Board , describ i ng L.1\. as a 
c i t y, " .. . wh ich cannot c:: x tend upwar<.l , a s N'ew York does ... . 1t must 
e xpand outward. People must work in the city a nd live beyonct 
it ... 
T h e San Fe rnando Valley T imes, a staunch supporter uf 
r ap id transpor t th a t would facilitate the 1'.'esidentia l boo111 in 
thei r part of the city, ed itoria lized, "Of all people t he L.A . 
Realty Boa rd, a g r oup who have profited most b y t he ct ty's 
phenome na l growth, should o p pose rail rapid transit wllich \vould 
continue thei r prosperi ty." Th e Va l l e y Ti mes bit t:.er l y 
critici zecl the Realty 3oa rd's opportuni stic use0f-11 soc ia.~Jzed ," 
noting that bankers ancJ businessmen wro t e t ile l l::lgislaticn. "" 
T he Real ty Boa r d , along with t he Wi lsh ire and Micac le 
Mil e Chambers of Comme rce, were welcomed i n to oppos i tion by the 
Gou thwest. Wave , an impoi:- tant paper re presen t i ng the i ntert.? :st.s of 
ii business-ceri't er several mile s sou t h a nd v1est of t he c tm . 'r11e 
Wa ve had wri t t en following the 1~48 defeat of ~TAG' s ini t iat i v e , 
'
11\gai n proving ther e simply is no substitute for d.isi:rict 
represen t ation in public 9 overnment , t he c ity counc i l very 
properly has t"efused to bow to t he terri fi c pressure of pro-
freeway and ri:!pid trausi t proponents. selfish , wel 1-org.:tniz.ed , 
and richly-financed downtown supporters of the multi- billion 
dolla r frel?w a y and transit p r-ogr atn found our local councilmen 
1loughty servants o( t hei r constituents, rather than subs~rv ient 
pa w n s of entr e nc h ed in t e r ests ." 7;he W~ kep t U!) its vocal 
opposi tion throughout .lCJ48 and 1911 9. 3 
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In April, the Los /\ngel.es City Counci I took IJ J the 
question of whetllet" or not. to support the distric::t-ena bl.i.n (J 
legislation pending at the state capitol. !-Jeil Petr-ee add :r~sst::·d 
the Cour.cil, stressing the importance of rail rap'd tr ansit, t l1c 
openness, flexibility and fairness of: the proposed l<-:!' g isLa t. ion, 
a n d th e f a c t t !1 ;.i t s h o u l a t h e c i t y c o u n c i 1 v o t e n o c n tr i e 
question, the bill would certainly die. The state would 
obviously not support a measure that the city opposed. The c t t y 
Council, reflecting place compet.ition \vithin the City, voted H-G 
against creat~ng a rapid transit <l ~ strict. The Los ~ngel e ci 
Cnamber of Co1nmerce suffered an astonishing defeat. 
In a post-mortem on the vote, the Los l\rig e l e s Ti m•2' S 
p oi nted out, ''Opposit.ion seer:ns to be centered in the clo::;e-inLos 
Angeles districts a!1d in neighboring municipo.lities \.Jho fe e l t he y 
\vol.lld not be benefited by a rail system i .n prop ortio:·i t o theit· 
t_ax liability." 'I'he 'l' imes, which had 3Ypported the l L>.gisla t. ion, 
nctc~d that, " ... th~ Chamber of Commerce grouL'.l see a s so 
discouraged about t.he chance~ of its project. ... ff, afte r t wo 
years of voluntary civic service dratting the en ab l in g oc t , the 
Chambet"'s metropolitan traffic and t ransit co1:11,;ittcernen u.re 
d.i~~ltlStL'd cind dis7ouraged by the Council's close decision, no o.-1c 
can bl Lime thef.'l.. "2ll 
Reeling from the crushing blow, the L.A. Chamuer chos~ to 
concentrate its entire attention on the freeway building- pro•3r.;rn;. 
Reyarding rail rapid transit, t.he Chamber adopt e d the stt"ates y of 
advocating a comprehensive, n:etropolitan= wide study befor e.: any 
~ction, such as creating a nistricl, be taken. 
F o l l ow i n g t h e C i t y Co u n c i l a c t ion , C r u C t. o o k u.p P F ' 5 
first postwar application for transformation o f_ a L1i1 j Ot:' rortj o 1-: 
of its electric roilw a y net\1ork t.o bus es . Pl~ had ztC \.. Uc l 1y 
s u b Iii i t l e u i t s a r r-.o l i c a t i o n r11 u n t I 1 s ea r 1 i e r , d u .z: i n 9 t 11 e R ' AG 
legislation controvr.::rsy, ,\ nu rii.uer of stat~ and local of fici als 
ask e d CPUC to delciy con sidera ti on of PE' s reguest until a ( t.e r the 
outcome of the trans.it district issue we.is }<nown. /~l t ho u9 l1 PF: 
w-as not yet proµosing to abanJon rai 1 pu.ssenger servi ce on any of 
-th e l i n e s RT AG ha d co r~ t. e m p l a t e d u pg r a d i n g , l a r g e 1 y be c a. u s e 
r2r0llel fr~eway facilities were not yet iri place, it w-i::J. s c l ar 
".:__ o n. 11 concerned that th i ~ l 9 4 9 a pp 1 cat ion was ju s t the f i r :3 t 
s;tep. /\ yc,o.r lat.er, in May, 1950, CPUC granted 1c10st o( t.n•l' 
c r .-:i r: s f o r m c. t i o 11 P 2 h au ~ o u q h t . The Lo s An rJ e l e s T i m e s ; n o t i. n q 
wilh bitter irony that numerous local '~L-oups opposcdPE's e ~ ·ut·t 
to abandon street railway service, recalled the L, .l\. Ch am b er-'s 
effort to fashion an alternative to individually protest i ng P1·; 's 
actions. "Our local po~ iticians, who are now outra'::i' e d a t t he 
? u ?:J l i c U t i l .i t i e s Com m i >: s i o ti ' s d (o~ c i s ion , vJ "" r e h u t s u f 'f i c i e 1 t l. y 
:;.nter;este<l at that t.ime to memorialize th~ Legislot.ure in sup)ort. 
of ra.pi<l transit di.strict enablih'J legi~L1ti.c.rn. tJei gh>or h ood 
merchan~s and property owners, who scream to high heaven when the 
?E thceatens to cut. off their co m .. wnities, cast a cold eye at the 
Chamber's proposal. 'rhey regarded it as a dire plot t o , et 
everybouJ 1-:)t:.O i:.he downt:J\vll district, forgetting t"tlat l ra i. n ._, r un 
b0;:_:1 \"ays.·· 25 Opposi.tiunists, however, were interested in 
I c· 
,:_) 
local, street-running trains, whereas they weren't. interested in 
t h e m e t r o po 1 i t. a 11 s c a 1 e t r a i n. s t h a t w o u l d r tl n t o a n J f r o (It 
downtown. 
As the L.A. Chamber withdrew, the leadership mantle of 
the deciraated rail rapid transit movement was taken up by San 
re r nan do Va 11 ey ( s F V) res id en ti a 1 de v e lop ti: rs and e quiµ men. t 
financing/supply allies: the Southern California Monorail and 
Transit Corporation, and Monorail Engineering and Construction 
Corporation. Ralph Merritt entered the transit ~ovP.ment as 
executive vice-president of the former firm. The SFV leadership 
oacked a plan to build a monorail line that would run along the 
r,os Angeles River channel through the valley, the L.A. CBD a.nd 
down to Long Beach. The River channel was attractive because 
r ight.-o.f-way ac.-:tuisition costs would be reduced. The propone 1 ts 
argued that the route would serve the large number of industrial 
production zones th~t were located near the River. Since the 
l{orean War-induced production boom was in progress, the movement 
leadership µromoted the River route in order to interest the 
national governrnent - perhaps t.he Reconstruction Finance 
Corporation - in buy inc monorail bonds as part of the de::::ense 
effort. Finally, monorail construction was touted as a 
tecl\nologically innovative, tourist-sensitive way to rehabilitate 
i3 moribund transit industry. l\n extensive system of connecting 
surface feeder lines would, of course. be necessary. 26 
The SFV-led movement sought state legislation during the 
1951 session based on their monorail proposal. Their efforts 
engen~ereJ a broader range of conflict than ha<l been the case in 
1948-1949. The L.A. Chamber stood by its posi.tion. of 
comprehensive study first, then legislative action. The ChYmber 
went int.o opposition, drawing along counterparts from around t11e 
County. 
The private transit companies, led by LATL, were 
especially active amor::g the opposition forces during th.is 
session. once again, the private firms feared "unfair" 
subsidized competition that would further reduce the value of 
th~i.c assets. The surface feeder lines the new public agency 
would be entitled to operate were especially troubling to the 
µr iv<:1. te properties. 
The California legislature wanted to be responsive to SFV 
constituents, was acutely aware of mounting tra~fic problems in 
the area and was also mindful of the local conflicts enveloping 
the region on this issue. Therefore, it passed legislation in 
1951 creating the Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority, the 
most "bizarre" instance of governmentalization any1tJhere. LAMTJ\ 
clearly reflected the transit stalemate present in the 
metropol.it.an political economy . T11e new authority was so deeply 
const.rained in so rna.ny financial and institutional wuys thdt it 
was clear to all concerned that in its origin~l form it was 
condemned to life .:i.s a marginal organization, unloved and 
unwanted even by l.he L.A. Chamber, five members of which the 
governor appointed to LAMTA's Board of Directors. (Two Lang 
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Beach Chamber of Commerce representatives rounded out the seven-
member Board.) Indeed, the Los Angeles Department of \·Jater and 
Power, one of the laryest and most prestigious local government 
agencies in t.he United States, was so dist.urbed by the LAMTA 
legislation that it sought an amendment - which was adopted -
de c 1 a r i n g th a t th~ LAM T ,\ Act was i n no way to be taken a s s et t i n g 
precedents for the structure and operation of public authorities 
generally. 2 
LAMTA began meeting in 1952, with Ralph Merritt kired as 
gener-al manager. LAMTA resolved t.o seek amendments to its 
founding statutes dut"ing t'he 1953 session in order to reinuve tile 
institutional and financial obstacles to its functioning as ~ 
bold, comprehensive rapid t.ransit agency. Moreover, Ll\M'J'A moved 
to take up the L.A. Chamber's call for a comprehensive st.udy thdt 
would provide the basis for action. LAMTA sought legislation 
that would enable joint state/local financing of suc·h a study. 
The 1953 session, however, recapitulated that of 1951. Tl1e 
entire LAM'T'A legislative progra1n, including study money, was 
defeated. 
During 1953 und in ensuing years, how~ver, actions of the 
private transit carriers generated changes in the political 
cl i mate. In 1953 SP/PE moved to complete the PE transformation 
from rail to bus and to shed itself of all its remaining, badly 
deter-iorat.ed passenger services. PE sold all its passenger 
operations (including t.he few remaining rail lines) to a company 
organized by Jesse Haugh, longtime associate 0£ NCL. SP/PE 
stipulated in the contract of sale that Kaugh should proceed 
f o r t_ h \•/ J. t h to s u b s t i t. u t e bu s e s for a l l r e 111 r:..: i n i n g t r a i n s , w 11 i c h 
Haugh was pleased to do. Equally disturbing to the L . A. Cl3D 
.;:::;i,lition was the continuing service and financial deterioration 
of LP..TL. These developments produced a limited corisens~s on a 
program to governmentalize the two companies, which was expressed 
in amendments to the 1951 LAMTA Act during the 1957 legislative 
session. The rail rapid transit stalemate held sway, however, 
and was reflected in the emergence of LAMTA as an agency that 
could buy out- using revenue bonds - the privat.e carrie?Cs ano 
provLde service, but do nothing else. 28 Indeed~ the competition-
genera~ed stalemate would persist, structuring Los Angeles area 
transit politics for a generation to come. 
Rail Rap.l.d Tran5it. .i.n the San Francisco nay Area 
In orde:c to und~rstand the OAR'T' system one must begin 
with the San Francisco-Oakland Bay Bridge iu the 1940's. The 
Bridge had six lanes of automotive traffic on the ~op deck, three 
lanes in each <lirectic.n without any shoulders or divider. 
Commercial traffic - trucks and buses - was confined to the 
bottom deck! which also carried the 13ridge l~a5. lway. The Bridge 
Rai1v;ay, which opened in 1939, replaced a I '°'rry service that 
carried street railway passengers from the Key System dock on the 
Ea s t Ba y s i d e a c r o s s ~he w D t e r to t h c Sa n F r a n c i s c o 1:~ e r r y 
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Terminal on the west.. The crucial point to note is tha.t ~ ridge 
Railway trains were oriented to downtown San Francisco ra~her 
than to downtown Oakland, reflecting the spatial patt et n of 
activity when the lines were built.2° 
1'he w<.1r and post.war Bay Area boom produced 1ncrei:.ls in9l y 
severe traffic congestion on the 8ridge, and, because of lts 
design, d growing nuinber of traffic accidents. Accidents oft.en 
paralyzed the facility. Given the impol'."tance of the !Jay l\rc.a as 
a defense production zone, a Joint /\n:iy- Na vy Board (JANB) 
undertook a study of the situation. /\t t 1 same tirr.e, the 
California Department of Public Works (CDP\'J) carried out its own 
inquiry. Ooth reported in 1947, reaching radically dif.terent 
cone l usions and touching off intense controversy. Th~ trajectory 
of the 13ART p~oject was inextricably linked to the resolution of 
the Bridge-related conflict. 
In early 194? JMIB recom rn encled irn ;:1euiate construct.ion of 
c. southern crossing connecting /\l.<t :11 eda County south of On kland 
wiLll a point. i.n t.he southern portion of the City of San 
::"r<;·1cisco. For the longer tenu, however, J,\'JD recomme1n d.ed the 
uay i\rea. start planning for a transbay underwater- tube t.hat v.:ould 
replace the Bridge Rail way, connecting to subways in the East an{l 
Nest Bays. l\ t.ube would allow reconstruction of the Gay Bridge 
for motor '/ehicle traffic- This was the first mention of the 
13ART concept. However, J/\?113 noted that f3ri dg e RaiJ.way t.rafEic 
h a d be ~ n f Cl l l in g s i n c e t h e e n d o f t h e w a r : i n d e ed , t h ~ f a c i 1 i t. y 
hu.d never carried mor~ t.han a fraction of its enormous d e s g1; 
capacity (50,01'.H'.l people/hour). Trans t ay trans i t capacity, 
therefore, ought: to be sufficient for some time. CDP\~ re,:...oc t ed a 
few days later, L"ecommending im1nediate construction of a parallel 
c:cossiny, 300 f€et north of the existing Brid':)e. The 13ay l\.rea 
plunged into turmoil. 
The 13riuge crossing conflict dragged on for more than r.1 
decade. The basic l.ineup was as follows: Downtown Oakl o.n d 
l~aders and centcal Contra Costa County resiuential uevel o p ers 
supported the parallel crossin<J. This alliance sourJht to 
concentrate traffic capacity in the existing corridor, fcuring 
the div~rsio11 that 1;iight result from a crossing several r:liles 
south. San Francisco elected officials, joined by the p eninsula 
counties of San Mateo and Santa Clara and by southern Alamedn 
County, stood behind the southern crossing. southern Al~~ mc.Jo, 
San Mateo and Santa Clara were concerned to get more transport 
capacity to Eacilitate the industrial development that bur~eoned 
in their areas. Official San Francisco l ooked to a southern 
crossing to <Ji vert through traf fie away fro1:'1 the badly congested 
:lowntown area and to support industries located t o tl\c: sout.h 
a long t ·n e Bays ho re . I n t e res ti n g l y , do \II n t. own San · :t.: an c i s co 
business leaders waffled on the issue. At. first t.hey s<::.aunchly 
supported a southern crossing because they hoped transcontinental 
r3ilroad passenger trains could be routed across a southern 
crossing to a. downt.own terminal. These t:-uins currently went to 
Oakland . When the rail ro;tds expressed a profound lack of 
interest in the S..:in Fran c isco p.li.ln , the busirit:."ss co1..,1!1u11ily 
lD 
t ransfen:·ed its allegiance to the parcdlel bridge, bei 11•} ma inly 
concerned, then, with expanding traffic capacity in t h e e xi st. iny 
corridor. City officials were de~µLy wounded. ( Busi n e ss ~rouµs 
later sheepishly rejoined the offi_cial lec-~dership when tl1c 
parallel crossing was doomed.) 
While the bridge crossing controversy ra.g,ed, in l 9 4 0 S -::i n. 
Francisco political leaders took the initiative in form i ng ~ 
mo vem e nt for a Day region-wide rai 1 rapid transit sys tc: 1, th e 
o t her part of J ANO· s proposal. /\.s in Los J\nge les, San "'r ,1n c i s c o 
l eaders were de eply troubled by worsening conges t ion a n d by the 
s e rv i ce and financial decline of the existl-ng transit co1 1p a nies. 
I n t. h e Bay Area, Gr e yhound supplied bus service from Ha r ; n 0 nd 
c e.1 t r a l Cor::tra cost.a Counties to the San ~'"rancisco Cm) . Southern 
Pac it ic [-an comn1 u ter trains between a po or ly locat e J S an 
Franc· sco tr3' n~ inal and peninsula poi::ts. r<ey Sy st.em o per at e d in 
t h e East Buy. The decline of Key sy:;-tern - cont r o ll e d , a s wa s Los 
An g e les Transit. Lines, by National City Lines - wds esp~ · ia 1 1 y 
precipitous. 
San Francisco's ini tia ti v~ was given a decidedly ho s tile 
rec e ption by downtown Oakland politic.al and business l_:a i?r-s . 
Not only did the bridge crossing issue divide ther;1, Oakl and na 
c v e r y cl i f f e r e n t v i e w o f the t r a n s i t q u e st i on t h a n d i d S a ! 1 
Francisco. Jn Ookland's view rail rapid transit w a5 n o t 
regional question at all, but an issue with three se 2 ara ble 
com po n e n t s : ( 1 ) a n r: as t Ba y d i me n s i o n ; ( 2 ) a VJ 1~ s t. !3 a y 
clj_mension; and (3) the transbay connection question. Tn fa ct , 
downtown Oakland leaders had been talking rapid transit for soi.i~ 
J'E~a· ,i::., by l 9'·~ 8. They we r~ very troubled by l<ey system actions, 
_s peciu.l.ly its lack of interest in expanding service, .and h a d 
al ways been dist u1· be (~ by the s~n1 Frzincisco focus of the Bri d \J~ 
i .l way tro:ins. The o a kli:i nd l e ader-ship was interested in i:l r .:ip id 
t ;r ans i 't system that 1,; o u L d int e gr at~ r a pi d l y gr.ow i 119 a re as i 1\ 
A ame da and Contra Costa Counties into a metropolitan syst e m with 
i. -.s office/co~merc .Lal center in the Oakland CE:J. Oak. land 
2.. c k nowledgeo its lack of a world-class financial district; its 
a mb i tions, therefore-, were correspondingly moderate a n d 
r- "stt·ictQd to t.h8 £ast Bay. Pegarding the Yl' es t C\ay, ~-;a n 
Fr a nc isco was to deal 'f.lith its pcoblems on the [:>eninsula. Wh a t 
h cl£YJ:>e n e ( l there was o f 1 i t t le concern to Ouk land, sin c e 0 ven t s i n 
t.he East Bay were perceived to be of little interest t o San 
Francisco. Oakland didn't really see the trur1 s bay connectiun as a 
prob l em because the po.ral lel crossing and t'ne ex is ting 8r i r"Jge 
Ra i lway had sufficient capacity in its view to handle trilffic 
v o lum e s for the for~seeable future. In conclusion , Oakland, 
-::.oge t h er with several of the smaller East Bay cities,, saw the· San 
Franci sco regional transit initiative as anotlter effo rt tc de f ;e::n d 
t i1 e h i i:;. t o L" i c I? a t t e r n o f r e g i o n a l d o m i n a t i o n , a n o i:; ., () r e d 
the mse lves foe res i stance. 
In the 1949 stace legislative session, S a n F rancisco 
~; ponsor-ed a transit district enablinu bill, as d id th8 Los 
Ang e 1 e s Ch a m be r o f co rr, me r c e • J_, • A . 1 s b i l l w a s i n t h e s t a t c 
A s s e m b l y , w h i l e S a 11 F ,r a n c i s co ' s. w a s i n t L c S ~ in ei t e, • '1' h e J , o s 
l" 
Angeles stalemate prevented passage of any legislation in 1949, 
while u i3ay Area transit district bill did, in fact, pass . TIH:~ 
difference, however, was more apparent than real. As a resull of 
Oakland-led opposition, the successful district bill reflect~d 
the conflict rather than providing the basis for a functioning 
public agency. All involved in Bay Area transportation questions 
acknowledged tllat the district creation process embodied in the 
1949 law precluded a district. from ever being formed. Officidl 
San Francisco responded with a c0r11mittee of ledding citizens -
bankers and downtown mercl)ant.s everyoue - that would srJck 
l e g i s lat i v e ch an g es i n th e 1 9 5 l s es s ion . i\ l a n Browne , i3 an ~~ o f 
America vice-president and municipal bond expert 1 a.nd ~"\ rti1ur 
Dolan, inv$stment bank.er '""'ith San Fru.ncisco's leading fi rt•t , were 
among the group, and would be leading activists for yedrs to 
come. 
Foll owing their 19 49 def ea cs the Los An9e le s a.nd S ~ n 
Francisco rapid transit movements began to diver9e, although 
their- objective situations retn<iined similar for so t::e tim&. . The 
L.A. COD contihgent ei.bdir:at'.ed dire.ct leadership, while its. San 
rc:rdncisco cour1terpart rc•Jrouped and rea i) i. eu itself for dnother 
engagement with its Oakland rivals. 
The San Francisco wing came back to the 1951 L•~g:i. slc>tivc 
session seeking amend!':1ents that would rnake the 194<) legislatinn 
vi<ible. The Oakland-led opposition held firin, resisting b >e Sa n 
rrancisco initiative. Ironically, the San Francisco leai::le!'.'shi ~ . 
thl?n 11\ade u. t~ctical shift, adopting the [,,,\. Chamber posit i011 o f 
callin~ for a study co1nmission that would assess transit needs as 
a prerequisite for u.ction. This t.actic prc<.luced a sua.11 succeo35. 
'f'he state le(_Ji s la ture created a Bay Area Rapi<l 'Pt-ans t Com rn Lss ior~ 
(BAR'l'C) cornpoi.;ed of members frorn the nine Day l\rea counti~s. ';'he 
legislature even ~!located money for d study: $50,0G J . 
The San r.rancisco 91·oup wu.s i)leased t hi:1t the movement not11 
had an institution al express ion. The ll mou0 t of iaoney al loc.a ted . 
how .: v e r: , w <1 s seen by a. 11 in v o l v e d u. s ob v i o us l y i o ad e qua t e f o r a 
seriou5 study. once agnln, state legislativ~ ~ction reflected 
the intense conflict -.:..t th~ local Level, b~ing bot.h pcirtia.lly 
resr:ionsive yet mindful of the local concern with autonomy. 
Through 1951 t.lte Los Ani:5c les ano San P rancisco nay i\cc;1 
movements had advanced equally in institutional tet-ms. Got.h hod 
or-gu.nizu.tionu.l fon(ls thilt were so legally a:1d financially 
constrair:ed they wer~ incapable of either study or action. iJARTC 
used its S5!Jd300 to hire a consultant, DeLeuw-Cather, who told 
RARTC that !3ay l\rea transportation problems urgently ceq'..li t:t"d 
attention, an(1 that a cornprehensi-ve plan costing $75_0,8'00 should 
be prepared. 
LAMTA and BA~TC both asked the 1953 state legislative 
session to help them raise $750,000 for study and plannin~. with 
state funds contingent on local contributions. LJ\MTA WilS 
def~ateJ; BAr:rc. however, secured t.he tJesi re<l legisl~tion. l\t. 
this point th•~' twu rnovei11ent3 raiJ.ic"llly c\iv~rged. 
2(ij 
The k~y was thilt Oakland ha<l become vitcilly lntere st·~d .Lil 
the transbay traffic yuest'ion. l\s a resuU of various state and 
national legislative develop1 nerits, t h e pa r-alle l cro!:>sing h.J. d b·i ~ n 
decisively rejected and the southe rn cr o ssi ng , anaU• t:~ 11 . ;: i '::.(.1 
downto\1/n O.:ikland, emerged as top prior lt y on the n:~ 9 i o11,·il 
1. nf :r:il.str-uctural a ye nda. Moreover, trie ();1k.l a n d l(:i'i(h~r s hi.p w .:i s 
a lso inc reasingly worriecJ '"'bout its do17lin a nt position i11 til e E cu~t 
Ba y, as d ovJntown me r c h ants and ·their po1 itic.A l ;:i tHJ t.(2 ch 11 ' c a l 
ul l ies nervously watc:hed the ra ;_)id l y t~""' ~a l at i n g de t et·ior:at.ion u f 
:.. ey System. 
8 l\ RT C hi red Pa rs on s , !3 r .i n ck er 11 of f , Ho 11 and Mac I o n a l' 
{ P BHM ) to prepare a comprehensive regiona l rapi.J tr ansit µl .:in. 
PC!! M was hirt::!d becaus~ they were consi d er e d b y th e £ i .. a 1 ci LJ.l 
cc 1~im u nity to be one of tl ) e t\.,rO top traospot- t a tio11 co nsul. ·i _, 
f i r 1>1 :s i n t h e co u o t r y , w i t h s l> e c i a l e x p e .r t i !> e l. n t u n n e l t n y .: ; . d 
~e ve nue and patronage forecasting. ~ince ~ny p r oj e ct wu ulJ Le 
f i n a n1:..:ed throuyh the sale of mu nicipal bon d ~:, t h e o p i n i. 0 11 of 
"i. ea.ding bond finacciers obviously was decisive. c o ve ru le .1nd 
Co 1 p i t t s w a s con s i () e r e d t h e o th e r l e a d :i. n 'J :f i ri 11 • L .I\ \ ·j 'f 1\ h i i: · ; ' 
Cove.rdale and Colpitts to do a wonorail_ feasibility stud y \-J 1 tl1 
::;01:ie r,ioney given. L/\i··\TA by the L.A. County r..oard of Supe:rv iso I: s . 
In early 195G, Pl.31!1 ! µresented l3A!tT ' : \vi th Re y ' on !]l. t:>:ip i d 
•rra. n ~· it ( RRT), the basic docuwe nt in tht:) C',A!\T µl..::ln nin<3 l.) ·oc e::; .s. 
The following elements of RRT are critical for understandi:1'.:l t (·1e: 
ne x: t phase o ~ the Bay Area movement: ( l) RRT .·:; u.pp l · ~: ,_·i t 1i ,;: 
technical basis for an alliance- betweell the uow n town ca.:,;.li.tions 
o f !:>a n rranc isco and Oak I.and, which ~11as a necessary cc nd .i ti on of 
m0 ve rnent pro<3ress. Th~ }?l.ao met the condition sfn"clf i 1=<l by 
Oakl a nd as non-ne got.iable: r.ast Cay lines cent ~ r.ed in d u \.;1nt o .. ·1n 
O a k 1 a n d , c c~ n v e r g i n •.J L h ·~ T 0 l..> e E o r .(~ c r o s s i T1 g t \) 1; D -1 y t. u ~~ a r1 
F r a !1 c i s c o . '::!' he s y s t e rn r e c o ;:i ::i. c n d e d i n RR T w 0 u l d , t h e r e f o r <2 , 
· 1i minat <:= the l1ist0:cic Sari Francisco focus of the 13ridgi.:: Ro.il~-Joy 
t.r-3.i ns, gi.ving downtown Oakland enorrnous recepti.on capucity .:ind 
a llow ing the Oakland c rm to pe n ct:.rat~ deeply i n tv rapi cl y y r. o w i. thJ 
are a s throughout t.hc F:ast Bay; (2) P[HIM s a · cl t hn. t b y li n}~ in g 
t h e t wo downtowns with a transbay tube, rat1'1er th an v.i ;:1 .J 
rn od e n . ized Brirlge Rail way, the ~eiy Bridge could L>e reccms tr u e t •..: d 
f o e r.i orc effic i etit motor vehicle LLSC, tl ·,e.ceby elirnina.t. 1- n':{ t h (:: 
nee d for a southern crossin<J for: at. l e ~~st a good 1,12 n y yt;:ar s . T h :2 
t r ~ nr; b ay t L1be concr~tized the downlO'w'n alliance, enc1blin. 9 l>o t.!1 
C u r; ~; to p u r: s u e t ·ti e i i· a m Lo i t i o n s i n t ! i .:-~ r~ a s t !3 a y . 1 ; ·.J re o 'J I.! ~ , t 1 e 
a l l i. a n c e w a s s t r ~ n g L he n e J by r D l1 M ' s a t t a ck on .. _ h""' s. u u t 11 e r n 
cros::;ing. All addl.t.ional tr~1~1sl.l;.iy traffic c.:i.pa.c.:i.ty '.~-.-.:; 1 i l cl be' 
located in t.hc existing corr ir or linking t.he dow n to wn s . R ,T's 
recomrne:Ided act.ion - the o ptirnum rlan - carr i ed a h i <J h pr i ce, 
th0 ugh. 1'he peninsulc::i. counties of San nat.eo and Sant. a C.lar :-i. were 
e<H:i~rl.y looking f orv:arc1 to the soui.:hern crossin<J as a rad jor 
Structural element in their O\v'n devclopm€nt 5Cenar iOS, Om. t 1UU8 
.cu1;.1bl i ng s o·f di scvntent bubbled u)J fro1ri t.l\e sou th. 
[leni:isul~ displeasure lncreased as a result of ct t111.rd 
crit.i.c.al. asp(!CL 0£ the Rl1T plan: the ulignncnt '.:if the tr,) i n ::.; 
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running south of San Francisco. PEHH~ advocated routing the 
trains through the corridor occupied hy the Southern ~acific, 
right alongside or above the tracks SP used for both its 
commuter trains, i,.;llich had been losing money for some year!", and 
for its freights, ;:1bout which, as in L.A., SP careu a gre<:0.t deal.. 
PH!lM had concluded that, in filct, the SP corridor was the best 
available in teri:·.5 of 1ow .right-of-way ac..;;_·uisition cost ;ind 
travel time criteria. Once again, however, SP was disturbed by a 
rail rc..pid transit proposa.l that threa.tened to disru_pt l-ts 
freight business. 
The dollar cost cf P!J!f,'!'s Optimum Plan - $716 million -
frightened everyone who heard it. BARTC, however, bold l y went to 
the 1957 legislative session with a district creati .on b;. ll to 
build it. Before San Fra1:icisco an<l Oakland ~vere ab l e to app ro.'lch 
the legislature v.•ith a united front, thouqh, they first haJ to 
deal with one more _profound t l)reat t.o their o.lli ::',! :1ce; O;::. k laud'::< 
creation of th~ Alaincda-Contra Costa Transit District c.s t f)e 
vehicle for immediately governt11entalizing Key System. 
Political and business leaders had been ta . .lk.ing about a. 
public transit operat.ion in the East. Bay for years, of course, 
while Key Syster-;1 deteriorated . 1;owever 1 for ideological an d 
competitive reasons these discussions hu.d never gone past the 
stage 0£ threatening Key. Key Syste~ got tired of waitinJ for 
the ~ast Day to overcome its inte~nal confl i cts, moving to 
t::irod the leadership along the governmeotali:c: c:ition path. 
During the surniner of 1953 l<,ey Systero \vOrkers struck the 
cornpa.ny; the strike lasted 2 and 1/2 months. Sh~l:'wood Sv.ran, a 
leadin9 Oa.kland COD merchant an.d long-time transpo t" tu.tion 
activist, and a TI/\l~TC member told l!.l\P..TC that downtown business 
had suffered badly during the strike, especia l l y t he 8mali e r 
merchants. \/hat upset the E:ust Pay leadershi p most was its 
inability to do anything about the situation. 1rhe 1.vocket:s 
offered to sub.rnit to arbitration. Key Syst~m, however, ref used. 
'; li e e v e n ts w e re d i s tr e s s i n g l y s i m i l a r to a l 9 4 7 s t r i k e , w h en 
management had also refused a union offer to arbitrate. Key's 
intransigence was widely intel:'preted as an effort to force a buy-
out. 
Clair Mac Lead, a railroad lawyer, elected off i c lal in a.n 
East Bay cornm unity, and a Bl\HTC member, led a movement. to fot"m a 
permanent East !Jay Transit Committee. This group would con~id0r 
forming a public trdnsit agency. By the end of 1954, Alarne d u 
state Senator Breed had a drdf ~ of a transit district ~ill r~aJj 
for discussion. llowevei.-, alt this came as a shock to San 
Francisco. No San Francisco BARTC r.1embers were invol.ved with the 
East Bay Committee's work., or were even well-informed about i t. 
Mor0ovcr, the plans thus far developed for an r::ast !3ay tru.nsit 
district did not consider service to San Francisco . 
Sena tor Breed thought that transbay service was not t h ei 
concern of people working on the East Bay district. ''Pro~-JC. t)J.y 
the G/\H'rc will com(·~ up wi.th i'l plan foe sec-vice between th'~ t:Jst 
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Ba y a n d S a n f' r an c i s c o • T ha t i s th e k i n d o t th i n g t1:1 e y i) r •O?-
st. u d yin 1." The East Say needed to take a ction now; the prob}r;.. tn 
was a local one. 
Sherwood swan agre~d this was a local 1:ta t ter. Swuo sa.id 
\e y Syste1il wanted t.o get out, and t.he East !1ay h,td t.o be r:r .. : 1)areJ 
to t.ake over. "It will be a practical., useful n;cJSS transit 
sys tern for our East 13ay at"ea; und we are deal in'::l wi-::.h it fra1n t\~1~ 
point of view of d0\1111toh10 Oakland. If the valuP.s of our- prOlH~rl.y 
are goinq to be sustain.:!d, we must. do it. by r.i systew which serves 
our urea well--hut this bears no relation to (-.l:"-c\ffic tu s.:in 
Frilncisco . 1' 
Swan brought Rcber-t i'Jisbet, assistant Oakla~ d city 
attorney and l eqa l adv is or for the Cast Day ·r•rc; n sit CaFnn i t t e e to 
a BA J-(TC meet i n g to discuss the proposed transit district 
leg islcn.ion. Nisbet explained the rast 1'3ay's n•.=:ed to be Hl i1 
position to act on this l.ocal issu e . {le sa\.; no co n£ i ct betvtc·_n 
this r=::ast nay initiative and r"'gional rapid tr a n s it. T'.-te S.:rn 
F'rc.ncisco contin ge nt \11as very disturbed. l\!'."t.h u r Dolan asked 
lhsbet how it would be possible to tie in an P.ast 'ld..y c1istrict. 
~;ith the envisioned :region al operation,. Nisbet r -epea teJ th8 ~''. '.1 3l 
n ay operation would be a strictly loca l one, just like San 
F r a n cisco's Municipal Railway. Th er e was no confli.ct. l dn 
13 z.· ow ne said he sa\v possible difficu lt ies in v10rk ing out u. n 
arcansement. Dolcin agr~ed with 8r:owne i: t at forminq an Ea s t :i<l.'f 
district would make it rnore difticulLt to financ•: a re :;( ona l 
s y s t e m . S \oJ a n re s po n Ll e d h e co u l d no t co n c e i v Q u [ a n y o t h t:: r 
ob jt.=:,ctive thar1 integrating the µropused Fast l~ay jist.r.ict \<.ritl\ 
an y overall opera.tion. l\nother l\.lar.1eda County repr~se n tat.iv e 
a s 1< e li w ~ 1 y c.. n Eu s t. !3 a y l o ca l s y s t e t<1 w o u l d h a. r m f i n a n c i l"l ':J f o r a. 
eg ional system when San Francisco's locc:il system wouldn't. :. n 
any case, he thought. t.hat local transit would r-einain luc.::illy 
operate-d even after the regional systern b e gan opt~rat ·n:::li he 
didn't see any integration problems. Dol a n repl i e d it <l id not 
s e e. unlikc-ly to him that stu•li~s c.:urrcntly un d erw a y w o ul d 
indicate the desirabilicy of having San F rancisco iH1<1 · as t Ba y 
1 ucal transit line& operated by the sa i e agency th at ran th e 
r e gion al system. ~lan Browne said a separate East Bay transit 
<H st. r" ct would confuse ~he financial coiamuni.ty. Cyril 7'-~a sni h, a 
leading San rrancisco crm merchant,. stepl;ed in to pt·ov os e: t hat a 
spec i a l com m i t tee be : o r m e d com po s e u o f me m be r s f r om s a n 
P r .:i n c _i s co a n d t he -e:: a s t IJ a y t o t r y to w o r k o u t a n a cc o m rn o - d t i o ri . 
13ARTC vot.~d its approval of this motion. 
When t his special committee met in early 1955 the San 
Fra ncisco tiler 1 be r~ stressetl ·t.he neGd for uni :;,y an.rJ for ·1:l<-:1 '.( Lng !iU re 
the East Bay action did not jeopdrdize t h e lur >:J 0r project. Th l~ 
Eas t 13ay cont_in(.:1ent pro,tt:st.ed t.ht:ir sincerity, err-.ph.:si<'..ing t.he iz:-
a l leg i a n c e to t: -e g ion al go a 1 s . 'l' he s u m m i t w a s a bl c to r '.:! <""J (: h 
ayrt::ements on language t.h.:i.t was acceptabl~ to Si:J.n J· 'rancisco. 
'rhe financin<j concerns eXt)r~ssed by Dolan and l~rown~ '"i::nt 
t 0 t h e u 11 c e r ta i n t l. e s t h Ll t. w 0 u 1 d e x L s t f 0 r b 0 l1 d h c' 1 1 e r s l r t \H:1 
autono mou s acplncies J•rovi_dec! service 111 t\ie 8·'•1'1L' t(:::r1 1 t.<Jl'y. 
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Without some kind of understanding it would be possible for one 
agency to take ac~ion that would jeopardize the r~v~nue 
generating capacity of the other. Such action could threa t en t h e 
security of the bondholders. Interestingly, however:, t, e 
provisions fin~lly agreed upon were vague and did not provide any 
.-::oncrete guidelines for future relations between agencie!>. The 
leaderships on bot.h sides of the nay infor:,1ally agr0e<l on a 
division of laboc. lJowever, nothing specific would ever be 
LegCJ.lly adopted. Tlle East Bay had decided it wanted a transit 
district. In the interests of the larger regional p r oject S~n 
Francisco reluctantly acquiesced . Ironically, th~ intE::gration 
that was s~pposed to characterize rel.ationn between the P"1y J\rr,:.d 
and Enst nay systems did not spontaneously e1 'H~rge. In Ea c~-. 
relations between the Bay Area Rapid Transit District and t!1c 
A]a;~1eda Contra Cost.a 'l'ransit District have been cllar<..1ctcr iz<;' d by 
a great deal of bit.terness pl-ecisely on the issui~ of int.egrat1on 
and the a.i::)propria te role each is best suited to pl y. 
Following f3ARTC's endorsement of 2. transj_t district for 
the East. ~a.y, Alameda Senator Ilree<l submitted e· r. abling 
legislation. The procedure called for the creation of a ~istrict 
by a vote of the people in the proposed area. In ad d ition, 
people would elect the district. board of dir~ctors by ·.Jard. '!'he 
district would be able to sell bonds for a11 amount up t.o tl.Yent.y 
percent of the assessed valuation of district property . 
Furthermore, the district was authorized to levy a property tax 
for any distric~ purpose; no limit was set on an allowable tux 
rate. 
Tne only controver&ial aspect of t~e legislation w a 5 its 
provision::i dealing with t:r:ansit labor. The P.ast Bay wa s di·Jided 
on the quest.ion of whethe'C a civil service-style merit 'e r-sonn e l 
system or collective bargaining procedu-res ought to gov "'rn.. 'T'he 
o r i_ 'J i n i.I l b i 1 1 ca l l e d f: o r .:i m e r i t ~ y s t I.? tri .• I n ad d i t. i o n , the b i 11 
did not say anything about what would happen to transit workers 
in fi rrns that were acquired by a district. 
/I. new set of labor provisions was soon arnend0·d into u-,e 
bill. Collective bargaining betw~en a trC.JnsLt union .:1:-.d a 
dist.rict was mandated. Moreover, to the extent nec~ssary for 
service, all workers of a utility taken over by a transit. 
district would get the same jobs wi.th the district. and would n0t 
suffer u.ny decline in stn.tus. District workers were, however, 
forbidden ~o strike. The more conservative elements in the East 
Bay had been persuaded that things would •JU H•or~ .si.,oothly, 
politically and economically speaking, if these concessions t.o 
organized labor were granted. ;h~ labor provisions were c.men 1 : 1~u 
further to protect the fringe benefits of affected private sector 
workers. 
Given t.he long history of strong anti-public uwne=ship 
a.nd anti-labor union sentiment in the East Bay, the relativ~~ly 
smvotb legislat.ive passage of this transit district bill wus 
ext.rilordinary. It reflect.ed t.hc p oli ti c.al str-engt.h of. tlle 
uownt.O\oJll Oetkland le~<lcrship iTl loc<:Jl an1l state poliLics, und '-.;:c 
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confidence the coalition felt re ya rd i ng its ability to r.iiH1"19e its 
triu1sit affairs. ~d.thin its Jomain t.he- elected uoL1r(i of di.c'-'-'-:t\_,r:-s 
would. govern as no other tr.:rnsit di rec tiny body could anywhere on 
t.hJ.s continent. The /\lameda-Contr-a Costu. 7rat1si_t 11 }.sl"(l.Ct h·.:t. 
was a pioneering piece of legislation in several ways. 
The unrestricted and Unlimited property taxing powt:r-s 
gr.cnted to the district directors were unique, No other pul;l 1;.; 
transit agency had any taxing power of its own at all. '1'1ie.., e 
:i:;-owers would allow the district a grecit deal of flexibil.ity in 
financing operations frorn a variety of combinations of f~r e bo x 
and prop c rt y tax revenues . TI) e t wen t y per c 8 n t of 7l. s s E: s s •..::. d 
valuation bonJin<] cap.-1cii::.y was extremely generous. Furth~r1;\C>r~, 
t:1e fact the district did not have to see"k a pp roval Cro:t. ot:~~:r 
tJOVernmental a.gencies be[ore subr:iitting a b o n d :;_ssuc t<J tl·e 
,:,lectorate represented ci 'JLo!nt of fon«al autono1ny th;jt ~•iU•/ other-
tro.nsportation agencies, including aui..horiti~s, lJid not.: posSQ:;s. 
The labor provisions wen~ likewise pioneering. •rLis wu.s 
th e first ti1~1e agenci.~s of <Jovern ment i n California v/1::.'re alloW ~ · -1 
an d manddted to recognize labo r un i ons and sign co l l e ctive 
b argaining agreements. \.'hil~ they gave up th~ ri g ht to !'it1~i~:.e, 
nev e rtheless, t.1H:: local unions involved were mor e concern e d with 
g~inlng recognition and bargaininy rights. Public sector l.:ilio 
or 9a niz1.ng received a boost. The provisions esto.bl ishi n s 
protection for private s~ctor workers supervisori~l employees 
w2re no:. sirnilarly protected - were also precedent-setting in tl1c 
California transiL tndustry . 
. l\.f ter t.he passage of the legis la ti on the [ .. isl r_id.Y Lt ,':Jns it 
l eadership re-organized to car:tpaign for district £or;;1.zition.. 
'nhr e e BARTC ;•1ewi)-ers wo\Jld be pur t of the co 111 rn i t t~l2 (Jrepa r i. n <J for 
t 1e e lection. T:icy wert! t..liere, as Sherwood Swan to1d iJJ\l~ ' ['C, tt) 
~ ·uard against the po:;sib.:.lity of East Bay objectives conf ' i c:t1n<j 
w i t h those· of the regional movement. ,l\s an inte·.;iral po.rt uf 
their election publicity, those speaking on beha.Lf of· ..in Ed'_;t. \3...Jy 
di. stl..-ict st.ressed the complementarity between the l.oc:.=il effo 1-l 
and t he r~gionol sysle~ being developed by BARTC. 
Joseph i-<:no\vl nd, the "u:ch-conscrvative Oakland Tribun 
p 1:1 b l i. s. he r a n d l ea d i n 'J a c t 1. v i s l l n t h e r i g h t - w i r HJ u f s t a t e a n ci 
n ationc:il -Rep\.itblican parties, supported t.he creation of c.:..n 1.::ast 
:Jay transit district. Knowlan.d concisely and prccist::ly explaineiJ 
his reason ·for: supporting governmentalization; his con;rnent sumr.ieJ 
up the relationship between business ideology and business 
politics on the transi:. yuesti0n: "I am not an advoc'.~t.2 of 
~ u b l i c o w n I? r sh i p , a s s u c. h • 8 u t w e a r: e h e r e con £ r o n t e G w i t h .. 1 
condi t.ion, n•>t a theory.'' 
The l\L).med.a-contra Costa Transit District was cr 1~aV>J by 
vote of the people in 195 (.. However, t11e pl ace co1~1pe t .it ion 
dynamic constrained ever.. so po\.,,erful a coalition as the Oc:ikl<1;1d 
CDU .. Coalitions in por-tions of Cont.ra Cost.ei County O!? . osed 
<l.i.stricl formation because they fear-eo ::Jotilin.ation by OO\v!~to1·1!l 
O"lkland. The n8w district would soon fu.ce a serious cha l 1•:1' ;,. 
from within its own midst. When ACTD r:ioved to buy-out T<ey and 
begin operating service its at"eal extent was cone:tru.ir,L?<l hy 
competir.g coa 1 it ions in southern Alameda und central and 0::a s t.e ~- n 
Contra Costa. As a result, a successful BART project r~ mained il 
crucial downtown Oakland objectiv~. 
The San Francisco-Oakland fract.ur!:: may '1-1:·:.\le ".Jeen st:!ale.J, 
bu t n e w f a u l t 1 i n •...'. s a 9 f> ~ a r e d a s n fl. R ·r c s h o o k u p t h c l 9 s 7 
legislat.i.ve session . When the shaking stopped the Bay J\ren Rapid 
Transit District (BARTO) was in place, w~thout, however, Santa 
Clarci. County being in it. Santa C l ara County business dnc.l 
political leaders were dce?ply concerned with the ovtonomou.5 
economic aevelopment of their area. Mar.nfacturing industr i s 
were their primary concern, hence their keen interest in - a nd 
disapµointment. with - the fat.e of the southern crus.s ir<3. A rail 
rapid transit syste1~ focused on the San Francisco CD~ Gid little 
to advance this interest, and th ccutened develop1::ent aspirat.icm:• 
in San Jos.e . 
Reflecting the intensely controversial nature of t~e 
project, C\ARTC sought. district. creation l)y tri.e governor, ,inc 
gubernatorial ~:ippointrnent of the boa.re of <..~"i.C"ectors. '.i'he fl. R7n'i-~ 
i_) r o p e r t y t il. x i n g po \..t e r s a n d i t s u c c e s s to the r e g i on • s t:. a x b o s e 
were relat.ively H<Ore constrained thail ACTD's.. Moreover, Su ;·1 r·utr~o 
County had insist~d on u. provisio1t enab1.i.ng counties to ecH:iily 
withJI"aw fror.i the District, befor~ any c.:::>1:·,1,·1itmcnts \H.: rr?! maJ~;. 
Hith Santa Clara already gone an<l Sein Mateo clearly \vaverin':;, the 
re9ional nat.urc of the project, from the downtowr: S<',::. ~- rancisco 
po i n t o f v i e \v , w a. s i n j e o !? ;:n d y be c a u s e o f l i k e l y f u t u r e t rd v e l 
patterns. The traffic mcvement into the San Fronc i sco Ci?>D .f:ro;;: 
~he peninsula was then, an~ was fo~ecast to be su bstant i ~lly 
larger tliun the CUD-bound movement from the E:ast. Gay. 
BARTO hired. a joint. venture composed of Parsons1 
Br inckerhoff and twc locally based engine~ring and con.struct.i..on 
fi r111s, Tudor and Bechtel, to engineer their- systen. i~'hile th~~ y 
worked, however, relations betwe.en t11;:; District and San ~'l atP.o 
Coun t.y s t.ead i ly worsened. The main 11 ne of oplJOSi ti on was t he 
s a r,H~ as ha d a i v i de d s an franc i s co and oak land ear l i e r a n a h D d 
paralyzed the Los J\.11<.Jeles movement. ,\ peni.n.suL:i grou1) cle<tr l; 
articulated the conflict: "The tra:isit distt-ict is d ~s i s rii=d 
almost Erntirely for- ·the purpose of moving people into ,H~ J. out of 
the San Francisco and Oakland business district.s to t.ne detriment 
0£ the development of San Muteo County." COlllbine<l v: i.t t l'e 
elimination of the southern crossing, ancl Southern Pac1f~c.:'s 
f r e i g h t-b .a s e d op po s i t ion , th e \.J i th d i:: a w a l p r e s s u r e :3 ~ :: ca 1,1 e 
inte11se , During the early post~·1ar period San Muteo develop1~erit 
had been primarily residential, so interest in rapid transport 
c on n e c t ion s to e x i s t i n g a n~ D s o f c m pl o y 1 '• '-'-' n t co n c e n t r a t. i o .n w a s 
great. However, a.s the l950's wore on, office/commercial 
acti.viu.es the kin <ls of octivitit!S Cl30 •:Jroups Sd.W i:.!S 
" n a tu r a lJ y " c ~ n t r a l i zed - i. n c re a s i n g l y d eve l o J..> e (l i n out l y i n y 
dre<:Js. Place-Dosed int ~r ~· st.s coa.lescinSJ in th0se outlyiri<J 
business cente rG opposed the down t.own-rad i al i nit ia ti ve, call in~ 
for transport L1cilitit>s that would fa c i.1 itate autonomous 
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e~onomic growth. In late 1961, the San Ma tso county aoa rd of 
supervisors voted to w i t'.1dr~n,.1 from BARTU. "1 it h San Mat eo g on~, 
Marin County was forced to withdraw; the sh run ken tax bas~ ""ou l d 
not support a Golden Gate crossing. 
Indeed, the Oistr.ict Jisintegrat1011 proces s nearly we nt. 
us f a r as Contr~ Costa County. Outlyioy business ce:ntPr 
inte r e sts argued for withdrawal from 8AJ'.Z'i'U, just ·'1S they ;.;uu•Ji t... 
to rer.-1ain outsir:e /\C':"D's jurisaictiori. llowL-:!Ve r , l.:a gt-
res i dentia.l developers .i.n the ct:ntrul portion of thld coun ty, w1w 
h a d b een le~din9 activist.s since the transit mov em ent.. ~ 0 <J:J n , 
rn a n a s e d to keep L 1 e Co u n t y i. n . A v er y ,j i f fer en t , 1 1 u ch s ma l i ,~ r 
".\ A WJ' system th a n the one envisioned in R<2giona l P-a p id '1 r a ris J. t 
lir,1pea on to t·11e 1962 L>al lot. wlM:~re a VE:ry h e avy pr o-P.AP.1' vote ir. 
.San Fran cisco, linked t.o the freeway r-evol t., barely edg e c i.t. ovvr 
the top. 
BART reprE~scnts the triu mph of<:! spatially l.i.1~ 1 i ted 
a lliance composed of the Si'ln <Francisco and oak land CBD coa I it ions 
- n d their East Bay resi<l~ntial development allies. In crnc 
i mpor t ant sense the Dl\R'r success wus possiblt:= because of .l 
co l te xtual dimension not direct l y related t.o eit l1 r 
t. r a. n s p o r t a t i o n o r r, 1 e t r o p o l i t a n d e v ·~ l o p r:1 c n t a t a i 1 : t. ~ 
<JOVernment.al structure of the Bay re 19 ion. 'I'hc fiJ.cL t l :..).t u . ~ 
t;~ e t t; of' o 1 i t u n a r e a w a s cJ i v i r3 e d i n t o c o u n t. i ...'! ;:.: l 1 er 1;1 :i t t ~ d 
disc:l~~'Jr12- y-ation as -,1el l as allj_arice l.Juil.J1n1J , OJ.•rone nts , s uch a s 
San r-ldtl!O anu Santa. Clara coul.d withdraw -..;ithout stal 0 rnati 1iy t il e 
entir e r:iov:::.:ment. So long dS tl1e movem.ent '.•as ""1ble to su~ c e e1 j n 
other count. ies, t he n 1 i mi t.cd alliances •.verr: p1..Js s i b l e . G i v .: 1 ~ ~ ) 1c1 
s p <l. t illl distcil>u t ·on of develo p ment o.mJ politi ca .l p0vH• r 1r: 
7\ lai 1eu·c. .:int.I Contra Costa c ounties at that point .lt'\ hi~t.ury, ll10 
rnuve1<1 c;,·n ': was al)le to prevai l . 
Such a sulut.ion to ti\e l;lact::: coni1Jetition d yn a mic: \·: as u t 
o. va i.l ablc in Los l\oc.Jel~s County. '\')11:l' very l~r ge n um be r u f 
e x i s t i n ~ bu s i.. n c: s s c l? n t <2 r !i • c a c h ~" i t n i t G ow t1 l o c a l 1 y - o r i e t ) t " ·J 
developni·.~nt aspirations, made coal i tlon bui l d in•3 bas€d 011 t. ;:ins i..1:. 
s ystein Jesi':ln impO$Sible. Inde~d, RT1\G's _•rulJC.s a l to pla c ' r a i 1 
r a p i d tra :tsiL lines in free1.1J d. Y rn edia L'LS virt ,ually elir11in a t c J rn ust 
p h y.;icol possibilities of co01Li.tion huil J inr;J 1 beca.usc o f t}).;~ 
d ist<ince: 'l::f~twccn fr~ew;:iy transit s te.L "ion$ an] OLt t .l y.i.. :v:l busin~~; r:) 
c c n t e r s . 1' h a t a t l t I 1 e s e o u t 1 y i n g c e n t e t· G "'' e r e s 1) a t i a l l y 
a i stribut.ed \.Ji thin Los l\ngeles County ( s well il:i 1.1J it hi. i1 the 
C i t y ) p !.'" e v C? n t e Ll d i s .:i ry ·J r e <J u t i o n . T h e L , !\ . C ! , I~ i n i t i u l i. v 1:~ , 
therei:orel was s t..:; le1~1 a t:--·d . 
1'he Ba.y /\rea., ho-.-1evcr, soon came to exhib i t the dy n<1rnics 
of an intensel y competitive metcopolit.:~. n area wi t h a ve .1.:; e.:.nc•:?. 
r·.s outlying b.:lsiness centers d~ve!opet1 1 de1:1an d.s fc; r loci'\lly-
or i-c nted transit service i n ee-ea sed in u rgency. Fo l l o in'} th e i r-
w i t hrJ raw al from the regional rail rapid transi t project, Sun 
Mateo and S~nta Cldra Counties each cr ea ted their own transit 
districts. Har in County latt:!r cre;:ited a district as \.Jell. 
I n s L ea d u f a u n i f i ·~cl r e '.:I i 0 n - · .-1 i de .s y 5 t e m ri u r i n 'l t h ~ l. ') 7 •) ' .:: t Ii·-~ 
na y ,'\re<:> now l ' o n td i.ncd no f c=· "'• e c· 1 h.i ! eigl1l t1ul o 11o m o u~; Lr .. 11 :.o J_l 
properties, six of which wei:e public agencies. (SP u:-td Gr e yhound 
continued private operation ~t this time.) This nro f usion of 
governmentalization, witii u._ minir:1al amount of coo 1) e ration un 
fares, transf~rs and service policies, an(: an iriter•~!.itin~ au~ouot 
of over L..~p on certain routes as well. f;.~ii t.-n!:u l ly ru !Jrud uced the 
co1;lpetition prevailing in the metropolitan political econo1?1y. 
The Ji\any f?Ul>l i c as enc ies 1 each seeking to facilitate rJ,~ve ~ - ornen t 
aspirations, int~ n s if i e d tis ca 1 c r is i s pressure s. l' h e s e 
_,:;ressures, in turn, generated another round of i.n~ e rv c nt ion - t '1e 
:;e t.ropol i tan Tr<insportation Commission - and cont in'-1 ing e [for ts 
to rat.ional.i.ze trar1sit in the region. 
CSD's vs. Suburbs 
T 11 re f o .l. l o "' in~ ca s e s tu u y o f gov e ~ n "'en ta l i 7.. a t i on i\ n cJ 
regionalization .Ln tlie Seattle aud Portl0.nd metropolita n ar~as 
J. .i i< e \..i i s e i 11 u s t r < 1 t e s th e d y n a 1.1 i c s o f s _pa t. i a l co m p e t i t i o 11 , a s 
downtown coalition initiatives cH·e resisted by outlying arcr.\s. 
°.\Yhile these two metropolitan areas are in 1~ ransition L:co; .. CUD-
do1;linant to intensely competitive, as the Sa.n Francisco !3ay l\.rea 
c a 1 :: e to be , the re a r ~ i fi1 po r t Li n t d i £ f e r e n c t:: s . l-' r e c vJ o. .'.l r 1~ v o 1 t s 
were. in progress anJ the environmental m:Jvement was r3ather.i.n9 
str~n13th in th<.: ra.cif ic North1.-.1est. The defeat of the Seattle C' L3D 
trcinsit invest.1:;'-!nt progro~-1 i:lnd the controversy <".:iCli~r u. teu l:y t.ie 
craation of the Tri-Metropolitan Trnnsit District in th e ?urtland 
area, therefore, i 11.umlnate the fundamental nature of sp<1 t i a l 
cot:'lpctit.ion in t•ansit politics. Indeed, in the Port:lelnu case, 
g o v e r n i~i t:! n ta l i z a t. i on w a s i n t. e n s e l y con t r o v e r s i a l E: v r.: ?1 i n t he 
absence of .an <"l mbi tious do\..intown/ radia 1 rai 1 rapid transit r)lan, 
as was the case in Scatt. J e. Th~ Portland area conflict pror u c ecl 
a governr:1ental ag{;:ncy t/1.'lt WdS structurally sir:1ilar to LJ\MT/I. -
one created by the goverr.or ~vith a Board of Directors u.ppoin t.f~d 
'oy the governor - yet was much l~ss constrained than LT\MTA. 'l'hl: 
greater financiu.l and service flexibility wa . .:; due to the t_Jr ectter 
strength the Purtlc.rncl Cl~D cod.l i ti.on wielded in state politics a.t 
this _particular _point in time relu.t.ive to downtown Los /\n,~2les. 
Gubcr11atoria.l cr~ation and uppointmcot. WC.!re Portl r :3 CL~[) 
strategics a i 1:1ed at dis ti.tile i n<3 the new govern 1~ 1'.! n t P! l a<jen 'Y ft· om 
outlyin•J ar~a pressures. Given the increasir:y.ly co•:1pct ttivc 
natur~ of the Port.la nu r.1ct.~opo ! i tu.n area, t.hou<3h, t. l i~ p ol i tice:i l 
insulation built into Tri-:l~t produced a very cautiou:3 entity. 
Efforts to governn1entalize and regionalize transit in the 
seat.tle ci.nd Por-tland metropolitci•1 areas ill'.;.str-ate Vie _political 
dynarni cs characte:rietic of the transit ion from a ci:m-dor;iinant t.o 
::. n i:icreasingly coiapet.it i ve cor:text. Dut·ing the p eriod 196.'l -
l'J72 service and inst.i. tut ional innovations were adopt~d iii b•.)tt1 
<..treas in respons e to the Sci1ne proble 1.1: the in,_-ibil i ty o .E t.hc 1·,-
existing central ci ty tr.1ns.it ~ystc m s tu provi.cle the k_tnd:'.i uf 
service thought necessary by CL'D cud litiuns. rr_;_vatt.'lj-Oh'Uecl 
·.,'.ose City Transit anJ 1~1un.~ci.pally-own~cl Seal:.t c T ransit were 
incre.asinsly i.n fi.11anc.iaJ Ji [ficulty c...ncl •.v\~r- e c ,H11J :·1t .u1 z1 
du1vnwcrJ spiral of t>hysica l <'Ind service d et.e riordtion. Hor:QOv~r, 
both properties were severely limited in terms of their areal 
extent. 
The Portland and sea ttlt: areas shared another contex tu.:1 l 
feature as well: both were nationally known as leaders in the 
burgeoning environr.1ental movement, as wer~ their respective 
states. In addition, Seattle was facin~ a freeway r0volt Juring 
the period when major transit. innovat.ions were on the 
metropolitan political agenda. The par~~cu!dr innovations and the 
rout.es to their adoption dif(ered in the two areas, yet in both 
cases competitior. between the CBD and outlying centers structured 
the innov<ition process and the outcomes, even though the level 
of environmer. ·i:.~l consciousness io both areas ~vas quite high. 
The Ot!fc-at of Rail. l~apid Transit in Seattle 
Seattle-area voters defeat~d bond issues for extensive 
rapid transit systems i.n 196!~ .:nd i070, parrying initiatives 
developed by Forward Thrust. In 1972 Ki;;~ County voters .:5:!nnlly 
agreed :.o a. lit11it.ed progn1m of regionalization and modern1~ation, 
aut.horieing t.he Municip<J.lity of netropolitan Seattle (~!etro) to 
levy a transit sale tax, take over Seattle Transit, anu operate a 
County-~iac bus system. 
o n e p o l i t i c a l a n a l y s t c a. 1 l e d !:'' o r vJ a r d T h :: u s t , 
" ... unqu.e:st Lonably the most lmpressive example in the history of 
Seatt.le's charact.er~ stic 'governr:1ent by citizens' grou p s. It 
represented a ~assive effort, in large parl successful, by a 
bro.:i.dly based citizens' con1mit.:t.ee t.o develop a courd5.ridt.ed 
capi tul-i mprovement prog:ram for the metropolitan rcqion"30 'T'I e 
i de a for Forward Thrust was advanced by .JC"Jr:ies Ellis, .a Seattle 
C.BD lawyer who };au been a leo.der in t he rnov1~rnent to create Met.ro 
i n th ~ l , t t e r l 9 5 0 ' s . l n t e r e ::; t i. n y l y e no u 9 h 1 t h e o L- i ~ i n a l ;· 'I e t r o 
proposa l called f or a regiondl agency that would handle sewnge, 
plann .1ny as well as t.ra11sit for the metropolit<in ar e a. Tl1is 
pro~osaL was defeated in early 1958, however, a revised version, 
leav.~ ng tran~it out, wa~ approved later in the ye.1r. Another 
James E lLs-led effor t to includ~ transit as a Metro function was 
defeot _d in 1962.. E ll is, as well as other c:w coalit).on leaders 
remained committed to a rapid tr.::i.nsit system. In the mid-l 960's 
the city of Seattle pressur~d the Pug0.t. Sound Govern . . entu.l 
ConfeY.:E'nce to sponsor a rapid tr21nsit stuuy, wh:i. cll wo.s d one by 
DeLeuw, Cather and submitted in November, 1965.31 
On 3 November 1965, El.li~~ formally callet'.l for a "Forward 
Thrust" in a sp&ech to the Seattle Rotary ClLlt» In this speech 
r-: l 1 is c le a r l y C) rt i cul ate a the ideology o [ c:.i cu D- do 111 in ant 
;:i.:t.c-opolitan area. He envisioned do\l.lntowti Sci'lttle as the 
en:ployment, tourist, trade and cultural core of .::i great t·egion. 
Seeki nlJ to sh.-::ipc popular consciousness on this issue throu<jh the 
nst.:. uC a sugge.:>live biologicul ::nctaphor, E:l l is likc 11eJ the C PD to 
tlit:, " ... heart of the city [that] pur:.ps life givii .. , ,J blu()d i..nto 
t h e ::> u b u r b a n i:l r e a .. . " .:i n d i s '' .•• c o 1-1 r l e m e n. t a r y r: a t h e r t. t1 ;:s_ n 
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c o m pc t i t i v e ... " \J i t h s u b u r b a n bu s i n e s s c e n t e r s . tJ e w tr a 1 \ s po r t 
facilities were key to the successful functioning o~ the greoter 
Seattle organism: '' ... if the core:! is to develop to its 1~H1ximum 
US8fulness, rapid transit must be a major ele~ent of the 
rr-etropolitan transportation system." 32 
In the summer of 1966 Forward Thrust for ma 11 y ci-:1erged, 
leu by the following comrnunity activists: the president. of 
Seattle First National nank as president of the Forward Thrust 
Uoard of Directors; a Boein~ vice president as vice-president of 
the Thrust Board; the president of the Seattle Chamber of 
COJ:lMerce as vice-president of Forward Thrust; the prcsii:~nt of 
Pacific Northwest~rn llell as treasurer; and James Ellis as first 
a vice-president, then presiderit of_ Forwu.rd Thrust. T! 1e Ct1ar~·1bl':r 
of Ccmmerce loaned a staff member to serve as executive director. 
S12eittle's 111ay(.)r was an erithusiastic supporter. Careful not to 
appear to be dictating the infrastructural projects necessary LO 
.•_:.:~ope l S ca t t l e to \v or l a c i t y s t a tu s • For w a r d 'l' h :r u s t p l a n n e d l:1 
year of intensive citizen particic>ation to identify p?:iority 
capital facility needs. 
In e;:irly 1CJ60 Forward Thrust placed more t.han $800. 
million worth of capital improvewent projects on the ballot".. 'fhe 
largest was an extensive, downtown-radial rapid transit system, 
estimated to cost $385 million.33 An extensive public relations 
campaign was undertaken in support of the bond measures, led by 
the Seattle Times, which carried a weekly "Forward 'l'hrust forum'' 
coluJl\n in which movement experts responded to reader queries. 
organized opposition to the transit ballot measure was apparently 
limited to efforts by a suburban realt.or to discredit the rapid 
'transit program on the bases of excessive cost, fut.ure f inancial 
subsidy cequirements, u.n.J the inappropriateness of a doh·ntown-
radial fixed guideway transit system. A television reporter who 
criticized the proposal was SC\id to have been fired because of 
his stance. 3 4 
Yet the rapid transit measure failed to gather the 60% 
nt:firrnat:ive vote needed, even as seven of the other eleven 
ballot measures passed. The defeat shocked the C£3D coalition. 
Bowever. t.he fact that sl-ightly more than 50% of the voters 
approved the proposal encouraged Forward Thrust to submit a 
slightly revised version to the electorate in 1970, accompanied 
by a very aggressive public education campaign that reached 
"feve.rish ~report.ions." The second time around just 46% of the 
voters sup~orted the rapid transit proposai.35 In addition to 
suburban realty opposition, two University of Washington 
engineering professors, both leading urban transportation 
e~perts, were active and vocal opponents. The academics 
questioned the population and employment forecasts that were the 
bases for the rapid transit proposal, arguing that these were 
inf lated in order to make a downtown-radial rapid transit system 
appear necessary. Since forecast demand for -c.he transit system 
was questionable, the cost effectiveness of the plan was 
doubtful. Reflecting the controversy swirling about t.he f>roject 
and about the role of cicad.~mic analysts, one of the professors 
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l.--ece1vec telephoned death threats <luring debates leading up to 
the votE.36 In the face of stiffening resi~-:;t.ance a deflate:l 
Forward Thrus~ disbanded. 
Seatt.le Transit, surprised to fi:1<l l.Lself s t i 11 i n 
business, gamely tried to play a progressive rol~ in facilitating 
d o 1. . J n t c \·J n S e a t t l e a s p i r a t i o n s . I n 1 9 7 0 t h e c i t y :·::. y s t e 111 
in,:ugura L.ed eight ''U 1 ue Streak'' express bus routes f ro1n out. l yin(_) 
ces 1d~ntiul ureas to the Cl3D via "freeway.37 vJhen Metro took ov\:: r 
i n 1 972, the new regional ayency mociernized the sy:.;ti~i;t a n~1 
u n d c i:- t o o k ."l. n a m b i t. i o u s pro y r a rn o f J o \·J n to \11 n - r ad .\. d l t r u n s i t 
e xpa~;sion, increas:i.ng peak-hour servj_ce to the Seattle CP,1) Dy 
1 ore than 25% b~tween 1076 and 1978.JO 1ncr:e.-:1sir;g d ow n to w n 
reception capacity through som~ form of rapid transit :i:e11)ains a 
9rimary Metro pla;ining objective. Meanwhile, r1ctro iv1s r t::spon (Je d 
to the fiscal pressures generated by its exp.:insion.i.st progra. 1a 
with pioneering eontructs allowing for siyn.fic.1:1t ust:;": ot: 1.••·i rt-
tim~ labor, and with an emphasis on prograra budgeting a n J 
rr1ailctCJ ''! ;11eot. 33 
Metro has been able to do o.s rnucll as it has Eur 
th~ Seattle COD because of the leadin9 role played by the City -
led by JamBs Ell.is - in the fonr:ation of the regional agency. 'fhc 
p oliticc.l structu:re of the agency reflects t.he strength of 
s~ attLe in metropolitan and state politics, arid the rel iJt " v e ly 
iow level of suburban political activism. As nellevut.• c c ntinues 
to ~row as a business C8ntcr rivalling Seattle in size, t h e 
.L>olitical dynamics associi'lte<.1 with a more inte:·1scly cor:1p~t.iti·.1c 
rnetropolitan c0ntext will cr.1erge. 
GovernMentalizution in Portlnnd 
t·J h i l e re g ion et l r a p i d t r a n s 1 t. w a s t. h e ma i n ob ~ <::', ct i v e 0 f 
t. 1, e Se a t t l !'::! CB D co a l i ti on 1 Po rt l <ind !lad ye t to gov e r nm e n t a l i z. ~ 
t t s t r a n s i t o p e r a l i o n s . A s p e c .i f i c r a l> l cl t r o 11 s i t. p · u n 
crystallized politica l c o nflict in th~ Pugc.;t ~~ound regi on. 
Sven in the absence of ~ pa rticular proposal, spiltial compe ti t i on 
.~·;nu related issues of control and fihance were the diL11e11si 0:.;n s 0f 
con~· l ic~ cJur lng the Port l Lind are.:::i 9overnrncntul ization pcocess. 
l n ea r l y Nov e m be r , l 9 6 8 , the man i::l. 9 e 1:1 .. ~ ri t of ry o ~ e c i t y 
':':Cansit shut down the operution for two days, ignorin'.) u Port.l nd 
C i ty Council ultir::atum to t!ither run the buses oi: torfci.t. its 
f ranciu.se. Rose City was the l'3st re1.1ainin~ pr i v.:itely-owned 
\ .. ro.nsit $yst.em~ paying t. ~1e lowt:st wages, of all nujor west (:Ca.st 
cities. The t-cansit. wo:rkers had just rejected a co•<1pany Wd<J C 
pro~osal, precipitating the management action. Whe n an agreemen t 
,,;a,s reached granting drivers and mechanics modest was.: inc:re<\ .s e s , 
Rose City readied a fare hike. request for t.he City co.rncil. ~vh - n 
the request came in early nece1nber, the Council voted instead to 
revoke Rose City's franchise in six months and take over t.~oe l ~u s 
line. The Council re1:1soned that anotbe:r fare h ike \l/Oul:..! on : y 
:.:x<3cerb~te the p..:ocess of 'r:'."idership an<3 service d e cline l!1u t h .i d 
Jl 
br0ug!1t Rose City to it.s current. Llebilitated condition. p o rtldnu 
political .lea<l<:!-rs hoped that munici?al ow ne rshi p 1~ oulu : ).:: ; 1n 
intecir.1 effort, s;iving \vdy to a rnetropolitan wide cl 'Jen<.:y i 11 th e 
very near future. ,\s in t.he cas e of seatL.:..c ;ra: ) ~; i t , Rc :::; e c · t. y '!:> 
jurisdiction was lir,1ite<l to t.1112 cl::'.ntral city 11nd a Uirc e -n"i le 
band beyond the c i t.y' s boundary. S uburba n- 1..L..> wn tow n ru d iu l 
service was provided by four small private com;~nies, who w~re in 
si::i ilarly poor financial and service conrlition. !·! o se Ci t y h·;d 
shown neither strategic nor financial interest and ability in 
taking over these smaller suburban lines ancl consol .i. datin9 thcrn 
into c:i region-wide bus syster.t. r~elucta n t ly, therefore, Por t. l.::1nrJ 
embarked on a governmentalization process. ai rn .it':J at 
regionalization as we11.40 
The Portland City Council cre~ted a blue ribbon citizen s 
cor.117\itt.ee in December, 1968, the Mass Tt' LJ. nsit Auvisory 
Committee, to pr~pare a legislat.ive agenda fo-r th e tni r: sJ. t io r1 
from pr i v a t e to pub l i c . The s tat e 1 e g i s la ti v e p ro ;) o s <: l ~ 
developed by this group a.nJ. supported by the City reve aled quite 
c 1 c t'l r 1 y t ll e P o r t 1 a n d l e a d e r s h l p ' s a s s e s s r~i e n t o f s u b a r b a n 
political concerns. Re~ardin~ the transit distr·ict creation 
process, the City-supporte<.1 le<Jislati1Jh enobling cro:: d tion b y t h e 
governor. This would fo11-ow receipt or a resolution auopteli b y 
th..-• <JOVe.cning body of t.he most populous city i n a rnetrop ui_i t i.<:~ 
are.:l finding that are.::i-wide tra n sportation needs \·1ere no l b e i 11<d 
met by the locaJ. transi-;:. operation. Th·~ g o verno r \·1ou.L J ~:-, :~n 
at::point a sev~n-r:iember board of di.rectors for t h e t.r. c.. :1sit 
district. While the governor \.JOulcJ endeavor: to assure e<1ui t.able 
boan..i representation for all places in the district., the 9cver11or 
h a tJ t o t u l d i s c r e t. i on . F i n a 1 1 y , r e g a. r <l i n t.J f i n .1 n c e , ~ 
d.istrict~ould have c:ivaitable to it a wiJe ranye of possible ta x 
r:l..::Chanisms, sc;1ic of whicl l could be adopted by t.tie boa r-d of 
~ic~ctars without a vote of the district c l ec~orate.41 
In opposition to the Por-tland lnit.iativ.e, suL.1 r b «n 
co a l i t. i on s s po n sored a l e g i s 1 a t i v e pro po s a l t l 1 a t w o u l c! en a b 1 e 
c .r<~at.ion of a mult.i-purpose reqional c:.:; ~c ncy, havi ng se\\1 agP., 
solid waste as well as transit r "'sponsibilities, rathsr ·th ,•n t h e 
sir.g!.e-pllrpose transit distric t. Portland sought.. ~orc:over , 
cre.::Jtion 9f such a regional agency would h ave t.o be .3pproved t:y 
the elcct.orutc, along with its tax base. It.s hoa r d o f d i recto.r s 
\11ould be appointed by a convent i on of loczi l ly-elect.e 11 o f f ic ta l s, 
u. 11 o ca ti n 9 boa rd s ea ts i n a ma n n er th a t a n van c c; d !; u l.x 1 r L' a n 
interests. 21.2 
The Portland leadership was concerned that the transit 
issue, the one that was most pressing in their view, mig.nt b e 
submerged in a multi-purp0se agency sensitive t.o suburban 
development aspirations. Givl:'!n ';3)."itssroots support for bo t h 
~roposals, hO\vever, the state legislat.ure passed both. 'I'hE::: Ci t y 
seized the iniciative duriny t.he fall, 19G9, requesting the 
sovernor to create a district. Outlying area coolitions, who ha~ 
planned to place a multi-purpos-= .-1gency c o the i::iallot t l : <~ ne x t. 
y e<-i r , oµposeJ the City act.ion. The gove r r.o r, t'I O\"~ve r, c r ~.:i t c.:J 
<.lh~ Tr-i-County •' '.[•t.r·:.>polit..:in Transit r.~istrict (Tri-M e t), .-, ;" ~ 
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a:,~·,uint.~d its dii:cl..'.tors, several of whom we ·re m tt1';1 l:Jt·r"s o( the 
Ci.'c:.y-establislle<.1 Mctss Transit Advisory committee.13 
In November, 1969, Rose Clt..y Transit was locb:-' in 
struggle wit.h both the City of Portland over the fin.L11~ciol 
d imension of a public ta'keover, and with the transit \vor!~ r~rs' 
union regarcHng a new contract. l\s in 1968 4 labor- rnanagc1:1ent 
conflict threatened to disrupt service. Tri-Met dra ma t : ca l l y 
intervened at t.his point, requesting d permit fro>11 ttH~ Portl -:rncl 
City Council to operate a bus systern. The City Couoc-i l .:, rant e,_! _) 
pe rrnit . The Tri-Met Bo-)r<l then took up the intensely 
controvers1al question of district finaoce. 4 4 
Of all the mechanisms available to it, Tri~ M et chi:;se to 
i m p 1 e rn ~ n t an e in ploy e r. pa y r o l l t ~ x • S a t e s ta x es \v (~ r '~ be co i 1 i.: ! g 
increasingly popular as a revenue source for governm~ntal t.r<.1 n 5i t 
operatiO:\S around tlie United States. Sit1ce Oregon did not levy o. 
sa les tax, reflecr.ing long-stCinding oppositi on in the t ate, 
creatin<J t.he acii«iriistrdtive machinery necessary to collect t'rll. S 
tax: s te~red the Tri-net Board away fr-om it . The Board ~) l.SL") 
se n !l0d widespread political opµosition tot.he i rn l-.losition of d•i 
·>_nco:ne tax. The only other- tax the Board could i mpo se wi t hout a 
vote of the district electorate was a tax on em p loyer p a 1rolls. 
Tr i- H ~t pioneered the use of tbis tax in the Unit e d S t:a t.es .. ·lS 
n t. e restingly enow3h 1 i:l 1971 the Paris, France rr: etrOj,JOlitd.n 
transit agency adop~ed a differentiated employer payroll :ax to 
f i n a n c e i t s ope r a t i on s , The fr e. n ch Com m u n i s t P 0 r t y v1 a s t . h e 
leading advocate of this approach, claiming ct major victory on 
be ha 1 f of the Parisian working cl.ass. Indeed, the Paris appro<lch 
uf a s sessing employers in outlying areas at a lower rate than 
e rn p loyt::rs in th0 cel')_tral region would heive inaue a cire.::it. <l~al of 
sense in Portland. 4·1J 
The Tri-Met. i:.i.:i.y r o ll tax proposal- \~·as n~ver c'.ltt.J:ck1~ .J as a 
co1.1111unisl plot. lfowever, it. wa.s bittet-ly condemn ed by ontly intJ 
area business groups CJ.S grossly unfair. More tha n a ny o th e r 
finance mechanist.'\, t.he employer ·?ayrol l tax cry~~tul1 izes C ,l) -
suburbi!n conflict. on the tl:'ansit question. ~.t a hearing 
precceding the [-!Qard's action opponents charsed that, 
" ... :J usinessr.1cn in downtown r:>ortl.ancl, not in !:'.he subur b s, \.Jould 
b.;:1 1cfit from the raetropolitan bus systc ri .'' '!'}) ir r·- Mc t Boai:-u 
!?resident had earlier noted that he, " ... h.:ld not r4= c1::i ved any 
, e g a t i v e r e a c t i on f r o n do w n tow n r ,e t a i l er s w· ho w i 1 l b e p a y i n '-:J 0 
big share of the Fayrull tax.'' t>.notl\er tloard rne nibe r, a r1 Oreg on 
labor leader, added that !ie was, n • •• convinced that Tri-itet ·11.:1d 
com~ up with the fairest. tax inethod .... [t1]is c onscience w a s 
cle a r." An editoria,l i n the Or e gon Journa1 p .i. . p o .int i:0d the 
suburban rallying cry: " Taxation w i.thout transpor tat i o n ."4 7 
\1ithin days lawsuits were filed by suburban busin ess 
groups challcnginy the constit.1,.1tionality of the tax, ancJ 
r-1ovements emerged in Clackamas ~nd 'v.'a::;hington Counties to sl:!cede 
from t.he transit dist:r.~ct. The opposition cua le·sce<l in the 
Comm ittee for Metropolitan Cooperation. The ro s- ter o f (.lut lyi.n•J 
c o litions refusing to ;;iuy the tax mounted st."'.:idi ly. l~c ferenJDm 
J} 
petitions circulated. Tri-Met successfully resisted all the 
legal challenges; the Oregon Supreme Court finally vindicated the 
district during the summer, 1970. 'T'he petition movement tailed 
to gain the required number of signatures. Recalci~ r·ant 
businesses started to fall in line. Tri-Met moved to take over 
the suburban bus lines and create a unified downtown-radial 
regional system , 48 
Giv~n the intense opposition that did in fact develop in 
outlying areas, the strategy pursued by the Portlar.d C!3D 
coalition regarding district creation, governing structure, and 
finance mechanis1,1 was politically astute. In all cases the 
transit movement leadership sought to insulate decision-making 
processes .from outlying area influence. Having the governor 
creat.e the district following an appeal that only Portland could 
issue, then having the governor appoint the Board of Directors 
kept the out tying area coa. l i tions as far £rom power as possible. 
The key, of course, was the relative political strength of the 
Cf3D coalition in regional and state political arenas . The choice 
of a finance 1:1cchanisr.i that. did not require a vote further-
insulated the district from popular ;K.:ilit.1cs. und reflected the 
\·Jeight of the governmentali.zing coalition on t:-ie district 13oara. 
The triumph of the Portland CBD should not,, ho\'.iever, 
obscure the continuing - indeed, intensifying - nature of Che 
conflict that prompted the insulac:.ion strategy. As ou lying 
coalitions yain political and economic strength the <l ~ stant 
n ~ t. u r e c· f th e Tr i - : · i '~ t f'; o a r d i ri c L i n e s i.. t to tr ea d so f t: l y s o a s n o t 
to threaten its relatively autonofr!Ous status. In 1974 and a q ain 
in 1977 the o:JOVt).rnur re.i:>lo.ced the entire Dourd, respon:!irHJ to 
co n c Q r n s th e ll i s tr i c t. w a s r.1 o v l n g t o o s l o w l y a n d '1i a s 
insufficier1tly responsive to loc~l concern~. 19 A freeway r e volt, 
however, presented Tri-Met with a real challen<:1e. An allL1nce 
including the Portland CBIJ coalition and outlying business Ct!nter 
coalitions in the eastern part of the tran~it district s e cur~d 
re<Jionwicl~ support for a light roil line linkiril:J thern in rcturu 
for support for numerous hi9hway projects elsewhere in th~ 
metropolitan area.50 The financial imrlact of the light rail line, 
which li:.,,y drurnatically increase subsidy requirements, is likely 
to ex<?.cerbate the conflict bet\-.1een CBD and outlying ar~as 
regarding the structure of the district and its continuing CBD 
orientation. 
The next case study illustrates the dynamics of a weak-
CBD metropolitan area that is in transition to a competitive one . 
I11 the Tacoma, Washing ton, area the reg iono.l i l.a t.ion procesz was 
lea by outlying business center coalitions, s~ekin9 transit that 
\.JOUld foci li tu. t.e loca 11 y-or iented development. The highl i'Jht in 
tbis case is the space opened up for service u.nd e-.Cf .i.ciency-
oriented 1~anagerial innovations by the absence of an ~ctivist COD 
coalition promoting d downtown/radial plan. Moreover, the 
Pierce County institutiona1 innovation - a suburban -control led 
regional agency providing Mini-radial as well as downtown/radial 
service - may be .:i politic<1lly stable solution for rnetropol·it,1ri 
areas undergoing this particular transition. 
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Mini-radials in Pierce County, Wasi·ing t o11 
In 19B0 Pierce J'ransit. District be~~an operating a n ul t i-
tocal point transit sy$tem, in 1i1l1ich two 1-.inds of roL~t~s s erve 
five established transit centers: (1) local r-outes, opera ing .i n 
a " r.i in i - r a J _i a l" pa t t er n : a n d ( 2 ) i r1 t e r- cc 1·1 ;11 u n i t y r o u t.~ s , 
conn e c t i n g t r a n s i t c.: en t e r s w i t 11 e a ch o the r a n d \-' i th o "'' 11 t t_J\I,/ n 
T<~<:u!:~.i. The trans.:. t center-or i 1;:nted mir1i-radiu l con f i~J u:ra t. .ior: is 
t\le. qu in tessen tial se·c vice innovation in a weak CBD me tropo l it.an 
ai:-ea. Institutional innovations io Pierce Coun ty r e f lect, 
however, feat.ures cnar<)cterist.ic of a competitive netro::~o lit.an 
context.. The combineu fori:1 seems poteriti_al ly a p o lit l. c - lly 
sta\.)le outcome, likely to cl!-Jpear- in tl1ose are a s wher e Oli t lying 
business ceoter interests s8i ze the i nit iati vc frcut1 a dor m<.ln t CDD 
coa.lit.ion that does not rise up in o~position. Outly i n ::J y rou p s 
can then structure .J system that µrotects v.nd f a cilitates the1.r 
development aspirations whi l.e maintaining a place f or .a weal~ CBD 
es onf! focal point <:rn1on'::) 1nCJ.ny. 
There a.re t\-'O important context ti.jl feat.ures concernin•.J 
tile origins of Pierce Transit District and its transit. cent.~r 
~, rogran. In the first place, the 'rt;Jcoma C t?-D had bc-<:~ r1 serlo usly 
d. e c l i n i n g for s e v e r a l y ea t:" s , w h i l e a n u rn be r o f out. l y i n 9 r e t .:! i. l 
busi:iess and employment centers h;:.i(] dev~loped. In<h2Gd, l r:: .~ rl .I. ng 
downtown Tacoma i:-etail ers had been ir1dividua l l y pursuin g a 
subu~ ban i zation str~tegy rather than collec t ivel y undertakin g 
tr c:J n s i t-bu i l rJi n g a c t ion zi i med a t rn a int ;,i in in <J t ':1 e i r )) is to i: .i.. c 
posit :.on. Secondly, the i:out.~.~ structure of t h e .1·-exi::;ting 'T'ac<:> rn ~ 
Transi.t was downto\,•n-radi.al, .:. :1d tl1e property p r .\.1,1arily s e r ved 
Tac01!\a city r~sidcnts . . l\s the CBD had been d·~ c l. i.11i.rHJ , !:50 hi3 r.l 
7 a c o r.1 u T r«:n1 5 i t . S r v i c e w a s v i r tu a l 1 y no I\ - ·~ x i. s t. e n t i i"l t ho s i= 
outlying portions of Pierce county that were (jrowing , 5 1 
The process outlined in Washington stc.i.te law for the 
form a tion of public transit districts begins witt1 locally el~cted 
officials calling a Public Transportation I mprovement Conference. 
T1:e Confe.rence .i::5 al.lotted up to ~50, '.:./•,3G f ro m .the stat<:! to 
conduct r.l fe.asibility study and develop a compr e hensive ~ransit 
plan. Critical co1opone11ts of the study d!J<J p l an i'rlclude the 
<letern1ination of district boundaries; finance mechanisms, service 
p'-ltt~rns, and ·::ioverning a<Jency ~Lructure. •r !1e entir~ package is 
then submi~te~ to the proposed district electorate fo~ appr oval. 
Outlying bus.iness center coalitions in it ia tcd the r 1 e i:-ce 
County process and were deeply involve d in 11:1 9 rovc1:lent 
Co n f e r e n c e a c t. i v i t i e s • Th e Con f e r e 11 c e u s ea t h e s ta t. e .-:; on e y to 
h i re a consultant to con<3uct the st.udy and prepare a 
comprehensive plan. 'f'll~ absence of a CUD coal it. ion ar]voc.:.\ t. i ng ~ 
de •,1ntown-ra<liu.l t. t«>r1sit investment prograrn ccea t cd a. S j)ace in 
\tl i1 i c h. out l y i n y u. c t. i. v i s t s co u 1 J p LI r s u e t. l 1 e i r o t • j e c •:. i v <:: s . 
Mo r ~over, t.he t~chnici ai:n s hud iuor-t: roo11 wi. t.hin. whj c l i t.o \ •Jori:.. 
'J'echnicians cou lJ proc~ c.: d .\n a cclatively µartic: .ip<J t ury 1: 1i : ' tr 1•:!r·, 
Yi 
reflecting the widespread interest in outlying ar~os. They also 
could design a technically sophisticatecl system that accommodated 
the t.ransit rout~ structure to cu rrent travel patterns and 
likely future land development t.re~ds. 5 2 
Accommodation to existing travel demands and future 
spat.ial t re nds is Ci key as pe c t of current service <1nd 
institutional innovations . It expresses the consensus that has 
e111erged among t.eclrni.cians and aca demic analysts i n the past -BART 
era of transit policy evaluation. It also reflects the profound 
historical and political diff e rence s between dominant -C OD 
metropolitan areas and those in which outlying busines::; Ct?o ters 
increasingly set the rae tropol itnn p olitical agenda. 
The comprehlilns i ve plan finally developed by the 
consultants inc l uded: the two kinds of bus r outes noted above 
mini-radial and intercom~unity; ad option of distric t 
boundaries that included most of the pop ulation wi t h in Pierce 
County: a district-wide sales tax financing mechanism; and a 
Di strict Doard of Directors that allocated appoin tment of four of 
seven seats to electe d officials outs ide the city of Tacoma.53 
The tr <insi t center mini -r adials, the key service 
innova t ion in this case, reflect the relative strength of the 
outlying business center coalitiot1s in the planning process, as 
do the institutional changes tha t were put in place. Given that 
district boundaries were extended to include most of the County's 
population and that the new finance mechanis m would app ly 
district-wide, 3 vi <:tb le service strategy might have been t.o 
yr42a tly _ncret1!:>~ the a1<lount of suburban-downtown radial serv.i<.:e. 
lndeed I t his WuS t he strategy .adopted in those ctm-dorninant .:tnd 
competitive metropolitan areas where a downtown coalition led the 
process of i nnovation. "Covering" tha metropolitan aren with such 
service was pursued as the route to political accommodation . The 
Tacoma <ipproach highlights a diff~rent political emphasis . 
Institutionally, th e choic e of a si 11g le, exp anded 
District that would receive all sales tax revenues, rather tha n 
creation of one oc more outlying area agencies in addition to 
'l'aco111a Transit reflects the politic'll confidence o f the transit 
center area coalitions. The allocation of sea ts on the noard of 
Directors is the key feature here. Another indication i s t hat one 
of the consultant fir m principals became Director of Transit 
Development for the Dis trict . The fare structure innovat i on 
adopted by Pierce Transit mus t also be seen in the context of an 
absent Cl30 investment program . In 1982 the Dis t rict went to a 
peak/ off-peak fare d ifferentia l by r aising t he peak far e, rather 
than lowering the off-peak fare. While such a fare structure 
change is strongly ad vocated by technicians and academic 
analysts, as are other changes Pierce Transit is cons i dering, 
including distance-based a nd class - of-service fare·s, the 
poli t ical situation obtaining in the Tacoma metropolitan area may 
\.>e prl'!requisit~ t~ . their adoption as effici.ency a n t:l equity 
enhancitHJ measures. "* 
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W h l. 1 Q t h ·~ t. r Ll n :::. i t c ..-~ r: t e r m j n i - .r .1 d i .::i l s . r 1., v1 h ;J. :. 
distir;guish th2 ·:·;:.i.c:oma r:';~tr-opolitnn area ca:'le, downt0\·1n T?i<'.::oma 
c o nt i 11ues to Ge ~Jell serv~u uy the new 'J Over11~<1 ·~11 L c1 l 4 (~g i 11 e . 
't r.deed , 2:3 of th~ ·t'.:'~ r •)l.1tcs opera~ed by P.i.·~rcc T!:"u n si t r: , s tr i c t 
ra d i ate fi:-om the Tacc112.l CBD. Tl11:· ri:;"iori.J.J.i~;:;llti o n r~1ov e 1.1 n t ha :~ , 
then:· fore, eX1)<:rndc!d th e .scop~ of Cl3D-radia .l se .rv i.ce and ?l ii Ced i t 
on a much fi.r1;ier f 1t1<rnci a l foum)a t i o n t.han previ.o u :sly.55 
'r; \ e d u a l n a t u 1· e 0 f t h e D i s t r i c t ' s t r a 11 s i t u .1 v c s t n 1 e " t 
lJr osra1·1 ~trt;!;'lgb'ltHlS t.he l i . l~~ll. hoo<.l of pol it ·.ca. l ~ti1 bi l ity . .' be 
: Gy te:-;l:. of t !1 i s :")ot.~ntini 1 .::i s b.o.er1 dcve. lop i '1';;J '.1.L t h t l: e rec t: n t 
~mel.·gence, followin g the c·ce ei tioo uf c.11e Di!-> t :i; i ct, of. a 11 ci;:-: ·t i 1.' i ::; t 
1JO \J ntown 'l'aCO!:ta coa l 1tiu1~. Sjnc~ 1982 o s u l..:l ::itanti <t .l a m0 unt of 
bu il d.l.n<:) l1as been suing Oli in tht:: Tt1.c o i:'l a C Gll , un ,l rJo·w tltO'vJl 1 
bus inesses i\re uow a p f)urent.l }' ke ·1Jl.y inr:erE. stcd i n tr;:rn s i. t - ba:.:, ed 
acc e s:.~iuility. 'J'h i.:~ curren t t:lo:·J11t L>wll coatit.lOt1 Ls roo t eJ in 
o f£ic e- d. n.c.i 3frvice- ~~ype c:: i;- t iv i. tres, r a tl\er- t..J-. o. n in '1~ 1a j ,- ru ta il 
i 11vest.1 .H~r1ts.J6 1'h~ COu3 i tion' ;, r1CC~pt.:i.nce O f: t.hi ~; re1.j i 01H .1 l 
d i vision of labor mo.y proviu~ U ·1c ~conor.1i c b a sis f u r coo t ir~ l i ng 
tA>l itical stability. ~.i hould wors~nin'.:J CB) cons0 ~;t .i.on devcl c;., B s 
c> d ·...)WT\town coal i tioo cooc E-rn, hoh1 u ver, t hen more of t.he dy:nann c :::; 
c h.:a r dct<.~ ri~ti<:: o[ int.ensely co;;1petit.ive n1etrol>ol..itan areas 1 i.:i.y 
erne rge . 
PUDLIC SL:C7 -J F: Hl!)l!STlUJ\L POLI'IIC$ 
The n .'.l t i o nu L 1:1 o v ~ r n r:1 c n t e n t r a r • c e i n th e e a r l y 9 6 0 s ~·uu; a 
!,1a n.:'... f e stut 1o n ( ; f chc K£.:nrH:~U.y/D c 1uoctdtic Pai:l·/ urb~:1 ct 1:a t..::.g~1. 
T h e re \>H~re t. wo 0 oails. 1-t 'JJas pri1!1arilj aim~d :'ll .s t r e n'::lthc r1i n 9 
t i ~s bet we en !~ he n<~t i.o nal p ar t. y unJ i t~~ u.r b a n i.l J:" ~ a 
c o ns t.· tue(1ts. S 7 Sccon u c rlly i t. v.r<ls a n ef f o rt. y t he n al1ona l 
e x ecut.iv~ brar1c-I' 't.O ra t..i unnl i. ~ e Llrb <:i n pru g _a r.1 s in 9 e11 Yul · n 
orde r. t o increase tlleir ~Ife •..: t1 veni::ss. T~ie t:r a 1 . ~Ji t p ;_·o 9ra r· ·.n1 !; 
ic,t e u d e d tu supµo1·c. u r. i.J c::i tl c eneloJ d l prog r ar.1 a c tiv,;_ t. i 2 s n rid t o se n.1 t:: 
a!> a n i r.i_pl 'f: cnt i.1t:io;1 t.oc l l :l supp<Jrl 0 £ r.1c t n)1 c_, litan d e: vc lopmc :1L 
·1l u. n n l r\lJ • 5 '. I Thc~t? •.Ju u ls 11e1·~ i11stit u ti o n n .Lized .i.. n L h c ·Je ve l c..>,.> lr 1 ~i 
..> y .-; t <-> r.1 o ~ f e d e r a l. l. s :1 , j:) u r s u e d b 'I Re kl u l:J l i c an s a s ~,,; e 1 J '-' !..> 
Dc1:-,o t: r t ...;, . 
'l' h·~· firs t 0 rcler· t>f pub 1- ic sect0r IJusi. rn'- S S \.; <:1 s ir.t:': us t · :;i_ ; l 
mode r nization. T 1c f inanci ci l disabilities 0£ t b0. p i:i v .:: ti= r ."\r.s .it. 
c o 1:1 p c::. n i c s h ti. t3 i i r o d u c e d r1 r o t 't" iJ ..: t. c 1J f.' c r l. o d :;; o f d e f 12! r r <.; (.\ 
r.1 a int e n <.i n c c , e spe c i a 11 y on r a i l ',;a y r o 11 i 11 g stock and i.- i. g ht 5-of 
'.·v D f · Combi n ed \; iti1 l ack of in',1estr · ·-~n t in n e w 1::.·•1 uipm 1~nt u 1 J 
f a. c i l i t i a s , th e [' r o c e s ::; o f i n J u a t r i , l l d e c J. i. n e ha d t ; 1 :..:; e n ~' 
t e r r· i b 1 e t o l 1. V l r t. u i;Jl l y a n ( . n t i r e i. n r~ u s t r I h a Li t o b e 
r ecunstructed, ir.clud io~1 pl1ysic a l c n p ital a s v1ell .::. s r.1 1:1 .nage r .i u l 
dC. t~i.. tude.:.. Priv~te c omp.::iny 111ana<j<H'!; typir.::a.ll y ~ta.y ea on to c un 
t.he new public age ncies. Decades of r e tr- e ncn1ten t had produc e d a 
::1-J.;-, CJ ~ment g e ne:.rat i on, h c 1.:1ever, c.hat. was ineiu-..e::i eflC(~a .1. 11 i r .. il"..I O -
bu i.l J i oy , milrke t .in(J , tt~c l 1 no.l O 'J ica 1 i. nnovu. ti on, .'.l n d o t. h c r. r~ .. :.r· 111.;;; u f 
cn t.1-e p t.u neu:ri,\l rH.:'. t l. Vi l 'y'. , .. \or c: C1V c i.-, the J.ndUStl'"',('S ~VU!'.' f inanc i a l 
l-'r o spects held f e r, ; a t t r iJc t ions for j youn<;ic.-r tJ~rH: rn t i on 0 E 
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managerial activists. Research and development and man.Cigement 
t r a i n i n g , a s w e 1 l ._1 s i 11 v e s t ni e n t f i n a n c e \v o u l d h a v e t o b e 
governRentally sponsored. 
Early intervention had a nember of distinguishing 
characteristics: (a) it was financially modest, reflectir.g the 
narrow basis of support for a tr11nsit invest1;1ent progr.:lm in t~:c: 
Consress. Throu~h the early 1960's the olde:r ceos of tt1c 
northeast, LiiJwest and west 1 those already expel'.' iencing the 
combined forces o-f transit deterioration and subuI.·oan 
competition, we~e tht:: on~s seeking modernization a.ssis tance; (b) 
it focused on capital grants, reflecting the weight of Lransit 
e q u i p rn e n t prod u c e r i n t e re s t s i n the co a l i t i o n o £ gr o u p s ;.) u t 
together to lobby for federal action: anJ (c) protections for 
t r a n s i t l a b o r w e r e i n c o r p o r a t e d i ~·1 f e d e r a l l e ~1 i s l ,:, t i o 0 , 
reflecting the influence of org,'l.niz2d labor in nai:ion;ll as well 
as local Democratic Party politics.59 
'rhe first major expansion of the national transit inv0strnent 
program came in 1970, u.s downtown alliances in the south and west 
joined the original 9rou.p in supporting a. c1uaotum leap in 
resource comi:-t.itinent to downtown/radial transit construction. In 
addition to this much enlarged group, the acceleratins (1ecli.ne of 
private transit capital during the 1960's brought grot\ling r.\:•:1bers 
of smz.ller and medium-sized cities to the national government 
seeking subsidy for bus rnoderniz<ltion ef fo:ct.s. The Nixon 
administration, pursuing its own urban strategy oriented to the 
newer cities of the south .::i.nd west, was rcspon£ive to th<.:c 
concerns of these newer cities whose CBDs 1>1er0 now confront.i11<_J 
the same kinds of 1.'letropolitan development prec::ssures and valt·~rns 
.:i.s the older group hu.d. b0 
'I'he national investnient program dramatically ~xpan<lc,d 110xt 
in 1973-1974. Federal legislation increased re~;;o11rce 
commitments, partially throu0n granting t.ne first significant 
d~gree of transit acce$s to highway t.:cust fund 2:-ion5-::s, and 
in.i.tiCJ.ted operating subsidies. These two eler.•enls reflect the 
grow _i_ ng power of a new force in Cons.ire ss ionc::i l _poJ it ics: t :a~ 
intergoventrnent;:d lobby. 61 This new force, composed of s~ate ctnd 
local government representatives and professional associ.c.tions 
c l o s t::! l y al i g n e d -. .. 1 it h t h e p u b l i c s e c t o r , h a d t 1,o,· o m u i n t r a n ..:; i t 
obj ec t.i ves: ( l) a ugrnent locu l revenues \'Ji th nut i.onu 1 s u~Js i J i;::i:; 
that could be useJ to fund downtown allionce transit pr-oc:irarn~; 
and (2) enhance locul cot~trol of transit prograr.1 resources in 
pl a c e o £ e x e cu t i v e b r a n c !1 d i s c r e t i on . on~ i m po r- tan t 1<1 e ch a n i s rr. 
here is the use of forrnu.l.a-ba.seJ methods for allocating fur-.ds 
rather than rel i a nee on discretionary grants. For r·: uJ.,3 s are 
intended to mitigate competitive pressures, so that political 
stalemates do not persist. Formulas acknowledge the r2alitie5 of 
competition for: funds and reflect relative political weights i1\ 
the corr.petit.i.ve process. They also entitle r:10st con;petitcrs Le> 
"t J east some means of support for in div idua l pr-o jec ts .. 
Th e a e b a t e o v e r op er a. t i n g s u b s i d t e s 11 i <J h l i g : 1 t. s the no. tu r e 
anil pow(;r of the new .lnterrJovernmental lo'l::by. Executive bca.nch 
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o ffi cials and academic analysts both forecast the lL k e l y 
c onseq uences of or0ra::in<~ sLI'usidies durin<J the l e ngthy per··od o f 
eg i s l a t i ve cons iuera tion. Th e y agreed that t.ransi t ma.na 9e1i1 e nt 1 s 
o.b ili t y to impose wage J.iscipline on org anized l abor \ll OUl d h . 
e roded , and t ha t productivity would decli n e . oper~t iny sul s idi~s 
·1o u ld go partly to increase transit work e :r <.tJages, and p art ly :::0 
fu 1d ~olitically responsive, inefficient scrvi c8 0xpnn sio n . 
O pe rating s ubsidies unr'ierr.1 ined the rationc. e f o r: 
g >Vern ... ~ntal i zL 9 the t!".-H1sit ind ustry in the i n stiLi tion a l t or r! ::·; 
of relatively a. u toncrnous, "businesslike'' autl1or i ti ;.1's a n t: 
<list r i c t. s. Yet Nixon ;oiJ::1i n istration opposition, but.tressed )j 
these p lausible, articul,fte argumentsr gave way i n t he f ac e o f 
i n te rgovernmental power.6-
The e v u l u t i o n o f lo ca. .l , s t a t e u n d f e d e ..- a l pro B r a 1 ~1 s u !.. 
fin"l n cial support, adapted to local co r:-n r .t·ti ti. v t:· pr_ssu :: •.s ;,; '.1;, .i 
fa c . l i tate<.1 uy int~rgovernf'.\enta 1 activisrr. , elevet.t.c·-\ the t.rar1si t 
indus t. ry to t. he status of f isc<il crisis r.. a c h ine. This 1..; as iy, t ho! 
man n e r of, but on a much smaller scu.le t h an Uc: h e a lt h c <i rL> 
i n dustry. In health care, the combination 0£ private and public 
i nsu ra nce, retr·ospective, coi:;t-based pay~aent, and p r o v .Ld t~ r­
. n f u •? r. c e d de mu n d u n d e r w r o t ~ o. n e x p 1 o s i v e l y c o s t l y s e c t o r a 1 
ex JC!ns ion. A fin~ncially e;q·)losive, ''insured" tra nsi t. i n'i us try 
9e rierated efforts to cont.aiA costs .:i..nd increase prod<.Jctivity t h · l 
we r e q u .i t e s i 1:1 i 1 a r to w bat was go i n g on i n he a l t. h c a r e ; i n rl e E! ,_I r 
t() t!tforts in the service sec:tor generally. 
Th e n u. t LI r e o f t.11 e f i s c a l c r i s i s w a s t h i s ~ c.i o \<.i n t. o \'fl I 
a li~nces in 1netropol i t~n areas of CBD dominance an<l i n 6reds o f 
i r1 ten s e inisineGs center- coi rJ!.-)<:tition sought a;H} seL <. Jr ed.. t.h o f<.1 : 1i s 
o f tr t'l nsit service - long d i stance, peak period, downto,,1 n/~adia!.. 
- t ho t we re ex tJ: e me l y co s tly to 9rovide, and pr iced these .::it 1 1 12 l 1 
be l ow ma rc;inal cost. AL the same tir:'te, trnnsit l 21 bor was u ble t o 
secu rt:? ·."cl91o! 13au1s enablinr~ thern to keep pace wit. h \'1or k!::!rs i n 
oth t:r loc:ai govern.men t sec tor~ during a ver; in fl .:;; t:iona ry pe r io -' . 
r;oreov£r, transit \11or1-~cr resistance lir.iited m<.lna gem c nt 's ab il i ty 
to rnak e work rule changes thrit would sof ten the co ns eque n - e s o f 
th e con t. .i. nu i n g con c e n t r a t ion o £ pa t r o n a g e i n t h e p e. ci: k s . i"' 1 u s , 
t..~·i e :r '. ' er !:! unal>le to increase us~ of part- t ime, s pl it- shift , i1l"1d 
o u t bi<lc contract l abor. Since the new ~erviccs of~en carri e d 
r e. lat iv ly l iqi1t loads, t. lle cons~qucnccs -.,; e re a dr a ma t ic di=c l i! 1C 
in prod u ct i vity '1l. nci escc.latins financial d iff iculti es . 6 3 T h e 
c ri s i s ~ as poliLical as well as financial. Outly i n y b us i ne ss 
cent e r coalitions incrt=<lsingl y saw needs fo r loc a l 1 y - r es_[_Yon sive 
tra nsport goit>g u1H:iet whiie t. h ~ downto ; n C!ll iance pr0 g r am 
<.; • .. $vrbt:d even~ore :> u bs i d y. 
Escalatin fin .incial ,, nd politic- Ed c r i s i s should n o t. , 
h owever, obs cure a. central point: t .h c urban tr .:. n s poct.a ti o n 
prog r ams of th~ post world ~lar Two period , incluu i tHJ b oth 
fr eeways and txansit, rC!present a sta Jg ~rin g t riu mph fo r ma ny 
- owntown alliances t'nrouyhout. the Unite:J S tates. nea sured in 
t e r m s cf t he !710vem ~ 11t's own objec..:tiv 8 s i nc r. e a si::· d c u r; 
a c c essibility ~nc.i cece p tion ca p cit.y th e proli f erat io n o f 
o~ n town/radial fn~e \·1 a y . and t r a ns i t l in·2· ~,, concrete l y ·.:. x pr c s s t::he 
a cc...: o r!l p 1 i s h men t . I n t.l e e d , rn a n y C !3 D s d .t d so '" ~ l l s t r l~ 11 g t '.1 e n L : . •:J 
theic competitive position that few financial rest>urce:J w~re l c i:t 
to subsiciize the uevelopn1ent-rE.'lated transport a .s u ir dtion!::i of: th e 
most recent generation uf rap~dly growing outly~ng areas.64 
Public sector transit er isi:> has, thou9h, y.=nera t.ed r:;ov eu1e n ts LL> 
restructure, rationalize .::i 1 d priva t.i zi:? both inclust.i.·ial and 
institutional arrLJngement.s. '!'h.:sc efforts arE:: the: i :1nO'-l<..:tiou.s of 
tht: current. p~riod. They grow directly out. o( t'.1c uy.i<11 ::1c,~; 
outlineu thus far. 
'JHE DYNl\MICS OF umovNrrotJ I N \ESl?OV'."::f. TO !-'ISCAL CR:!E:H; 
ProtJram rationalizatioll aims at resolvin<J rolit.i..c1:1.l anci 
-fiscal crises pr.!. r.: arily in t:1e following ways: (1) inct"ea.se 
indu::.t:ri._a.l lHOductivity; (2) suppres$ co::-,petiti•,1e pr ~ s ur e s 
em;H1<.itiny from pol_;.ti.cally weak coalitions, while ci.·eatio:3 :::.01 ''' 
dec:.iree of order among rer:-,ainins cornpet.itors; a n d (3) 1~ u.pO\J 1::: r 
mult.iple tlt?ci.sion-11al<.i11~; c?!nters, e<.ich witl1 itG 01vn autonor .~~-' to 
pursue local objectives. 6 J ?artLc:ip<l~:Ls in tht:: tL~ t:sit. pe>licy 
acena differ, ·however, regaruillg i:.he nature aw~ ~>ur:>ose nf publ i.c 
cector industry. ':'hes~ u.:..fferences cir~ reflecteL! in appr o aches 
:::.o ra t.ional iz i ny: ( u) the prou u.:.:t ion of trd1~s it Ge l:"V ice '.5 ..... i th i n 
t. I 1 e pub 1 i c: sector ; ~·1 n rJ ( b) z: e 1 at i. 0 n s between 1 o cu. l pro 'J r a. 1~1 
::.;p0nsors and th~: 11utional sovern•nent. T'.H~r8 ~ne three 1t 1 .: ~ 1. . ·1 
a .i,.•p roaches: (l) Rcplic.:ate private s~ct:.or- b~havior us clo.!H:ly a :J 
p o s .=> i b 1 c; \I l. th l 1~ the p u L l i c ::; cc to c . ,\ H 2 cu no ni i ca l l y ,_. Cf i c i •.: ti t 
i ndustry is the target. Transl~ supply n<l p~ic~ J1~ torLions d~c 
tc· subs1t;i.es of vurio1.::; l~ind~; siivuld: be 1.11n:;.. :~iz ~ -J, .inc l ud 11 1•-:J 
i) c: r v e r s c i n c c rn l! d i s t r i h u l i G n e f f e c t s a r l s i n <J f: r o rn c r u s s -
subsi(~i~s. (2) Sul)Sidi~e th.:: .Jevelop1;1erit <.is!_Jira.t1ons o f t h o&8 
corn('eting places suf~icient.ly influe·ntial to r0qu.ir t: ":JovernliH:!r> ta.l 
resJ?onse. l\. politic-'llly le9iti m.:i t-c in<lustry suffice::;, subj_c.:l to 
_i n c r e a s .\. n g l y s e v c r e b u <.lg e t a r y con s t r a i n t s or; to t a 1 r {~ s u u r c ~ 
cor::!'1itments. Iner-ease the sh<J.re of national :11n(~::; allocuted 
th.rou9h formulas, how12ver, as a nreans of reducins local pcessl! r 'S 
on Congress: und (~) Provid.:::: 3 residual, social w e lfare serv i c e 
for those without_ adequate incom~ or capacity to ac..:hi8 v c 
n.~instrt.!.:Hn levels of r.iobilit;. 
S.ince the ~-Ji xon yeo.:r:s t112 cxc\:ut.ive br-u.nch hus been t:he : : , ,_ii~: 
pr-oponent of thL'. pr .t vate :.ector tifiproach to rat ior..::i lization. 'T'he 
ea r 1 .i cs t prod u ct iv i t y - inc re a s i n g s t r a t e ·:Ji es we r 1= the :~ t: b ~3 t :~ t d t ; (rn 
of cu.pi tal for labor and t he sedrch for ec0r.or:d. 8!; cf. sea 1.: 
throu9h rcgionalizat:i.Oll. In on industry where wa ye Li:;d relate l 
costs acc.:ount for the great bulk of o p era.ting ~xper: (;e t . .;; 
strateCJy has a ':ire2t d c .:i.l of su:r face ei:cnomic a e peal. ~lc t<.!cv0r, 
given the extreme physical deter:ioratic~r of tht'! i nd ustry uurin~J 
it.s l)rotcact.~u f)eriod of tJecl1ne, new teclH1v1c.>9 :; l:u 1J marketing 
c:i p I? ~· a l a s w e l l. rn 1 t: n t he t r a n s i t i n d Ll s t r- y 1,1 c.i. s in o s t ] y p r i v a t :::: 
an d reg u la Led l"' y state age n c i e ~, t \1 e 1· e g u 1 at u rs st r on •.:1 l y 
encouraged the companies to shift .Cror1 two-m <'. :1 to 01 :. u-mei J, 
streelcars, o,..;iiich 1"11d11y .C it- i11S did duri11y t n e 1 92~-:l!J a 11d t9J(~s. '7'l1 •~ 
(:1\l<'I' prOj<.'CL, lht: Lr:- .. 11Sttiu11 l.<..•twc .. :11 f•r· iv.1L~' c.1pi. L;d l:\ cll i•.cl :1r 1 ' I 
government financing, W2.S intended as a r adlcal suu::;tilution of 
c apital for labor. Advaoc<!c.1 technoloyy tran s it syster:is tha t wo· l.d 
n o t require vehicle operators were among the e o rlies t anu 1 o st 
pr o minent research and de·J~lopmei~t. efforts th~ na .... i o n i::l l 
yovern:r.ent underc.ook. upon enterin(j the industry in the 1Y1icl -
19G:)s,66 The s.::.vings theocetically available f r om tht~ 
su'ostit1.1ti.on of multi-car t.raios, opercited by one p c rq on . f o r a 
1:-i ultitude of buse~ e.cich operated by a driver cont in ue t o b e o. 
, a in justification for :cail t.ransi.t dernar1cls aroLlnd ·-1·1e c o u n t r y. 
noweve~ 1 a large number of place-based alliances s e e k in g 
subsid y for e.xpensiv~ Caf)ita,l projects generated a •3r e at de--.: l of 
rnacroeconornic and buJgetary concern among national ex e c ut i ves. 
The d o wntown allianca demand for CBC/radial rail rapi d t r a,sit is 
roo t e d in the spat.ial compe t.it:ion that c ~. l)s con f ront. .J\ ri 
lnc reasi:-1g nur.:1ber of rapidly growing out l y i ng bus:i ness cent('~ .t· ::; 
a l so became interested in the advantaq es rail syster.;~ we re 
h ou,3ht to confer . '!'he expense of s ub ~tituting 0::apit l f c, 1~ 
lab o r on th~ sca le d emanded :.:>y local project spo n sors througl-lou': 
the country prompted r;°'? shift in pro<luctivity str tey j' c u d :-19 t h e 
!·:i:.-on a .n:i nist.rd tion.. '-> 
'l' h e next strateg y w<is to rati.on.:ilize the al l o c at..ic:. n of 
scar <: .a ca~i tal resource s ar:iong th.; nume ro1..1s cot< ~pet.i t ion - i nspi c ed 
p r o je c t s. (.)r)o.;"" tar.tic the tJr lJ a n ?°-i J SS 'J.' t:d r SpOr ':.. at iClli 
Adm i nis:.ration (u ;'.'rl\) <idoptea wo s to r8quiru l cc•:ll ,H·o j t.:>C t 
.,,,·po nGors to do cost-ef f ectiveness anulyses an ,\ t o e ;< p l i. ci l ly 
i n c lude low-ca pi ta 1 cost .::_pµroaches u n10ng the .:i l ter:1a t i ve ~ . The 
J ot_ent ion w3s to Gcreen out the least effective pror)osa 1 s l"t:. fo ce 
Lo c al a.lt i an ..: s cu r;1e loot\:iniJ for subs i di •:;, .S. !lowe v B, loc0l 
.:111 i·' n c e12. c a n ,J. nd do \vOrl< t.hi::ou tj h the i nte ruover n ment. ti l oi..)bj c-t r,d 
the · r Congression;1 t repr .:= senta ti ves tu [.r ,se r v e a i_) l a, c e f or locrJ. l. 
p r c j"ects o n th~ ::i .:-1~io r 1 l c-.1·9cmda, In re:; pcns<?! 1: 0 th.~s e p r •.?u aurc s , 
e x e c u t i '' e b r .:t n ch o f f i c i cl l s s e e X: to i n s t i tu t .ion a ' i z. c~ o !.> t -
E:~fe ct.ivencss calcuL'l. tions ilS authoritativ e~ d eci si on- mo.ki n'_! 
exerci s es. Department of Transl_>ortation officia ls h ave \:..>1::!·e n 
t l. ./ :i .. n g to a ch i c v e. th i s s i n c e t l 1 e 0 •j 0 n c y · • .,1 a s c r c a t e d • Con q :c c ::; s 
h €1 'G r e s i. st. e (l , 11 o \v eve r- , under s t a n <l i n '3 th a t i n s t it t. ion a l i z i n ~i a 
· ecJ\ n i co 1 procedure \.JOU ld weaken ind.i v idua l me mbers' a.bi l i t y to 
rc s p o c t o local alliance demnnds.68 P iscal crise s , t h ~ u13h , 
e x e r t i n c. r e a s i n 'J p r ~ ·G s u r e t o w a r d i n !.i t :i. t ll t i u h a l i z. a t i o n , 
leg i ti mating the evaluat ion of projects a c c o rdi n g t o market > l~c ­
c r ite r i n of worth. rxecut i ves would limit c a pi t al comm i tment ~ t o 
t 1o se f e w C L1Ds that wi L l defi.nitely b(~ abl e to d '-'fend a c l. i:!i 1;1 Lo 
\-lor- l.d City status in the near future. 
on t he operuting side, .rationalizi n g s t. rat.e c:;i i es aifn a c. 
d i. re c tly r ed uci n g the industry 1,.1a9 e bill and i nc r easi ') fare.box 
rev.enues , The tnct.ics here include incre t:ts ing t he use o f s p l i t-
:shi.f t. and par t -time labor, and instituting pe.rlor;r. a nce s tuhda r us· 
i n the subsidy n l loca.tion process. The work-rule chnrHJeS su <:::h t. 
by r.\ a n a 'j e m en t ta k e th e i n d u s t r y ba c )< t c t h e pr e - W c r l <.J \·J a r ";' w o 
i?e r i od, \-Jhen th~y were s tilr.ila rel opera ting pr:..>c e chin ..:s. 
Mana·.::1~r:ient. i 11 c l L n ;_:. t i u n s ; 1 r c· ·c: t:: i n ( o r <.; i:.! d t_, y l c ~ l ~· 1 '"' t i v •..? 
ce<~ciireMents that contracts permit part-time labor, as in 
California. aeagan administration cf forts to eliminate federal 
operating subsidies are appropriately understood as a tactic 
intended to strengthen management's ability to enforce waye 
discipline as well as to cutback costly services. Indeed. many 
of the larger transit syste~s, dependent on federal operatiny 
subsidies for only a small poction of their r ·ev i;:: nues, wo1.ild 
likely welcome a federal phaseout. 
Performance standards are another ration~lizing rne a sur8. 
Those emerging in the transit industry, once again, pa2:allel a 
recently adopted innovation in health care: d.i alJnOstically-
related groups (DRCs) for M~aicare payments. T he feueril.l 
governr:lent now pays hospitals a set rate for providins c~re in 
each 0£ oea.rly five hundred <liugnostic categories, cre'1ting i1 
power fe l incentive for hoc pi ta ls t.o conce11trG te their: procl tciction 
in areas where they can deliver care "efficiently." ln the 
transit industry perfonnance standards hav~ t<Jken two r:iciin forir1s: 
reguir ing transit systei:)s to 111eet a certain proportion of their 
operating costs from forebox revenues; and allocating a ce,rtain 
(so far, small) proportion of operating s1Jbsidy money on tl1e 
b a s i s o f o u t p i.t t e f [ i c i en c y c c i t e r i a . '!' h · ;:; e s t a n rJ a r d s L.1 i rn a t 
encouraging public oper::i.tors to cut back and/or elininatc 
precisely those lines created to serve the interests o5 the 
alliance that led the goverornentalization process.6 9 ThQ 
prospect of such cutbacks will likely produce increasingly s~v0re 
identity crises for public sector carriers. They arP. al~o 
intended t.o strenz_;t.hen management in its efforts to secure work 
rule changes and to resist wage Jemands. 
<lhile the executive branch sought. industrial. restructurin9 
according to mar~etplace crite ria of efficiency, Congress workert 
to Jefin~ politically accept<:ibJ.e 1r.eans of retieving coropc~ titive 
rressures while rctainin0 n capacity for local responsiveness. 
Legislation passed in 1982 reflected the m~st recent settlement, 
following a protracted period of stalemate in 1979-1980. During 
these years inter•se inter-metropolitan co i:tp(~tition for fed~rdl 
transit resources surfaced. Those CCDs o.lre.:H1y h<.i.ving exte n s ive 
do\Jrto\;n-radial systems, an<.l seeking modernization ond expansion 
subsidies were pitted against tho!3e alliances w i t ! iou t, bat w i ti\ 
aspirations. The 1982 legislation. including a <l iscretion.::iry 
capital granl:. program and a new block grant program containing 
both ca pi t<i l and operating subsidies expressed the acco1111no~Jd t i on 
reached. 73 
At the local level, efforts to rationalize the tnmsit 
network configuration and privatize are gathering force. Fa.r-
reaching institutional changes are emc~~;ing as well. 
Privatization is n multidimensional strategy encorn~assing a wide 
varic:ty of practices. See1~ing to reduce the wuge bill, transit 
managements atter.ipt to contract with private sector f:i.rr.1s 
~r:iploying lower-cost, typically non-union labor for cert~:in 
serv ir::es. Local lJOVen1ments contruct with priv.:ite sector fin:-.s 
to supply transit services rather than create a public se c t or 
trilns.it <igency. Tryinq to murkct. services as u private co mr>1.n1y 
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might, transit ma~1a0e1\e-11ts o[fer subscr1ftion ser.v.i c~· · Lui. . ~Jn~· ;J 
t o the <lemands of individu.;l coinpanics and/or patrons, 
Private s~ctor eml)loyer.s take step!:! to €." l i 1~ 1 i na'c e W i..\.y e 
labor. in the journey-to-work entirely 1 through ~mploy r-spo _ s ore•J 
r ia asharing programs. The~~ include subscri pti on bus ~s, 
v a npooling .und other efforts in which vehicle uriv~rs are cor.lpa ny 
e mpl oyees. Pr i vat.el y-ownetl ahd uperat 'd crn::::i1 wt er ex i.;res s b L1ses , 
subscr ip"C.ion services, and small vehicle-bc.sed deman.l.l r e s pons ivE 
ser v .:.ces are increasingly in evide nce. These al te . n i::l. t.ivc s arc 
s u p port = d a n d .fa c i l i tat e d by U '.·1 Tl\ , .3 s e x pr e s 5 c d i n · t s 
p aratransit policy c..nd the recently created Offi ce of Pr i vd t 1~ 
Sect or Initiatives, 7 1 State legislatures an d re aula t o ry 
c o rninissions also support them, in the form of t a x br eak s f or 
employer-base<} ri.d~shar ing prot_Jrarns ;)nd ref!u<.::.E:d b.:?. r i e ""s to en +ry 
whe r .e feasible.72 
.Privatization and institutional pressures tow d r iJ 
f r a. g rn e n ta t i o n a re con c e n t r a t e d i n tho s e m e t r op o 1 i t an a r e ,:1..: 
<: :h6. ra.cterizecl by intense co1;ipe tit.i.on bet.\·!een a leading ov.:n t.own 
a 1 l i an c e and g r o \v' i n g o u t l y i n g Li u s i n e s s c e n t e r s . T n t e r m .., o · r 
inst i. t.ut.ional chcirige:, ti1.: lead ing innovz~tion is C'.1 f oT m o f 
res ion.:il tax base sharing, in which a portion of t a x monie s 
to r mc:.:ly allocated to a rei:iional transit age:nc:y is ui.v i d e u a mo r •. 
~etropolitaa area local govern~ents. The locals may spend t heir 
t. rc:insit ~ollars as t.hey set.:' fit.73 ThQ innovations ch._ r acter:ist t c 
u f CBD -<lominant areas - relatively autonomcua, financia lly s l ro11<_J 
a g e nci es providitVJ downtown/ra-dial services - g,i v1:: \·i o y t o ; 
t ransit s e rvices deploye~ by numerous outlying busines s c en t e r s 
e a c h designed to promote locally-orie.r1ted deV t:: ll,J fl e n; l:Hi d 
i s t i t Ll t i o n a 1 t-. 't. r u c t u r e !i d e s i g n ea to r 0 f 1- e c t 1 o c ,,_ l. g r o \<J t h 
c on c e r n s . P r i vat i z a l i o r. o c cu r s µ r i m a r i 1 y i n Cj u t l y i n g bu s i 11 e s s 
c n.te rs, int.he absence of public sector transi t sc~i.~vi ce . Th e 
ublic s ...:ctor supplies ver:y little in the vJC:.Y. of non - Cl D- or l e n ted 
tr u n ~p ort. facilities because o f the n.3t ur of t . ·~ 
') o v e i- n J11 e n t a l i z i n g a 11 i a n c e a n d th e f i s ca l C' r i s i s t b. e o h' n lo \;1 n 
3_11 ·.anc: e pror::1ram produced. Wh(}re J.\etr·Jpolit"in are as c: r- c i. n 
tra !"l.:- i t ion fTom cnp-dominant to competitive, suburb .Jn t ra nsit 
c ent1-'!_ s a ncl grid sy~ ,terns reJ>resent efforts to respond to outl y i .ng 
a rea conc ~.rns in the cun'::ext. of a rn-edoininantly down to\...rn/ racli ol 
n et ~"or}~ . D u s g rid s y s t e m s h a v e bee n r e c e n t l y i m ~ l c e :1 t e d a s 
.feeders seen as necessary in con junction wi t h downt.O\·m/r dio. l 
rai l lines. In those metropolitan areas whe r e in i tially sm all 
Cl3Ds have been seriously tleclinin<3, tra.nsit hu,s hi s t o ric lly u ec.n 
.arginal; the very ·11 arginality of transit facilitates a,) ptio 1 of 
certa in innovative <'lEJLlt"Oach.es to organiz<l.ti.un and suppl y o 1n "•ll 
t he d emands of outlying busint::~S center ai liance~. 
As population and employ?nent continue t(._• cecent l'.' t.1 1 - z.2, 
cri~uting a11 increasingly pluralistic, compet.it.i.ve n e t r o p ol i t .: .11. 
l a n dscape, privatization and fr d gmcntation beco me at trac t ive 
s r a tegies fur legislative bodies attempting to r esolve fis c~l 
a n d po l i t i ca l c r i s e s . Den tt li d s f o r: n c n ~ c 13 D - or u:: 1 t e u t r a II s p o 1· t. 
f -3c i litl.es and services must be t.tccomr,iodated in O"l:' l e r to nai r a1 n 
polit ical le<:1iti n :.H.;y; all ['>li1C~S huvin<J (l~velc.;ipnent azpil: ; tJ.v nS 
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and reaching political r.1aturity seek - "'nd usu<dly •.juin - sui:;e 
mc;:l_sure of suprort. Privatiz.<:>tion, facili.tate<.l by uppro1niate 
lnslitutional structures, appears to be a .relative l y c.::1e ~t:1, 
efficient. way of containing competing c lai rn::;. As in nia n:1 ot.ti~r 
inoustries currently facing int~rnation;:il co rnpe t i ':.1or1 'r 
comp et i t iv e pr es s u res em an a t in g from t. he l o s s of an '' i n s u r 12 <.l " 
st.a t_us, u pro f0u1)cJ i:.orocess of res t.ructur i ng is ta~ ir. <j p l ace. Th~ 
aqe.:H.: i es, services and col lecti vc bargain i r.<J ag reer.ien ts sronsLH~~·<l 
by' dO\<Jntown alliances tvill unde'C"30 Ll most painful tra11s f0~·,;1at. ioi1. 
/1 Revolution in Transit: The Los Angel es County 'fr<1n~portu Lion 
Cor.:r:liSsioti and Its Transit Sol~s ~ax 
·L'h'-.! following cas~ study t.i1:3hlights the relatio1i:;-:1ii) bctwecm 
a local project sponsor- .:i_nd t.hf: natiot1al 1_1ov.::-1-!:~n2:.:_ J'l the 11.::\-1 
conte~t: <>f fiscal crisis. r:oreover, in returni!'\g to th0 
intensely co1npetit.ive Los ,'\nc;cl1~s r:1etropolitan arGa, a numbt:.·i.- of 
i nnova t.ions characteristic of thiG t.ype o ~- met.rOlJOl i tan c;_w. t~;..: t 
n.r~ obs~rva.ble, including the hishly in.n ovattve t..ra nsit:. Sule~ 
tax. ~t the center of this case study is the e~eryence of t n ~ 
Los Angeles <.:oun t 'f Transf>O:r tat i.on Commiss icn, ri ~i n~i (>l10en ix- l i Y..r· 
out of the ashes of a generation of protracted tr;1 nsit sta l«:1utc. 
The f i r s t pa rt o .f t ·he ca s e .:in o l y !!, es the con t i nu i n 'J in al.:. i l it y o ( 
the regional gouer~1nental t~ansit agency to construct A r~~l 
rapid tra.nsit. systr.~m, on~ of u-.~ mai11 cause;, of thQ creatlc)n u.f 
t.he new County Car.mission. Competitive pr e sourcs .Eint:dly 
exhausted the regional transit entity. The= ne .-.: i r:stitut i oria l 
st.r. 1.ict.ures brouyht into being with and by c.he County Ct:.Hn tn is~iori, 
in audition to the grO\lt...h uf f)r.l\J()t~ly-O\vned ,-:.?: d O;~r,;it~d 
SE!'t'V ic~.s in out l ~'in<) a reo.s, s i<Jr.<-'l the new e rt:. of transit in th i. s 
metropolitan cc.,otext. 
] n rJov~mber, 197,-, I tlle Los l\nge; !_,_:$ CuJ;d.:.y ~-·l (! Ctur;JtC 
re i used , once a g a .i n , t. o i n c r ~as. e l h .;: i; a 1 : ~ !'.: r.c1 x Lo pay for n. n 
e x t e n s i v e r a i l rap id t r •. rn s i t ~ y s t e rn • 'J' hey 11 ._1 d t 1.1 -r n e d cl ow t 1 a 
similar program, placed on the :Jallot by t~')e SouC1ern Cali f u ..c 11i.'i 
Rapid Transit District (SCR'l'D), in 196 8 . .SCRT!\ li.15 crea t.ed hy 
~he ~,ta~e legislature in 1964 Lis r.ucceJ s or t.o TJ M'I'A , l'liU"l t 11i?~•~~ 
C:iffur~r1ces: SCR'l'D \JdS 1r:,1ndL'\teu t..o ou t ld a ru i l. rat)id tru11 : -,it 
system, i.Jnd was <Jt:ant~d a::::cess to a sales t.~x - c;ivl.:!.n elt~ t.: turLil 
approval to finance it. The old r.:t.pl.d tr;;insit stal1..: :r. r1L c~ 
continued to shapt~ the political conte.x'.:., iwwever. SCJ~'r')')'s boa rd 
of di rectors, thL> tinie api;>ointed by loc,1ll'f elecleu o[.ficio.l~,. 
gav -• t hi: City of Los Angeles just two of eleven ~cat.t;, with four 
seats res~rved for ~he othc:-c cities i:; the CounL1 :;r~·l the 
r e rn .;, i n i n ':I f i v l: f o r- the co u n t y u oar d o ( s ...i p <.:! c v i s 0 r. s • s c RT ~·J ,) .~ 
e1wt:"lop~<.i in place-based conf L1c:t from Lhe t u ne o f i.ts creation 
an<.J remains so to this day. SCrt1'D's contii.l1 i n9 failure to :.iuil<l 
a r a l l. r <.• p i <.l t r «.i 11 s i t s y .s t e 1:1 '" u. s t h ·~ $ o i l in w h i ch th c: Lo s J\ n ': ~ I. ~ ti 
CoL:nty '!'1·.'lnsport::ition CoHmi~~;io'i (Li\C1'C), t".lt: most i.nter<.:.'!...'.in'.:J 
ai.d important developr.H0:nt. on the ._-cgional trans Lt scene:, tnuk 
rooi: c1nd []our i~he<l. 
County voters had, however, supported ?ropositio11 5 in 
June. 1974. This proposition authorized t.he rC?cip if!nts of 
g~soline taxes - the state, counties and cities - to divert a 
porc.io.'1 of these funds to fixed guideway tr ::i n o it const.rl1Ction. 
The Proposition 5 victory ~ncouraged SCHTD to downscale their 
rail system plans to fit in with the ki.. n d of fun<lin <J that. might 
be .available under the Proposition and me tching Fed:;.:ral transit 
capitC>l ~rants, and to t.ry once as;ain. T l :e conc ep t of c-1 r ai l 
stacter line reflected this self-imposed limit. Moreover, ther~ 
would be an important change in the rules of the p ol. iticc:Ll •;ia .. :e: 
;;, v o t e o f t h e pc o p l e w o u 1 cl n o t b e n e c e s s .::i r y t o a u t h o i· i ~ e 
f1nancing and construction. 
In March, 1975, SCRTD took the lead in fonuing a Ha rJ id 
Transit Advisory Committee (RTACL whose task would be to 
re.commehd a starter lir.e corridor. flTAC meetings were usually 
large affairs, attended by technical and pol~tical officials from 
the rnn.ny lo ca .1. governments and transporto ti on agenc i es active kn 
the region. The <Jl"Oup quickly agreed on a broa corridor. 
1ronlcally enough, R'l'AC reached consen s us oh the same cocri<loc 
the state leg).slature had enabled L.AM T .1\ to study in 1951: San 
Fernando Valley r.o Lon~ E!e.ich via the Los Angeles Cl3D. 74 
The broad corridor consensus cont~incd n bitter c0nflict 
between advocac.es of two <Jifferent rail syst.eni contiqur-ati.ons. 
One alternative \<1as to construct a tunnel tbrou9h thi.? Santa 
Monica Moun.ta ins connecting ~Jorth llollywood a.nd the Wil s -hire 
dislrict, then bucrow east under Wilshire !3oulevard into 
downtown, then turn sout.h to the proposed Centu1-y Fre ·~way in the 
south-central portion 0£ L.A. '1'he otner al te rnat i v e waa n r.11uc!"\ 
longer system, stretchi.n9 from Canoga. Park in th e wes t.. t": rn ~..:an 
Fernando Valley tln::oL;r3h Glendale, Ourba i1k 1 central L.l\., and on 
doVJn t.o LOng neuch. ':'his second 1 i ne would use exis ting South rn 
Paci .C i c r i g h ts-of - w <l y t l; r o u g l~ the Va 1 l e y a n d fr: o rr. t he C e n t r y 
freeway to Leng Beach, combining at-grade faci.lit i•:O! S witr s o me 
yrade-separated const~uction 
The case for th-= shorter subway line was articulated most 
forcefully by City of Los ~ngeles technical officials, led by 
r l an n i n g Di r e c tor Ca l v i n Ma r:l i l ton . Th i s a l t e r n a t i v e w ::i s a l s o 
Zavored by the Southern California 7\ssociation of Gov~rn 1:-:ent-s 
(SCAG) a~d the Los Angel~s Chamber of Comruerc~. The longer route 
was sponsored by the Los Angeles County Coard of supervisors, led 
by naxter ward, and by the many cities through wh i ch the County-
backed line would pass: Bur.bank, Glendale, Compton, Long Beach, 
a n d ·•~ h e o t h e r c i t i e !.i i n t 11 e sou th a n d c e n t r a l po r t ion s o f the 
Co u n t y . In the r:i i d d l c o f J u n e the Co tin - y s u p e r v i so r s v o t ca t. o 
approve the long r-out.e and t:o comm it. t he County's s hare of 
Proposi~ion 5 funds ~o its const~uction. 75 
R~AC chose not to go beyond the broaa corridor level in 
r e c o m 1 :1 e n d i n '=1 a s t a r t e r l .i n e . G i v e n t h e n a t u -c e o f i t s 
composition, RTl\.C -was able ;-_ o contain t.he conflict., but not 
r esolve i-c . llo\.o/evc r , at ·.:.~~is stage o-f the process eve11 t.hi.s 
level of a~reement was crucial. 
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'Following the Novemb~r. 1974, def<~2-t, County surervisor 
.la rn es Ha 'Jes 'vJ e n t to I-/ a sh in g ton , D . C . , to e x pl ore t. h e 
c:iossibilities of federal fundir;•J· The Congress had ju~r. passt:d 
legisla"tion drarnat.ically increasing the amount of money aw1ilable 
for r ai l t.rans it projects. SCR'I'D hoped to obtain 80~ of the funds 
neecle c to build a starter line from u:·1'::'}\. 'rhe Los An:;eles 
region, had, however. a bnd reputation in the national ca~itol. 
Hayes came back st:resGing the nec~ssity of a unit.ecJ front on the 
t.ransit question and an end to local bickering; " ... federal 
tr~n5~>0ttation officials ... indicat.ed to me that unless we spca,:< 
'vJ i th o o e v o i c ~ fro r:. th i s reg ion , w <? 21 re not. 9 o j 1: ':3 ':. o g E ~-­
any th i :1g." Soon aftei; RTAC begun meeting, u.s. S·~crctary cf 
Transportation Colem~n visited ~_./\, and lnilde it cl<o:.;ir. that local 
agree~.ent and cor:-;:i1i tmcnt oC local funds l'/OUl<l have ·.:.o be 
forthcor.11_ng quickly i f L.A. w1!!re 'ffr l>e in the runnin1j fol~ larve 
u mounts of f'e<leral tr·insit morii~s. 
SCRTD W3S aule to take th~ RTAC consensus, ~n<lor~ecl by 
the state government. anc) com1;iunicate it to UMTA. ncwev~r, i: 
was clear to all concerned that the conscn~..:.:.> ic.sition w.is 
ex crernel y unstable. 
Oyron Cool~, rresic.lcrl'... uf 1~he SCR'l'D Ooon.l of Dir-t::ctors, 
told a statt:! legi.lilative hearing in late July, )_C)75, ~hat the 
conflict col"lcerned th(;! northern part of the line: th~ soutlH:!:C"I\ 
alignment was much less probl~ mat i.c. cook said~ " .. . the City of 
Los Ang~ 1 c s , i rt·~ spec ti v e of v1 h i ch w a y i t come s , w i 11 b c th c 
ultimate beneficiary of the starter line. It is my consid~rcd 
opinion that it ~hould serve as large a geographical area and as 
many p~ople as possibl1:,.,.To get lost over the hills tryirig to 
mcike Uilshice Boulevard a part of the starter line would, in my 
opinion, be a gross error, and I doubt that. an1 of us would live 
lon~ enough to sec it completed." 
ll a x t e r I '1 o r. J to l d t. he. l e y i s l a to c s th .1 t bu i Un n y I. h e L . A . 
City-supported 2.l\h:T-like subv1ay \-JOuld drastically shrink ~:he size 
of the fac:i l Lty that could be provided. Hard said, "~ie 1:1ust get 
to Long Ueach, and we must. 9et to. -~C.:i.noga. ParJ<.. You have to get 
t:he ... mile.uge."' Long Beach Mayor CL1r-:-::: also spoi~e to the 
possibility of shortening t.h!!. line in order to builcl a ~ .. 'ilshire 
subway: "I t.niTlk Long lleach's attitude is very strong in 
opposition. Jf you don't t'"each Long Dt'!2ch, we're 0oi11g to be 
very unhappy because we think we are a vital lin~ in that 
system." 
Dorothy La Conte, Councilperson f.rom t.he City of Rol l:ing 
Hills and reprea~nting the Intercity Transportation Committee of 
the South Bay, told tht: i)curing, "\>J~ do, of. cours~, endorse that 
concept which includes the extension of the corr-tdor cu Lon<J 
Beoch anu San J?edru, though not. runriins throu•Jh cue or ea, l :'l t:l.ny of 
our peopl~ will beGof:tt fcom the cor:::idcr .... rn unity th en:~ is 
!;t:ren(_jth. /\fter cornµlet.ion of this corr.i.dor, the t·ine for r.·ipid 
t can s i t i n ~; u u t. h l\ a y .,., i 1 l c () rn c , t ll c o v e r w h c l w i n y n e c J i G l u 
start." 
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Finally , u representative of the Los Angel es Cha mber of 
Commerce desc r ibed a study that had been carried out under th e 
Chamber's auspices . This study favored the \lilshl r e subway line 
because even though it would cost moro it would at t r ac t more 
patronage because it run through u denser corridor. On e o5 the 
leyislators asked the Chamber representative: " ..• setting the 
\Ii lshire as the priority, that mea ns we won' L g e L tu Long 
Beach . .. we mdy not come all the way from the tip and of the [San 
Fernando) Valley ... sc> it may be a shorter corridor. Now , you've 
heard the Mayor from Lony Oeach and the councilwor.ictn f rom Rolling 
Hills and the representat ives from the othe r cities in ai sti nij 
that for their part of the 1noney to bi;:- contribuLed to thi s 
project, t hey would at least require that we t ake t h is all th e 
way to Long 13each. •rhat is a problem you woul d h ave to resolve 
l ocally and soo n. Do you llndersta1u.:. tha.t?'' The Ch a mber 
spokesman re sponcJed: " I understa nd that . .. and I. think e v~ry 
effort should be made to get t he line to cov er the Long Ce~ch 
a rea . 13ecause in this study that we have made, it d oes no t 
include a ny political acceptabi lity . I ~ was based on la nd use 
and l.:.he technical aspects of service .. .. We have d ·ecided on the 
broad corridor and while we show preference for the Hil sh ire 
line, we have pointed out ... there ;;ire soine balancing factors and 
we would not oppose another line."77 
The interesting thing to note in the Cha mber's t.esl im o ny, 
of course, is the distinction between "technical" und ''poli ticul" 
aspects of t he starter line project . The \·.'ilsl1ir e sul:)\1 ,3y 
supposedly was t~i.! technically superior option, while the Count.y-
S pons o red alt ernative l' ad po l i tical appe.:il. na xt er wa::-d 
crystalli zed these j_ ssue$ i n. a newspap e r editorial clebate with 
Calvin. l!arni lton a few 1.o1<.!eks after this heariny. J\ttac k in<.J the 
\lilshire subway, ~'/ar<l wrote: 11 1\ lot of ignoring has to he done 
if the city ' s plan is to make sense: that it wot.lt.l pr.u11.:irily 
serve the Wilshire Boulevard busines.s interests, that it \.,rou l<l 
cost nore r:ioney th.:1n is availuble, that it would commit L.s t.o a 
type of technology foun ti wanting in San Franci sco, and t hat i~ 
would take 10 to 15 y~ars t o buil d . out we cannot ignore the 
need for jo i nt polit ical act ion, wh ::.c h dooms the city's 
plan .... It is simply no t l ogical to be lieve thaL Long 3each , 
Glendale, Burbank or Compton v-rill support a syst.em which does liot 
s(lrve their residents, nor is it logical to thiuk that the Board 
of supervisors could , in good faith, support a system which would 
only provide s ervice to such a small fragmen t of Los Angeles 
County." 
Hard ' s comment cast the political-technical distinction 
in an old and clear lig':"lt . His t orica l ly , r oi l rapid t ransit 
proposals had always consisted of long lines radiat ing from the 
c ore. Even though central L .A. contained just a small proport ion 
of al l t rip destinations in the matropolitan area, it still 
conta ined the single largest conce ntration. Therefore, J.. f t he 
ob~1 ectiv t? was to build rail rapid tr<1nsit, then Jines rulic.itin •J 
fr0n ehe central area made more traf fic/econonic sense than 
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o th8rs. Moreave r, the 1;; il shire corr id or W::2S specia 1 in :=moth al"' 
wdy: it was the only one in t~·1e central core that did n0t 
contal.n a freeway. As a result, Downt:own/\·Jilshire Uoulev.:;.rd 
traffic capacity in this corridor was severely restricted. An 
L.A. c.i.ty planner not.ed, " ... the h'.i.lshire corridor do~s not h.:ive 
existing public right of woy capable of accomrnoda '-· i ng su ff icier,t 
bust::s to provide u.n adequate level of service .... r.x .i~ting trafLi.c 
cor:•jes t ion anc project ions of future tr a f fie Levrds prohibit tl1e 
conversiol'\ of sufficient existirH) tr'1ffi~ lanes t.o cxcl~1:;ive bus 
lanes on a scale larye enough to proviJe ~dequate public 
transportation." 78 
Jusin~ss and political leaders from the tt1c1 ny cities 
sur:::-oonc1lng L.J\. hist.oric<.1lly - <:ind successfully - op1)os~1:l c rail 
r .:_~ ;> i J t ni n s i t sys t e m th ca t w o \.l l d f o cu s on cent r a l Los .'\ n g el es . 
Give!) it.s mandate to boild a rail rapi<l transit s yst0-rn in this 
historical cont.ext, and given ti1e co1.-1position of SCr\'I'D'!1 r.uard of 
nirL:ctc;rs, the Board tried to reconcile its rn andat€) with i!:.s 
p<.~}.it1c;.1l ai:d e<.:onoini_c bases o( se::r.>~)?'"t b y pr:opcGir J tl1.~t. 
downtvvn1/ rodiul .liric.•s bt: ~xtcnd<:-rJ t.hrc.)uqh .:is 1~w n y ciLi.~s .:i s 
see :;i ed t<.!<.:bnic.;.l.ly a ~1;; 1:iu <11 1~ : ially feasible. ';· 1i ~ L1 oaL-:J !>oped 
t h at coverage wuul :.~ SUpJJress locatio:1<il conflicts. ';'he 13oeir<l 
h.:E1, of cnurse, '.>..::~: 1 d:i. sappointf: d thu::; far. Duxter · .. :c1nJ's 
c:0 m 1,;ent uoi)e clear, thouyh, that t..;\ . City's pla;1 £or" sul.J\1•.:.;y 
sy~·; :em t .h;, t. '"ould i..>~ al1;1ost e11tircly wit.hi11 !:.he C i. t.y's li~:iits 
viol.:-.ted e-Jen this elemental }-50litit.:hl Jync.imic. :;Ly ,.;ould th e 
r~CR'T'f) noard, histox:ically concer-necJ wit.h coverage, ci.pp r-ov<:: a rail 
lirH: ~i1:1i t c<l to tc1e City? \·Jhy \'JOuld t.he s:naller ci.t. i ~s <t~:.) l~ie 
County Supervisors a?prove divcr~ing their respectiv e ya 3 t~x 
funds to bui l<l s uc~) .:.i triln sit project? 
In '.11id-,\u1..usi:, 1975, the £z:z:igile consensus her:,;a11 to 
v i s i b 1 y d i s i n t es r o. t e, .:i s L. A,. ,Vj a yo r l?. r. · d le y ca me o u t i n s u ~;:_)or t 
uf a l·Jil shir<~ sul:iuay. \.>.1ar-<l ci:iticizeJ Oradley fo.r (.Usrupt.ing tlie 
regional a<:j rl!~ ::1cnt. Long l3ecJc11 Mayor Cla r>c noteu, "To ;~. Br'1d le/ 
h.:i s long been J.denti. f)_t!d as a strong supporter of put.lie tr~. : 1sit 
in this regio:"l. ~k>W, howevet" ... hc enclor~:ed a :;yi:;ter.1 that will be 
~. o r d lly wi-t.:.i:-. Los Angele:.·~ . ... " 79 
!.n la~e J\uyust che SCH'J'D 13oard vot~d the hH'Jntown Los 
.l\ng<?l e 5 to Lon•~ St:c1<.::l'I ~egment aS their top priu'l'.'it.y. SC~'.:'D '.10t~d 
against <1cl.opt. ing the ent i r !:: p .l'."ojcct that had ).n:en oppro·Jed ti:; t n e 
County supervisors in order to c1 in j_ ni.i. z•~ City an t~·j C:1n i s~·, . l\ :ioard 
major .i. t 'l reasoned that the southern segmen t con t.:iined a l e: .cnts 
c ommo n t o both. City and County plan~ . r-;oreover, this segment 
addressed the coverage issue th<lt concerned the .S CRTO ~C.)nru. 
::>(.a-1no:; t h e next several weeks SCR'T'D ordered. co1~mcanccrrie(l~. of pr ~ ­
prel im ina ry engine e rin~ work in th~ Long Be~ch cor r idor an ~ 
auopted a fiscr.il yea:r 197 5 -1976 rapid U:c:\nsit work l)t"O(jram th<:it 
foctL:>el: ~!1t.irely 0n tl1c £..outhi.., rn ;;;e •3rnent. 
The 1,.1\. c.ity council. had confronte•.i a sim il..:H S C R':'L' 
Bonrd p r og rarn iJefor e . In ~ 1) 71 SCR.'I'D rt:!solv ed to bL1 i l d a li ne 
f r om downto wn into tJ1e south c~ ntr;:il portion of the Count.y. 'l\ _e. 
Ci.ly Counci l hll <.l refused to ~;u c:ilong l..Jit.h this proposa.l. 111 l(Jlc 
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f.>.u9 ust., 1975, a C i ty Cc.1uncil Ad. Hoc C o r.-;m ' 1-t ~ on rc:.pid trd s i -'-
r e coml7lended that the Cit:.y and County a sk Ca l t.r ans t.0 c on .. L 1c t a n 
i npartial. non-political study of th ::: v .:l rious alt.e r1 1. lives . 'l('l'AC 
l ikewise thought .$Cl1.TD' s comm i trnt'.!'nt 1:..0 the L . • - L ong 8E.·a.c· 1 J. i ne 
pre i:iatun.:. no 
l1.s the regional consensus disintegrat.ed, i n f lu11?1 Lial 
o utsi de forc~s began LO interven e . ln e~ r ly October t he f i r st 
"s 1 rn it" r.1eeting 1 convened under the ~uspi e s o f C u l ifo rni <..i. 
Se<.:reta ry of ausint;:ss anc.1 'l'r.:i.nsport;.it.ion Don il.l 13u :,- n_, , wa~ helo . 
The v a r i o u s lo c a 1 go v e r n m en t a n d tr a n s po r t tJ t. ion. a 'J e n c · e s \·.' e t· e 
in ) i t.ed . The Drown ,\d 'i~ i nistra t.ion was extr eme ly i r~t eres ~ - d in 
Los /l.ng t:les ari=a transpcn:.c..t.ion i ssues; the ... t ar te r l ine '•htS on"~ 
- f t l e Governor's h i':Jhcst tr ans it p t·io ri ti e s . :; CHTD C oc.:1 r d 
Pre '5id er1t Cook endorseJ the ' d 12a of un i rnpart iei l, C'.>Tit p.:11.· ,..lt ·ve 
sl'..1d y L>y C1:1ltrans ut t!ie su1:1m i t. The r.1eet ' n~.1 con c uc eJ .in th t:> 
ca l l for a caltrans ev~Juation. B l 
I n ad d i t ion to s ta t e <J o v e r n 1 ;i en t Ll 1 i n i t .i il t i v '2: ... , ~~ C RT 
r.eceive d a lett r fr-orn U[·1Tf\ l\drni r. .i.s Lra.tor n.obert l. <l tr i c etl.i. The 
•.dMi n is ' rator ativise<l SCP.TD to study the ent.ir_ c o r r.· idor, n ot 
just tht: sou tli ern scg n<;n t. ·lo r<:.::ovel:', D .e J <'1 cob s , U 1'i'i\. r;e1:J l .:rna J. 
l\d in ini:sti:c.tor, a l so com 1.1w1icated his £1~el ing th3t. SC R'i."I) should 
.0in a. lyze the entir~ corriclor._ In the f<..l ce of the se e.< t. · r n~ l 
(:' · ess t.1res, SCRTO ch.:in g e cl its stand~ t he Doat- d a~ · pt. e t a 
r es·::ilution authorizing work on t.hc £:nt.lYe corr j.-.~or. "!' 1<:! l1i i l s hil:I.:! 
sub-way was back i>1 tlle runi~ioy.132 
I n i a t c ; l o v e r;: b e r th e D u s i s s a n J 'J' r a n po r l a t i o n 
S e c r e t. a r y con v e n. e d t he :.; e co n d s u m rn i t ; C a l tr ~ n s s u b ra i t. t e d ;_ t s 
r e _t-1o r t. Based o r-1 the resuit~ of caltrun~.· s t u •ly t.he :.:;u mmi. t 
p r:-od. llced agreement on the top priority 0£ tl1e Down t.O \•/rJ - L011 -~.; B...:: .:i.'-'h 
s e 9 1;1 e :H.. !3 o th the ti i 1. sh i r e s · ' LH 4 u. y d n d the Our bu. r. k / G l. e 11 r1 <i J 
route s sh.cul.a be built in a seconcl st.G.·3e . OJ 
Caltraris' techtiicCJ.l una.lyses Gl ove+ a i le nc','1tly w i.t. h 
sc ., 'f l)'!> coverage concerri. tn 107·1 thG st a t.e l~gis a tur e h ac 
asked Ca :.. tran.s t o pr .- a re an c-v::i l u<J i.. ion of l: h e r ai l r.apia t.r .J. n ,· i L 
pl:op - . ls then bein~ cons iderecl l>; SCP.TD. Ca lt.r<'l ns h ad c o ncl u 'ed 
the n t h ~ t a l a r g e c :'" l>-• c i 1_ y r.,) p i d t. r a n s i t s y s t e ir1 - 1 i · t ·n e 
\·l :i. lsh ire s11bwl1y - 1,Jas >Ot ju~ti !:it~d. However , Cal t r a ns t 1our3\i t u 
meui u tXl -Ccl:)aCity systen1 - l i. e: t h e Coun ty Supervisor 's t_'.} .la11 - .!udt: 
sense. '1'!1is sumr.1it agreemen t r ei::.resen tec thl~ high point of tl e 
· po lit.i ·~ a.l" u.pproach to transit p lanning. Once ,:»] a i n, hu1,-11:: ver , 
the fra '::_r:i.. le consensus beg~n to unravel. 
RTAC, par-ticulll.rly the lechnical mc r:t \)e rs , ""'ere di s .1 · bt. d 
b y t he resul t s of the secon.d summit. l1\ich .::iel l<.enn eJ.y , an 011'T' .T•. 
rep resent o t i -v e a t tend in g , T A.. c n! e et in 1  s , r a is ea ' i u ~ ~3 +- i o t, s 
conc~;'!rn ing projected pat.ronas e , environ me n t a l im r~ ct" n c ost 
e f fectiven~tiS in rolat ion to th~ naw pria~ity line. Ke nnedy ~ lso 
s a i d, " ... th~t i n fJuffalu. Denver, o.nc3 Det ro · l , rol i.t i<...: · l 
d e c i s..1. o 11 !; co u l d no t 'u e s u . r.i or t e d .:>. n d t. h u t U 11T1\ . 1 :2 C.. t o r (1 cj u c ~ t 
t ii at. f1.Hthi?r attr.:!nt'on b 0 dir 0cb.: d trJ .1n rilte na .l v c .. .. H1< 1 1y ::ii~: 
l~"'" t Ll"-J lho.: e. - r · 1· i.vc111~.·,;!'; u[ .· ucb p .d ic..:.i. <.:: ;,,: ~•-·· C <...1 l~ j'C0 1 ,,, , , 1 l•\.IS 
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la !1 :;;: s on free v1 :J. y s . '' 1~ SC J\ G represent a. t iv e warned that t 11 e 
:results c£ technical analysis, " ... may not bu consistent 1r1ith t i1e 
summit results ... and that the members of RTJ\C should .•. s::: ek to 
i11press upon the decision 1':1ak~rs the importance of t.he technicul 
analysis work." i\t another !~Ti'< C meeting UMTA represent. .o:it.ive::> 
expressed their concern about committing to the sum~it decision 
prior to full technical ana.lysis.84 
~he Lo5 Anyeles City Council re~ained aloof. The Council 
-.:-cfused to endorse the .SC!~TD .LJriority lil\e until the results ot 
an analysis of the entire corridor were in. 
SCRTD, ho1;;ever, \/Jas emboldened '.)y the summit.. deci.sion. 
The Board of Directors changed their line once agc:iin, ar..cnding 
the SCRTD application to UMTA to ask for funds to analyze only 
t.he L.,\. - Lonu neach corr id or. 
SCRTD i n mea.iately came under l'ress1.1re £ro r:1 U HTA t o 
analyze the entire corridor. Re".:JiOnal IJ.!T7'.I. Administrator Jacobs 
hastily sought t.o gather support for a coi~1 prchenr:ive study. ' h e 
L.A. City Council votec t.o withhold supper':. for the stc:rter lini::: 
project until results of an ~ntire corri.dor c li~<J.lysis were 
available. 
r, few c'lays after the 13ou.rd's decision t.o cor:centrn.tc on 
t 11 e L • A . - Lon <3 n each 1. i n e , i n ea r l y J a n u a r y , 1 9 7 6 , i r ; t ens e 
l?ressure from U i'1TA forced SCR'l'D to reverse itself once d 'jain. 
The Board voted to analyze the entire corridor. llowevcr, th"" 
UO<Jr<.3 hoped the analysis v1ork could i~ minimized; thE.! southern 
seg:nent remained SCRTD's top pcior:ity. 
J 11 F e::, r u a r y SC RT [) t:"J. n ···~ u MT J\ he l d a tech n j c a l r e v i ~ '" 
session lo out 1 ine the an~~ l yt i cal work to be done. R1'l\C Chai. rl ''<i n 
Rich a rd Ga l lag he r , a s Cl~ TD t e c Im i. ca 1 o ff i c i a l , to 1 d :·,Tl\ C • "I\. 
m.J.jor point inad8 by the Ut'1T/\ c:;roup is that t::c:: 'in i. tiill 
ir.cre1.1en t' (of rail) for which we apply for funding be o complete 
'progru.1i1 package', including not only the first stdye uf fixed 
guideway, but also high-level bus ~> erviccs as appro:.:;riate, 
.:1rterial uncl fec:der bus improvements and activity c~ntcr 
c ircul u tion project.s. 11 86 
l\ctivity c~nter circulation meu.nc project.'3 like the 
Do 1..; 1 1 t o w n p e op l e M o v e r th a t L • A • C i t y a n d i t s C o m in u n .i. t y 
Redevelopment Agency had been work.inu on for some y~urs. UlY ' I':. 
~as very sensitive to thG need for coordinated planning oE the 
do,~ntown portion of any rail plan in relation to a people f:-\Over. 
The program packagu out.lined oy tJ!'·!TA officiuls wast.he 
first statement of what carne to be adopted as the ragional 
transportation plan. UJ·:TA, though, was less int.eresterl in th~ 
rail rapid transit element than in the other asp<:::cts of the 
package. UMTl\ had been .ir:terestcd in prornot i.ng p~ople mover 
tJrOjects in various cities arourid the countt·y. L.J\.':; no-.. .. nto·.1~! 
proposul was <ttt.rdctive to fedl~ral officinls as <1 t3~1. 1 r.; nstra.tio1. 
['!·l,jc.:ct. i.n l.J 1,1rt.i<.:<1lur ly[.JL' o[ tit'l 1<1n c-nviro11 :. i:nt. : ior l ·i; Vec, 
SC 
U M'l' l\, SCRTD, and Caltt'dns had rz~cent l y cooperat e~l o n t J H:.~ ::;;:in 
Oc-:rnardino Freeway nusway construction ef f ot- t and the :!antu 
noni ca Frec\.,iay Dic.:1rnond Lanes. U'.l'TA remaine J extr e me l y intl~re st e.d 
.i n b us~.;a.y projects of these kinds. F.in;1lly, ·.1 a r i o ~, fec!e i: .si l 
t r an sportation officials had, over the yea.rs, ex p :r s ·-d d o ubt 
r egarding ~1e vi a bility of rail rapid t ransit l ~ the automobil e -
u ~pe ndent Los Angeles area. UMT i\ , ther e.fo r~ .. w. nte d cri su re 
tha t l ess expensive, bus oriented appro ac1H. 5 ·1ere b or ou g h ly 
e xplo.red . 
Given these UM'I'A guidelines, S CRT D 1.1ov e d a h .;Jd \v lt\·1 an 
a n alysis of the entire San F'ernando Valley - centr.:il L ./l .. - Lon13 
Be ac c orridor. Five initial i.ncr erri e n t.~; uf ~~ '- d.l 1 • .; e r speci._ ' ed : 
l\l ecnat ives A cHH.l n were t.he JlOrthern anu southe r n St=tjffi•? r t s of 
t h e county~suppi..:n:·ted systen~; l\l t.ern a tiv8 C r n from do nt.O\-·.i n 
scuth t o the Century Freeway; Al ternative n was f ro~ down to~n to 
Cent u ry City, on e of the lent.l ing nori - ·c n t ral o ffi c e / c.1:111< erc .i ~tl 
cente r s \vest of downtown ; a n d Alte rnativ e E v,·a s the L. -A. C ity -
s po sored Nurth !lol lyvJoO J - Wilsh i re - Downto\v tl r o ; e . T h is 
r out e <l if fcred frorn t e one or i g i na lly propo sed i t> tha t it 
e r- , i n a t. e d do w n t ow n ; t li ~ sou th c en t r i.l, p o r t i o n o f th e c i t y \•J u. 
not c o v e red. 
"ii'11e criteria for specifyi n g t-.he se particular increhh::? ~ . 
e s p ecia l ly Alter~atives C, D an d E , were not i de n ti f iec in le 
a lt ernatives an a lysis reports that were released. Ther 2 w ~ re 
othe :r options availabl~, which is what n akes the p . !:· t · t"' 1.1 1.:1 r 
c h oices interesting. In f)Gcer;iber, 1975, SCJ\r, nd ~a s e d Cl rei.)o r t 
done by its s t,:i ff com:;ia r ing- various rail $yst01H con ei g Lir(1 U.on s . 
SCJ'1G 's c·.,1 <31. u;::i.tior. ~Lnclud e d SCHTD'~ increment ~ 1 as wel l as :-·, l.i n. e 
tha t L·an thruu<Jn the :.'lil:=ilire Goulevard cor-riuor t o d o wnto w.1 <1ncJ 
che n sout.;1 to the Cen.tu:ry F ·-e evl a j1, The interesti n v point is U121t 
he \;·,: i. 1 s h i r e Bo u l e v <:i r ·J - sou t h c en t r a 1 l i n e w a s p r o j • c t::. c d t o 
c -· r r y 1 6 p ercent no:'.·-~ pat~ :rons than increment F.. Th e costs o' the 
wo l i n es were very simi. l ar.87 '':"·he t.·7il$hir'3/ sou th entr a l l ine 
al~ o had an i;·;ipor:tant £-iOlitica.l attraction: it prov i ded s~r v i c•; 
t a v ery poor, lart;iely black. section of Los A n ge les t:1 at. h a ll 
staunchly s.upt-JOrted pcevious tra ns it re f e renda. SCPTL, h ) \.J c·vc · , 
c os • no l to analyze this al terna.t i ve. 
Perhaps SCP.TD wanted to focus it .s er1e·rtJie s i .n th·~ 
vii 1 sh .i r·~ co er id or he cause t hi u corr id or l 0ck.ec.i a f re e .,,z,y. L . A . 
C · t.y i-echnicians had been advocdti. n'] this v : e w t or- s ome t i. ;. e . I n 
a rJdit. ion 1 there was support for Ure sub111 y pl a n i ri Hol l ywood. 
'l'h e City-supported proposal provided a possible tech n ica l basl.s 
!:or recreating the alliance bet.wee n dovJhtov1r1 a n d Bo l ywou< 
c oal itions that had carried tr.e 19 4 8-19~9 nwi<l tra! i. si t propos ~L 
7 h s! S Cl\G-"-- esig-nea route ignored !iollywood. 
Durinq the course of th0 alternatives .c:~ na l ysi:o, the-
h'ilshire subway rose to prominence. As the study aocu i\11~nt:::; 
er:1er<y:<l, IJ~·\'fl\ Regional Ad r;1i n.i s tr-ator Jacob.~; sa:i C.:i , '"I.'l1e \J i l s h ire 
13.oulevo.rd line now has a l o t 11t..:n-e yoing fot' it t h a n u ·, ('=' corr idur 
to -::.,on g Be a ch . " The r es u l t- s o f t. h e a 1 t e :r: n a t i v e s a n a 1 y s i;; , 
r e l e a s e Ll i n ,l u l y , c o n f i r- in c ,] i n i t i a l i n c r e 1<> e n t a. s t I) (_: 
r_ l 
alterno.tive that would .:ittract t~e mo5t patrons a.nd \vuulJ provide 
~he most cost-effective service. 8 
At a joint rn e et in g o f R ·:· l\. c Lin <J the co ::1 1:"1 u n i t y 
Redevelopment Agency Study and Review Group in August, 1~76, d 
SCAG representative moved t.hat RTl\C recomi7lend sub1;1itting 
combination "U" to lJMTl\. "U'' consisted of initial increr.er:t .r.:: 
{the Wilshire subway); the Downtown People Mover; a series of bus 
system improve men ts collectively known as Tr.anspor-tation Sys~ ~ m 
>le.nagemen t (TSM) act ions: and freeway bus t.rans it. This proposal 
g e n (; r a t e d El g r e d t d e a l o f c c n t r o v e r s y w i. t h i n P. T A C . ~·: i t h 
representatives frorn th;; County, Glendale, and San pe(1ro (the 
nar-bor section of L.A., near- Long Beach) abstaining, I~T1\C voted 
to recommend the adoption of combination "u" to SCR.TD as the 
basis for an application to !JM'l'f\ for preliminary engineerir.g «ind 
environmental study funds. 
Another summit rneetinCJ fol lo\"ed. _!\ ccording to .-1 -SCR'J'D 
oL"ficial, each local agency had conducted its O\vn evaluat:.on of 
t.he results of the alternatives c.n.:1.lysis. !le said, " ... it becar:re 
apparent that the various agencies v1ere not focusing on de f i nin<j 
a staged transit system, one \•ihich includes act.ivity center and 
regional elements to be define:d over time." As a result of th0. 
continuing local disarray, Ut·ITJ\ requested for111ation of il jw i nt 
agency task force to come up with a combined µrogram. Cal trans 
argued for freeway tr<'lnsit, The City wanted the people •nov~r, 
the subway, and more buses. SCRTD had to build a rail Gys e 
but wanted coverage. They converged on combinat.i.on "u," ·..;\lich 
the su~mit endorsed.89 
In September, ~he SCR1'D Goard adopt.ed the four-r ;1 rt 
program, including initial increment C, " ... a sw_paent of high 
capacity rail rapiJ t:dnsit in the high density re~ional core 
acea which is n·ut dir~ctly served by freeways." Combination "U" 
c!_)peared to SCR'rD .<.ts the oest available means to reconci 1-e tht:ir 
rail transit mane.late, desire for coverO.LJe, an<.1 t)ie reLJuir r.~n•ents 
of external funding agencies. There ·v1ould be roil, alt.hOU<:Jh not 
very mu c ·:1 an u a 11 o £ it f o cu s e d on c en t r a. l L . h. '~ !-1 ~ freeway bu s 
i>roqrar.-i and other bus improvements \·1ould, however, provide 
County-\.Jide transit. coverage:::. 1"'10.ceover, IFIT/\ h•1d ex:pressed 
reservations about the County-supported long distanc:8 train since 
it had first. been ?idvocated. SCR'l'!J abandoned this li ne .:l$ 
unacceptable to UM?l\. finally, the: four-part j_)rogrnrr, er;1boc ied 
the favored progral!ls of Caltrans and J~-/\. City, encou!'aging t'.1eir 
s~2port for the entire package. 
Federal validation, h0\·1ever, did not cone easily. In 
late October, u.s. Secretary of TrarH3portation Colecil•'i''\ described 
c·~,e proposed Wilshire sub1.vay as ''costly" and "controvr,,rs i al." Ile 
said he woulcl have to look fl1rther into the project before 
'~pproving fedeni.l funds. The subway held ;:;i I.ow priority i.• t ti .;•:·1\, 
although Coleman said he thought highly of the other otements of 
t!"l.e four-part program. ColeMao :1oted that firm local financiul 
co1rHOitment:> wen~ still l<1cki.ng.'J(J 
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In earl y December, t! M'fA /\dm .inistrator Patr i c l.l i. v.i. sit.ed 
Los Angeles; his r-ccep t i on inclic21t e 1l that the regioc.al. consensus 
was i n grave jeoparcly onc e a g a in. S '\lpet·v i s or : ~ a. y e s t.] Ue stione d 
t r . e ne ed for the Down town People Mover , .::.s d it.! a c i t.lzeri s 
Ad v iso ry Panel appointed by Mayor 13radley. This pa n(~ l t h ou g ht 
t e peop le mover would be worse than nothing . S uper v i s o r Ke n ne t h 
lah n , the senior locc.lly elected o f fic i al i n Ca l i f orn i a , "b rus hed 
asid e " the need for a glamorous rapid transi t l i n e and sa id mo n .y 
s ho uld g o tow~rd improving bus service a n d k eepir g f ~ s low . 
T he Ex e c u t i v e D i r e ct o r of t. he Ce n t r a l C j_ t y D 2 v e J o ~~ m e n t 
Co r poration, however, pleaded for the su'' \'w' y a rid pe o ple 1~1over 
proj e cts. 
Patricell i said he ~.:as not hopeful about th e L./I.. r a il 
l.-> r o j e ct s , a 1 thou g b h e d i d 1 i k e t he bus pr o g r u r1 s ~ P a '- r i c c l i 
p red " cted the best Los j\ngele s cou l d hop ~ f or n ow 1;,,·,715 f e d e ;ral 
f u nd!; for preliminary e n g i n e ·_r ing a..nd env iro n me n t a l st udi e s. 
IJ 1TA 111ould not. likely nal<e a construction comii itmcnt.. 
Patricelli wa s only par t. ly corn~ct. on D ~ c e in ber /.2, 
l 976 , Secretary Cole ma n J.n f o rmr:::: d SCHTD and M3.yor !3 rad l e y t hat h e, 
as readt to commit to bu i ld i ngi the people inover. Co l e man a l so 
v.' rote t h at the TS M and free\..;ay bus service ele ments '-''ere ' ' ... \·1e l l 
just i fied by the annlysis." UM '!' A. and ti1e ("l~cJ c? r al 1li <:J} 11,; 1y 
Ad~i n i stration stood ready to prov i de f u nds for pr el m ·n~r y 
e.·1 g i neering ;:ind environ mental impaict analysis. 
Regarding the rl1i1 r-8.pi :l transit p r o posal, Cc'l C rL~ : was 
mor e circ L mspect. The Secr e t a ry concluded t h a t , " ... fu ~- tlle r­
s u.dy in th12 \Jils h ir~ cc,rr i d o r - b ut only in t l t corri •!o r· is 
m ~ r i t. e cl . Thi ::;. s tu d y m ~1 y i n c 1 u d · i n i t. i a l en g i n e e r i n ~I a r1 d 
e nv i r on me ntal analysis; but before t\.1 l L p r e 1 i r;i i n a r.y e n <)i n e e c fr,,_,; 
1.-1 i 11 be a u t ho r i :.u: d , s c v I.! r a l i s s u e s mus t b e res o). v e d . " 'i' hes 0 
' ss w ?s inc.I ud ed : ( l ) t i 1e relu. t ionship between the s ubway a .1 th e 
people mover, F'ederal cffic i als wanted t o see a ny ov erl o fJS 
·~ l ir.1 i n a ted; (2) t h e i: el a. tionship betw t-~e i.I the s u ·ow n y an0 i i g h -
1 eve l bus serv .ice on t he nol lywood Freewei y ; (3) the r.e l o t i ot . ·h i p 
b e t w e en th e s u b \oJ a y a n d re g i on a. l la n d u ~ e go a .l s ; a n • ( 4 ) t h e 
p osi t ·on of the L . f\. . County SLlperV'isors, si n ce ti y wo u ld e 
p .r 0 vid i n 3 a signif i c.:1nt: portion of the nec e ssary l oca l mt.1.tc l ti n0 
f u nd s. 
Cole.man went on tne emphasize tlie impor ta nce t.h e f er e r-al 
g i . ..1 v e .r n m e n t a t t a ch e d to th c ·r '5 Z ~ and o th e i..- b l i s ~) ;-:- o g r a m s . 1f e 
con c l uded by notin<:J th .:tt rJo::; Angel e s rn u!:: t sti ll be 1,; i l :ti n .:1 t o 
c o mm it to p rovid i ng funds t.o o pe r 1•te the s t ransit servic 0 s one~ 
the f i xed fa c il i t ies are pu t. i n :? l a c: e . I f Los An9c~l cs cou l d no t 
m · k e suc h a lo n g -term f .i.na ncir.11 co i:irnitm e nt, t h e n t: r1 f ed e r a l 
9over n1:11~ nt wo uld not conside r it sensible to inv~5 t the c apita L 
", s a Christmas present ," Los ,'\ngcles got $ll million .fo · f u r he r 
eny ineerin~ and envir n mental work.91 
1'he four-part progr ai\ was adopted as part o i t h e lLg io n0 . 
T r a n s po r t a t ion P 1. .:> n ~' y S C 1\ G i n {\ p r i 1 9 7 7 . :' h e L . l\ . C :i t y 
Coun c i. l. u rH.lor5ed l: l\e p.:i cka'-J I:.! in 3ept~mber, 1977, ;:ind t he Bon rd ' f 
53 
Supervisors endorsed it "in principle" ubou.t the same time. 
LQcal anc3 state financial commitments remu.ined elusive. 
l1owever. While the tenuous concensus was under cons t.ruct ion, the 
sar~1e actors were laboring in the state ca?itol to cre a te a ne\11 
institutional presence on the metropolitan tran s portation 
landscape t.i1at would stand a better: chance of conc:c e tizing t.he 
pliH\:3 thclt had $1.u:vivcd thus far. 
'T'hi:: defe.::>t of the November, l974, transit. iniU.ati ve had 
~een preceded by a t\llO-month strike that shut dovJl' l sc1n.-o. In 
December the st.ate l\ssembl.y held a hearing to explore thi;;·se and 
other problems plaguing Los Angeles area transit. Th is scrutiny 
was acco1apanie.d by several bills aimed at restructurin9 '~ Cl~'I'() ' 5 
Bodrd of Directors and t.he organization of the cJistrict. 
Mayor Bradley ""anted a r.:uch stronc,;er role for L.7\. City 
on the SCRTD Doard. nradley noted that 60~ of SCRTD service was 
within the City, and 54% of City voters had supported the 1974 
initiativ~. Bradley wanted a new Doard composed of f ive n1cmbers 
appointed by the City instead of the two current appoin t ees, five 
appointed by t.he County Supervisors, and one by the governor. 
!'radley was clearly concerned with ~niniinizing the influence of 
t.he smaller cities in transit a[fairs. 
The L.A. Count.y League of Cities and representatives of 
t h e s 1 n a 11 e r m u n i. c i ;>a l i i~ i ,~ s d i s a g r e e d , o f co u r s e , ,'l 11 d a t t ,;. ck c cl 
SCR'TD for failing to provide adequate locally oriented se~vice­
\..iithin tl1eir jurisdictions. Several member~ of the Los Angeles 
City Council joined in criticizing set-;:TD on the local ser-vicc 
issue, even as they called for a larger City presence on the 
l3oartJ . 
These local service concerns v1ere pal:'t o f a bro ,:t •d er 
criticism of SCRTD's downtown focus regarding rapid trdnsit 
j_)lunnin<~ as well as existing bus service. I\ Siln Gabriel valley 
Assemblyman wanted t.o know," ... who are the people whc arc 
ae n~llH .. L.ng rapid transit to downtown LOS Angeles? i'/c have 
lobb yists in Sacramento an<l you have pressure groups down here. 
Oownto~>Jn Los J\ngeles w<.rnts to brin<:i everybody down here. Who are 
the pressure groups that want everything to be funnel e d inco 
do\11nto\,,rn L.l\.?" San F'erna!1do Vall e y Assemblyman Antonovich <il~o 
want~cl to know who were the interests that wonte(l to :::ocus 
everything downto, .. n, while outlying areas went without service. 
L-~· City Councilme~ber Braude pointed out that 5~% of a ll person 
trips in the region \I/er e less t':1.Jn 3.J miles long. Pe::-haps too 
much attention was being paid to long distance trips. 3raude 
il l so r a i s e d an o t 11 e r prob l e ri be s e t ting tr d n s i t i n the r e <3 i on : 
con!'.:licts between the rnuny bus companies often delayed set·vice 
improven1ents. Most of thc~t:! conflict.s involved one of t 11e 
munJ.c i pal ly--owned pr ope -rt i.es f i qhting with SC!~TD over who ou9ht. 
to ~ r o v ..l !.:._ e s e r vice w i t i1 i n a j u r is cl i ct i on 11 d link. i n •J th~ 
jurisdict~on with neighbors.92 
Tn nddltion ·to these problems \oJit.h GC!~'T' D , SLi1t.c ,1.:1<1 lOC L\l 
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transit activists were deeply disturbed with the continuing 
i n~bility of the Lo.s Angeles region to attract si'F1if lc ant. 
amounts of federal transit capital funds. 'l"here wc:i s w idespr-ead 
concern that SCRTD was simply incapable of ac h iev.ic g the 
c u n s e n s :.i s n e c e s s a r y t o c a r r y o u t a s u b s t a n t i e1 l p r o 3 r- -c1 m . 
Moreover, SCAG, the designated metropolitan transportatior. 
pJd nriing a9er,cy, had been likewise t:inab l e t.o unite the r-e~ion 
b e hind an ambitious effort. 
State legislators were increasingly convinc8d tha~ an 
iGst itut i onal structure was lacking that could facilita t e the 
e merg~nce of as well as enforce a county-wi de con s e ~~us o n 
cri t ical transportation issues. In a ddition to t h e co n t i nuin9 
rc:-1-pid t.ransi t stalemate, important parUJ of the reg i o n <'l- 1 f re c wciy 
i:.JuildiM:J program, particu l arly the raassive Century F e Gway 
p coject, had been stalled for some time. Confl.i.ct$ b<~t \11"! f~ <1 t h e 
state highway department and local jurisdiction $ were of t e n 
int ense. The state was refusing to commit Proposition '·i y,'ls t a x 
f 1J n d ::; to r a p i. d t r a n s i t , e v en th o u g h L . 1\ • co u n t. y v o t e -c s h a d 
.-1 J:>p r·oved di version .. 
In March, 1975, just as SCR'l'D began its start.e r rail li ne 
:;- L1nn ing effort, legislation was introliuced tbat \•JUul d event u a t e 
i n th c c re at ion of t Ii e Los An') e l cs County 'J' rans po r ta tic n 
Cornwission, one and a half years l ater.93 't'he ke y as e c t s of 
the new agency and its do :nain as they legisl<itively e:volved 1;,1er e: 
(1) the cornposition of th~ Com r:iiss i on; (2) L.1\ C'r'C a n r! t.r at1s i t 
p lannin9 and fina.nc.::Ll; (3) relations with municipal opGr at.OT'B a n J 
t he coordination question~ and, (4} forf71ation of l o<.:<.\ l 
t r;~ nsportation 2iones. 
'the follo1vin g cor.;parison of Cloards vf Di1>-~ ct ors is 
instructive~ 
LJ\CTC 
S S upervisors 
3 L . i\. City 
l Long Deuc11 
2 Sma..der cities 
SCRTD 
5 Supervisors 
2 L , l\ . City 
4 S r11al l er cit:ie:.; 
The composition of 'L/\CTC .t- •= pre::.en ted a s mc-111 ;:l d v a u i:c f o r-
L.A. City and a co1 :1 2<lt:i1ble dimi n ution in the :i..rt f lu 0n ce c f the 
f;;naller cities. In its efforts t..o cr<:; a t c. .:i fen.Un w-he1~ e '-~ Gc ic ive 
actio n could be taken, tl1e. stat~ leg i sla ·~.u r e v1a s LH::i bl 0 t. o move 
very far in terll\s of governing body structure. ~' owever, tl1~· m:w 
c. 1:F;'CY was endowec1 with an unprecedented set. of f1nanci_,::i l 1.-0 1.,; , __ r.;:; . 
:..ACTC wa::> directed to muximize the flow of fe u ·=rc. l f u rni 3 
c o :n 1 n ·~ J. n to t h e C o u n t y . !\ !I ea r l y l e g i s l a t i v e ;:.i r o v i ·s i ') n 
fn- o h i bit c::d any ot h er pubU. c entity f ro i! t a~.)p l y i n g tlir ec: l l y to 
Hashington 1 D.C. for money; this prerogat i v e ~ rcnd 1 ~ 'L'..! r e s ~rv~~1i 
fo:r:- LJ\CTC. l\ latl.!c .:trnenrJrnent pcn111itted others to .:_q ,:i p ly, bu t UfJly 
under c-0 11diti.on s i ; r-jt by t'rl~ Curn1 1 i ~ .::>iu:k, 
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LACTC was given control over the County Tr~nsportation 
Improve t'1ent P rogr u.1~. Al 1 projects r ~cei v ing s tatE:' an d "'edcra 1 
t r a n s i t an d h i g h w a y f u n d s h a a t o be i n c l u de d i f t h <! y ~.,, ere g o i n <:.J 
to be eligible for- ~xt.ernal aid. In addition, L .'\CTC • ..Jas t o 
ceterrnine a forr.1ula. Eor allocating state transit funds t.o loca l 
transit operators. 
LACTC was ~lso wuthorized to impo5e u s~le~ tax, subjc~t 
tu v o t c r c:i pp r::: o vu. l , v; h i ch co u l d b ~ u s e d to f u n d p u b l i c t r a 11 s i t 
i m p r o v c rn e n t s , i n c l u U i n g r a p i d t r d n ~ i t: . L ,'t\. C TC w o u l ci J) ,1 v c 
authority to plan, design and construct such f~ciliti es i f ~ 
sales tax were approved. SCH.TD would opera te .;:rny r J.piu t r u. n s i t 
syster:i LAC'('C built. Bowever, SCR'I'D's rap.id transit p l an n i n9 role 
was dra1;.ati.cally reduced, as Ll\CTC was positioned to t a k e tht: 
initiative on the rapid transit issue. 
SCA.G's planning role w'ls restructured as well. ;, rou':Jl"t 
division of labor •4as established between LACTC and SC1\G. SC~.G 
woulci do long-range planning, includin·~ identi.ficution of: the 
~;1.'.'.\ jar corr idvrs of travel, the prob1.~rr1n in these corr .idor-s, and 
corridor travel goals; land use cJoals i_n the corridors: pr iority 
corridors for majo.r resource allocation; the n ix of 111odes for 
each corridor: Hnd a statement of general policic~ to 0uide 
investment. LACTC would be responsible for short.-:can9e c ;:; >\ i tu. 1 
and service plunning, incluuing appruv ~ l of a 3-5 :1ear 
'l' ran s po r ta ti o n I in p r o v e m e n t 'P l a n ; d e t er rn i r a ti o r1 o r a ~? p l: o v a l o f 
location and capucit.y needs of capital projects; select i on of 
trans1)ort harrJwar~ and t::c11no!ogy; and staying of l 1~~ provc r 1 1 ent 
Projects. ?reparation of the annual transportation \>.'or :·: pror3 rilrn 
for the r•~<:Jion wus initially given tu LACTC, bu.t. l ate r c-~s s.i. r31H..> 1 
to SCJ\G. 
C l e .) r l y , th e r e w e r e zi. 17'! bi g u i t i c s a n d o v ~ r l a :~ s i n t ti e 
~ivision of responsibilities. The legislature specifi ~ J , 
however, that it wanted LJ\CTC to coordinc1te t h e plann in:i 
activities of existing agencies, rather than be~om~ d plan n~r 
itself. LAC1'C would have a s:na-11 staff and tlepi::m<l on con su1tant 
studies Eor proj~cts it could not handle on its own. The ;·najor 
ambiguity concerned the st.atus of SCl\G's Regional TranspurL t. i on 
Plan in relation to LAC'l'C's policies and actions. 
Relations with rr.unicipal transit operators ,.,,as o~ic of t.he 
~nost cont-_rovcrsial aspects of the 1 '2«3islation. L1\C'!'C \.vo~ 
directed to l"esolve transit operator jurisdictional '.::lisputcs ond 
to rQ.tio:\alJ."Le the growth of the municipals. Given t h e conu~ rris 
with luc -.il.lj' oriented servic<: _t)r.:!valent i!\ the Cou11ty, l1ov:ever, 
the s tatG had t rOLlblc granting Ll\CTC power to -Eor:ce re.ca lei t r.:.nt 
op<=rators to cor:.ply with coordination ..Jnd ratio nu. l iz;'l tion 
progroms. A later amendment to LACTC's basic statul~ inclu<...:ed a 
mandate and deadline for- Ll\CTC to adopt. rul.c:J for r~solvi n l!J 
transit disputes, and to ir. . .t-)lement ~ coul:-dination F:cogram . . i1i S 
prosram could override various protections th~t wer e g ru n t ed 
municip~l operc:itors in Lif•.: bnsi.c lav1. Cor:1bi. ri•?d wi.t r1 r . ;1,c ·r c: 1 ~ 
c 1~ 11 t i· a J r u l. ~ i. 1 1 , , I. I o <..: a t i. 1 1 '] ::; t .:. t c: l r ;:i n s i t. s u bi.; i r1 i e ~ l o t I 1 e 
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i"'•tmicipu.ls, the Co1:imission was theoretically \N'ell-plac c·d t o tdke. 
action on the coor-oination question . The Commission 110'.·J <:! Ver, 
wliich included a ;3ubst_antial nurnber of peopie coric0r ued to 
e nhance the status of locally ori.ent~<l trannit finns, wou 1 .. 1 h ._,V'..! 
~ o t ~-ead softly on this issue . 
. l\ final important dimension was LACTC's capacity to 
create local transportation zones, a direct response to the 
wiuespreud criticism of SCRTD on the local service issue. The 
lejislature explained in the statute that L.A . Cou n ty is a J~ulti­
cen. t e red area with diverse socioeconon~ic levels -.:ind t1.-.~i v el 
p a.t. terns. A majority of trips were less th21n or lO' qt~a l to four 
i:.i L:.~ s in length. Local transpor t zones were defi n ed. as ciL.i .• ~ ::> 01· 
t1 ni ncorpora ted areas which corit.:i i ned an economic cen t. ~~Y or r'.1 '1 jar. 
t :-: .i.p gener<:i.tor in whicb ther.e Wi:!S a large percent:.i 9 e o f s hor t a nd 
rn 2ciiur,1 length trips. Ll\CTC was di rect.ed t.o establisli G U t..:h zones 
a n d a d op t g u i d e 1 i n e 5 f o r t !1 e i r o p e r ,"\ t i o n s . f ·: o \v c v e r 1 t h e 
Co 1nmission could authorize such zones only where it cieten "1 in e iJ 
sc · T U or other municit:ial opGr-ator::; coul c. n ot. pro· 1 t ( e ad e c;u <J tc 
s ervice, The last provision was inte n ded t o prev t'!! rit uu :·1y 
n ·.:: '·" c o me r s f r o m e n t e r i n q th e f i el J , a s s Li a 9 i n y t i "< e f E ..:i r s o .f 
existing operators that subsidy manias wo u ld b e Jil u t~d by a 
1 a rs; er nu 1:i.ber of claitni;ints. 
LACTC immediately bi;:gan to unravel the knot ~; th .:;i t h.J.d 
bet::ri tying up ;r.ajor County transportation projects. T h e 
Co1~.r:-1iseion played an irnporta11t i:-ole i r1 res o lvin s t)10 C'. ent 11ry 
Ffeeway dispute. Jn addition, LAC'I'C secured leqislation :orci t;,q 
tht.J std.te to alloc.:i l(: the r:i aximurn possible amount of Pro p o si.tiC <) 
;.; funds to th~ starter line rail projoct. The Co n:m i ~ s io11 
c o r;i ff,i tted itself to providing the r e1:iair1der of fu'1 ,:Js ne e<l e <l t o 
m.:... tch a poss ib le f e der0l tra nsit capital grant. LACTC the n moved 
t o p l ace a sal es tax on th~ ballot th a t would s upp o rt a n 
a . bitious trt:lnsit i11vest n ent progi:am. Commi.ssion st aff b eg u n 
\v or:-~ on t. he s a l e t.> t cl x i n c a r l y l 9 8 I) , a L:< i .11 g to 9 e t i t o n th :;;: 
b .~ ll.ol i:"l ~~overnber. /\ lthough the recent succe~> . .s o f P r opos.i t ion 
13 in Ca lifornia r.1acl~ staff vJary of proposir~'d ,"\ t :n: in c r~a se, 
p e r h aps the mo re r e c en t. r:1 e 1 ~1 or y of l en <J :. h y l i 1: es at- g i'i so 1 i n•:~ 
stat ion s d uring 1979 a n d contir.iling air polllltion probl e:r.s wo uld 
favo r a b ly dispose a larger proportion of th 0 ele c tor at e to a 
transit i.nitiative than har] previously ocen the case. 
L/\.CTC staff initially propo~ed the followi ng a lloc at i on 
o f sales t~t:< funds~ 50% for guideway projects. inc1uding f.n.? e\.:ay 
t ransit and rail lines; 40% for inc r eased bus and ? 6 ra-t ran s it 
G e r v i c e i n th e n cw r - t e r rn ; a. n d 10 '6 f o r t. r a n s po r t a t i o n :::; y <> t ""' 11 
rn a :-i a iJ e m en t pro y r u m s • S ta £ f was n ' t s u r l.:l ;1 l>o u t L l1 c 1;1 o cl a l 
~om poo i ti on Of the <]Uideway projects, thOL\<fh then..: \l/ u 'S ,:i_ fe e li n c~ 
th d t voters would prefer rail rath e r th a n b u s. In Ju ne , sta f £ 
presented a proposal to the com~is&ion calliny for p r eliminary 
Cornmission adoption of the allocation for ;:-,u la a n d o ~ ct 0 £ 
corrido:cs for guide-..Ja.y construct.ion. These c orridors \Ile r ~ t. !"i e 
h i s t. o r i c s et o f d o \ J n town J r a d i .:J. l s . S t a f f c e co r:1 r;: e 1 H \ e d th a t. ~ 
::; eric~ s of public hearin<JS be. held to t"(' t:'.e ive i n pllt r t:gar-d · !liJ t i 10.? 
i ri i. :.; <..> f bu s a n d r <'.' i 1 'd u i de w ~'l. y p r o j e c t s • Th c Co m rn i s s i 0 ri ."J 'J r t:: e d , 
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a l thou g h i t w a s c l e a r th c c o r r i do ~ s t.. th e m o a e i ~ s 'J e , u n d t. ·1 c 
allocation formula were controversial.-1 
SCAG staff indicated support for the Sille6 tax and for 
the allocation formula. They were especially conce~ned to avoid 
the prolifer~tion of small, inefficient, uncoordinated local 
services if local governments yot a significant z;:>1ount of mo ney. 
They offered the SCAG-adopted regional transpor t..:::ition plan as a 
b l u e .P r i n t for t r an s i t g u i d e ~.,a y i n v e st men t s • T h i s w o u l d r;, ,_; <-t n 
busways on freeways rather than rail rapid transit, with the 
exception of tne Wilshire su~way. However, t h e officicil. .SC l\C 
committee dealing with tro.nsporta.tio n issues refused to 1.·ndors~ 
the s ta f i po s i t ion , c v en tho L\ g h i t 111 ea n t s e t ti 1' g a s i_ .J e ;1 n 
agreement that had been laboriously co~structed j ust a fe w yea rs 
before. Official SCAG felt it was i n appropriate to t i 0 L ACTC's 
ha n d s . Th i s w a s a c 1 c ·:l r i n d i ca t i o n th a t th c .i n s t i t u t · o 1-. , 1 l 
s tructur-e of transportation planni D"J had dee is i vely s td f.t. eJ, .,,  i th 
SCAG now playing a distfr,ctly secondary rolc .95 
In August LACTC and its staff discussed th ~ resu l ts of 
t.he public review u.nd comment process. The Com missi o ner s were 
ger.~rally disappoint~d by the lack of excitement. •Jener .::i t ,.!d h y th~ 
sales t<:t.x proposal. Turnout at public hea ri ngs a verag e d 3 ~.l - SC 
people per session. ~1any speakers used the opportunity to dt t.ac~: 
SCRTD. There was rather strong su?port fer retur n ing a share o f 
sales ta~ µroceeds to local governments . In outlying u r eas t h ere 
wer12 a ~ ~-~r..ber 0f comm~nts to the ef feet tha.t proposl:d gui d e w<:i;s 
would not serv~ these areas, yet people wou l d be paying t he t a x . 
Of f i c i u. l s i n a ~• u r.i be r of c i t i es t h a t w e re no t. inc 1 u de <l in 
designa tcd corridor~ demanded guidewa y s for their area s. 'T h !.!re 
wasn ' t a clear µu tr.ern of response :regardir:g the mode .s pcci(ici t.y 
question. 
Staff then recommende<.1 that the gui J eway invest ment. be 
identified for the ballot as a mixture of ra i l anJ hu5, with t h e 
COD ~;li!>S.l.On mainteiini11g flexibility. l\ mtip \vould 21cco1:11'•'" J t h e 
o rdi n ance, showing the proposed corridors. Th12 s t u.ff j_ndicatc-d 
it wa s favorably <lis~osed t.o adding a few addition~ l cor r i J ors -
do vrn tow n I r a d i a 1 s - bu t no t o th e r s . S t u f f p r op o s e tl a c h a n 9 c i n 
the allocation forrnula to reflect the de 1::o nd for return t.o loc al 
governments. Staff now argued for: SO'S g u idet.J ays; J~H reyion a l 
bu ::s service, TS:l and reli:lted r; rograr,\ s; und 2 :'~ retur n to l o cal 
~overnments on d popu l ation basis. 
The Coi;, :.<ission a9reed wit.h til e staff un th e 1~1od~ 
specificity question, and agreed to a map. r1ov1ev<:.:r, 
Coumissioners voted to increase t.h~ local retur-n t.o 25% and 
J.:..!crease the res i onal bus service/TSM component t o 25 %. ,\ t its 
ne .r: t n;eeting the Commission would finally deci d e on whether or 
not to go to the voters, and on specific ballot content.96 
This crucial me~ting was a very lo·ng, cor:iplex, and o ften 
confusing affair. Ciscussion of the sales tax was p ostpon cC fur 
45 minutes while the Commission waited for on e o.f t.he mu mher$ 
r e p r e s e n t i. n g t '' e L e a g u e o [ C a l i [ o r n i a c i t i e s t o s h o ·i u p . 
St.:t)~ r visor Hahn llsed most of this ti 1ne to i n f 1r::: .·i l ly ~~ d 
p } ilosophically discourse about the ne~c.1 for "vision." r1 .:i h n 
recall. •~d p:revious vision<:iri..:.:.s, includin9 the rn cn wh o Lr~i u gh t 
w e.: te.r a nd el ectr ici ty to Los Angeles. llahn t hen we n t on t:o 
<lescrib.:! a proposal he had developed a.s ar, alternative to U 1e on e 
the Commission haJ approved two weeks p revio u sly. 
The dramatically new der>artur~ H<.lhn r roposetl was this i 
give SCRTD - and the municipal operators - suf ficient f unds to 
su~stantially lower fa r es and to hold fares at the lowe r e v e l 
for 5 years. Hahn also called for a 25% re t urn to lo c a l 
•Jovernment.s, and for spending whatever was left to c o n s truct r a i l 
- ar:J on l y rail - rapid t:r,1nsit lines. 'I'Ji e Leag ue of Cc:i li f or:- 1ia 
Ci t i es representu. tive then walked in, announc i n g t1ia t t:he Lew~ ue 
lad vot.ed 17-15 to opp ose puttinr3 the sol~s tax on t h lJo v e .rr:ber 
ba l o t, an eerily similar vote to the one tha t sta l l ed t ran sit 
district creation in 1918. 
Fol l o w i n g a v e r y h e o t e d d i s c u s s i on , th e L e ~ ':i :J e 
r eyre s e ota ti ve placed th0 quest ion of 1'1heth<;r or no t LAC7 C o or3h t. 
to <.:JO 1:0 the vot.ers in Hove rn uer on tile table. o n a r-o l l c ~1 l l 
vo ·:::..e the Commission voted 6-S .::iga.inst a b allo t me a s ur e . i\l l 
t.h::"e" City of Los Angeles r.1embers, inclutli.ng Mayor o rad l i:y 's 
c.i l ternat.e, voted "no . " However, imm~diatcly fol l ov;_i ng t h ('- ;;o e 
i·iayor ; ~ i:::adley's alternate chan<;Jed h1s vote to 'ye s ," t h e re b y 
passing t.he measure. The Mayor was appar~ntly cone r ncd t h u. t u,~ 
.saT e s tax was suff:i_ iently uivisive 'th .a;_ it s c\efe<.1t \V <:Ju l a 
jG·opartlize the chanct2s of the ot11er t.Lansi ·t t=-rojects t hat ~1 a c1 
s ec u re d t en u o us re 9 i on a 1 !l u. pi..) or t. J-J owe ;; e t" , D r <:id 1 y ]) a J 
n is t o rically be.en ide n t.i ficd as an advocate of trarzs .J.. t. " l ! (J i ,.:1 
not want to appear as the one t.o keep the measu.re o f E t. .1e · a l~ t 
i f the vote was clo::)e . 
The Co mmi s,sion t hen took u p l·lahn's pro1".l os a l. \1 <1l 1n 
e .·plaine<i he had recently re t u.rned from a tr-ip to Atla nta, whe r e 
he was p rofoundly iupresse d by the .:i;>p r-ocJ.Cll t hat city h a t · taken 
L O transit finance. ntlantb voters had approv~~ d s ~ l e s ta ~ th~t 
wo u ld be used to reduce bus fa re s and help ~ui id ~ ~ ~ il ~ J pi d 
tran s it sys ter.i. Hahn arsuea that fare r educ t. ion wa !> t he only way 
t o g e n <~ r a t e w i d e s p t· e a cl s u pp or t . I n d e e d , \'J h e n ! \ ~1 h n .( i r s t 
s u g g e s t e cJ f a r e r e d u c t i on t o L /.\CT C s t .::i f f h e \./a n t e a l ow c r f c:i i::: e .'.:; 
g u0 ra n teed for 10 yenrs; the staff had ta l ked him ~ awn t 5 . 
llal1n's action was consistent. wi.th position.s h e h a d t.a ke-n 
sine 8 lie was first electerJ to off ice £ollo\ ... i.l'l '} 't'l'orld \·/a. r 'l wo. 
t'iahn had never been a supporter of "glamor ous" rai l r a.p i d trans i t 
project.s, and he hadn't become one a t t his p oi n t. u r in g t h e 
cecent.ly concluded $CRTD rail starter line planninrJ p r o c e ss 'la h n 
had argued .for 1:iore bus service und lower fares. In 19 4<) , \'l' h · l e 
<in L.A. City Councilmembcr representincJ the distr i ct tha t w a s 
h o1-.1e to the GoutlHvest Wave, hi:; had bc~n one of th e 1'dough t y 11 
e i g ht votin g against a transit district. Ho h n i n c lud1~J t 11e l o c a l 
g overnment return element becaus~ of wiC:.8s r r t! atl sup : o rt f r lt . 
li e also called for spending rcmainin ''.3 :~ :on ies solel y on ,.. , 1 1 
pr o j c c t s i 11 or ck· r t o s cc u r ~ the v o t e o E S up er v i so r ['. <l x t r::.i r ~-~ a r d , 
5'· 
who was a committed rail advocate. 
Hahn's proposal came during an increasin<J1. y severe SCRTD 
financial crisis. The tran!:iit agency had uramatica .lly increo5eL1 
fares in the very recent past, and was clearly signalling ~n even 
t.iore dramatic tare increase in the very ne~r futur-e. Moreover, 
SCRTD had had to weather a barr<lge of criticism provoke -.'. by its 
fare policies. Critics representing low inconi~ groups n::;, well 
as policy analysts chall-=nged the base fare increases thaL fell 
nost h€avily on relatively short distance, off-peak riders, as 
well as the laz:-ge 11r.10unts of rnoney sul,si1Jizing long di::>t.:Ancc, 
peak period, express trips made mostly by higher i:icor:1e 
corni;rnters. SCAG ha,d rec~ntly concluded a study, sup_portt..!<l by 
TJJ\.CTC members and staff, that nnalyzed th~ costs involved in 
supplying commuter express service. riCRTD emerged as t he l1i::Jh 
cost supplier in the region. SCAC's report was intended to 
encou..:-age more cost-effective alternatives t.o (;CR.TD. L;\CTC h.id 
been concentrating on wayr. to ra t.ion21 l i ze gov~rnrnental t ra':1si t 
operu.tions, including the develop1nent and use of perforr::unce 
ne~•SUJ'."es in the process of allocating subsidy monies. Th~ ;-1a·nn 
proposal, especially the enor1nous incre~se in subsidies that 
would go directly to SC~'rD without any mandated service cL.:inJCS, 
undercut these ration-:1lizinC::J initiatives.97 
A great deal of discussion and negotiation ensued, which 
result~d in the allocation fonriulp that. finally appearctl on t.he 
ballot: H.:i.hn ayrced to change the guaranteed £are reductior. C-coi:\ 
5 to 3 year~; loca.l gov·crnments would get_ their 25%; a::c! the 
remainir.g funds would go toward rail construct.ion. i\fter three 
years, 25% \.JOuld continue to go to the locals: 35% would be 
earr.arked for rail construction projects; and the remaining 4'.J% 
woul<l be al located accordin9 to Commission discretion for an"/ 
transit purpose. This compromise p.".l.ssed oy a. 7 - 4 vott!, loJith 
..'jll. L.J\. City representatives in the opposition. 'i'he City would 
not contc~plate further subsidizing SCRTD aL the cost of ex~anded 
resional bus service. 
The commission then added i.t few !norc corr.idors [or ·~ood 
measure, including one that. wcis not a do~-.1ntown/radial: ;::i line 
along the San Diego Free\lw'<\y from its origin in the northe21stcrn 
corner of the San fernando Valley, past Los Angeles Internation~l 
Airport, to Long neach. Sine~ cor cider co1\struction priori ties 
were not established by the bu.llot measure, the relative standir.•3 
of this laet corridor should be especially intcresting.9B 
Many, perhaps most of the Commissioners thought the sate~ 
;:ax would be defe .·lted. Indeed, perhaps a Commission majorit:,.: was 
l~ i 1 l i n g to de f e r to S u l) e r v i G o r- ! : ah n ' s · l e ad e r sh i p p .r e c i s ~ l y 
because they thought. it would lose. Uahn was, of course, riyht. 
/\n extensive program of rail rapid transit investment rode lhe 
b a ck s of a .SC RT D far e re <l u c t i on an cl lo ca 1 gov.: r n 11: c n t re tu r n to 
s u cc e s s . Re pr e s e n t. i n g t h r.: t r i u ni p h o f a s up re 171 e i y " ? o l ; ~. i c c:i l " 
l.iilf>roztch to t:.ransit plut1nin".:) - the process by which .:.iddit.i.01v1l 
corridors were added was enough to ma.ke ot.herwi::.e slt"On':J 
technicians wobbly - u .stalern0t~ that ha<l persist.ell £or <lcc.:idcs 
G0 
was appd:ret'1tl/ transcended. 'J' i; ~ clements of LACTC's f\Cogram n .:1y 
coexist rather uneasily, however. 'Phe r:iany competi n 9 place 
coalitions in the County now have the 1i1eans t.o dra rnatica l ly d l te r 
existing institution3l and service structures. 
Local governments have been slow to effectively ~tllL~t= 
the monies they receive under the local return pro~ram. ~or n10Gt 
of them, coming up \vith .,,;ays of spending transit sa.les t a x .Eunds 
was an unprecedented experience. LACTC helped them lea r n, w·itll 
3!! extensive t.eclini.cal assistance p.royram. As of early 19BS , t h e 
locals were spending abcut 30% of their monies on paratra nsit 
p r o jects, primarily for the elt1e.rly and disabled, and fo r. t he:! 
g ener<::il publ. J.i:-. Many of these projects wece contx: a cte(l O\Jt. to 
pr i vate fir~$. Another 22% was going toward locally or ien ted 
fi x ed route transit projects. Not a single local j u ri sd i c tion 
was contract.ing with SCRTD for addi t;.ional service, i 11cJ ic t ing t h e 
dep th of estrangenent from the re g ional c arrier. 
Indeed, the most likel.y longer-te r m con se~uent ial 
developments arQ efforts by a nur"'.'lber of 5ub.regi01ial coali t i o ns -
tnree at present., in the eastern and so u thet"n porti ( ·~; of th e 
Co u nty - to form local transportation zones through which t he y 
mi gh t expand locally-oriented service. Using their local r etu n 
f u nds, ~hese zones would have a stable source of fundin g tha t 
would enable them to establish autonomy in relation to t he 
downtown/radially conf1~ured SCRTD. 
A.t the center of the County, the City uf Los An g el <:!!5 bas 
bee~ exploring taking over the operation of express ~us s er v ice 
frorr: SCRTD. Given SCRTD's historic~lly l i mited s ubs idy sou:cces , 
the development. of expres~> bus scrvi c·~ hac b e en 1 i mi t.e•J. I n deed, 
the exist.enc£:: of sizable outlying busini:ss ceo ters ·r1.:id genero t 8 d 
Ci :.::. h r i v i n g p r i v a t. e l y- o \v n. t! ct a n a ope r a t e d c o rn m u t. e r ~ x p r e s s b u 
i nd ustry~ servin9 corridor!i SCRTD was politi. c a lly and fi n a nc Lall y 
UJ1"1l~ le t.o s~rva. The most important of these corri dors s tretc hed 
no r th and south of Los l\ngeles International l\.iq»ort. More over, 
the study of conrnuter expresses in the region sponsored by SCAG 
pointed out how expensive it was (or SCRTD to provide e xpress 
service relative to carriers that were able to ut i li z e non-uni o n , 
p a rt- t im2 labor. The City apparently believes it c an i i. prov€ o 
SC RT D. In add i t i on , C i t y of f i c i a 1 s \'/ e I" e d e e ply d i s t. u r _ e d "'h e n 
LhCTC traded off re~ional bus service for local return and lower 
.fares. The City·~ prir1Z'l.ry gohl in the short and mediu m ten ;) ·,'/as 
to dra.r:.o.tically increuse express bus ::;ervice . Hai l r an · a 
tra~sit , even if approved, would be a long time co1:1i rHJ . 90 
scnTD, 1w\"ever, continues to exert in fluenc•-" s i p ly 
becausi::: of its weight on the current tran5it scene. I n l a t·~ 
19G4, LACTC decided to allocate all of its 40% discretion~ry 
share .- now that t.he 3-year- guaranteed fare reduction progr<w• wa8 
~bout to expire - to gene~al public ~ransit purposes for at lea s t 
t 1:: ;;c.:xt t\Jo years. At least 90% of of these disc r -:>.t .i.l)nary ·· una s 
w i ll l>e allocated to scre D anJ t~ie raunicipul oper -i t o rs i n onle r 
t o 1;1 inimizc fare incrc6ses and ·.5ervice cut'Gack.s. Up t.u 1 1 % ""' ill 
h e 1.1:.: i 1 i zeu il s .1t · i nee: n ti. vc t. i c· r , c-11cou r Zl.\j i "''.:J I uc;..1 I IJ\..>V 1.: t· 1111 ·n t : .. 
cl 
to explore rat iooalizing strategies, including contracting, the 
s u b st i tut ion o f _Q_ a rat rans it for f i x e d route s e r v ice , and u s er -
side subsidies. um 
The structure and behavior of LACTC, and the developments 
resulting from its sales tax initiative clearly illustrate thE 
dynamics of an intensely competitive metropolitan area. The 
position of the regional transit carrier, historically weak, is 
bein9 further eroded. Indeed, as subregional coalitions becor..e 
increasingly activist on transportation questions, the continued 
existence of the regional carrier in its present form is in 
question, as is ·the future of the rail rapid transit ~>ortion of 
the sales tax program. Given an increasingly com}?etitive 
context, those downtown/radials may begin to appear increasingly 
anomalous. 
RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT 
The following table highlights the relationship between 
metropolitan structure and service and institutional innovnt ion 
during the transition from a mostly private industry to a mostly 
public one, and then in response to the fiscal crisis iJener<lt~d 
by this transition: 
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'fable l 
'I'he Relationship of Metropolitan Structure to ')''(ansit Jnnovation 
I'e.rioci I: 
~-!ctropoli tan 
St.ructure 
Governmen-
ta li zat ion 
P.coc~ss 
Ideology 
I nvestment 
Progcam 
Institutional 
Outcome 
Inn;.Jv~tions 
FROM PRIVATE TO PUBLIC 
COD DOMINA.IJT 
CL\D-1 ed 
l-Jier.01rchic.:.!~ 
Strong Core 
Spe-cialize.J 
In ten.lepcnden-t 
Down town I 
radial 
Powerful; 
r:cli:ltively 
autonomous 
r::xtcnsive rail 
transit/express 
bus service in 
addition to ex-
istins service 
COM P E'1' I 'f:! VE 
CDD-led: sub-
llrban C[)position 
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Self-Contained 
Multi-Centered 
Non-Hierarchical 
DO\.Jntown/ t"dll i a l 
vs. outlying 
center orienta.-
tion 
Fin<J ncial lj .;. i ld 
spa tially cori-
stra i.ned 
Some express 
buses : li1~i.ted 
:rail tra.n:;it in 
udclition to .::x-
is ting ~··~u:vice 
CDD l•IEi\!< 
Limi t _1.i lo 
centr,)1 city; 
Sub urba n-led 
Noo-Ccn. tra]ity 
Out yi 11 r:l Ce1 "(.:r 
ori e t.a lion. 
Social \·/e f c.i re 
servic e ; l oca lly-
ocien t ._d fH l b -
ur'oen se:: vic~ 
Period IX: 
; .~etropoli tan 
Structure 
Rationaliza-
tion 
Privatization 
Institutional 
Chun<::Je3 
Table 2 
RESPONSES TO PUBLIC SECTOR FISCAL CRISIS 
cno DOMINAtn 
Substitute 
capital for-
labor i \.Jag e 
discipline and 
work rule 
chan0es; sor.ie 
looJ shcddinrJ 
Privately oper-
a tcd dO\·m tow11/ 
radial express 
buse.s; !30me 
contractir19 
out; sorne em-
ployer-based 
r ic3eshar in<J 
Som~ .=1s cr,!)-
Dor.i nan t 111i th 
t710re load 
shed<ling; $Ub-
urbo n t.r..,,nsit 
ce n1:.cr s a n • .::i 
gr id sys t cin~. 
Much contract:i n·._, 
uu t by local. <jOV-
ernin0n ts; ~xten­
::; i ve subsc:c ir1ti0n 
bus service and 
private express 
buGes; much em-
ployer-ba secl 
ridesh<.tcing 
r.e,~ i ona l tax 
bo se s11ar in'.::l; 
activist e 1:1pluy-
~ r- basec: t r <1 n .':;-
'i)Or tat ion man-
dge 1r,cn t associ-
ation~; cn_;~ ,2r/ 
fac ili tutu~ a~ 
1 ., c-:ro1~0li tan 
le•1<.: 1: nu:-,1er0us 
public ascncies 
111ithin metro-
poli.t.:.:n area 
C BD UT:: .\{~ 
J:ff ici ~::·•ci-or i-
entt::d f.:>.r:•2 r_>oli-
cie-s; !:O"'i'ill vi.:: h i-
c le , d ena. nd-
r e .s pon~ive 
systc1:1~ 
Cuntr.::icted-out 
small v0hicle 
::>y~tc:~s 
l.3rok~ r If uc i l. i t<.t-
tor at raetroroli-
t.'in le•1cl; sub-
urban-d01.1ina ted 
~'.)\l L l i. ::: a 9enc·1 
The ;;att.ern uf development in the Unitt:!d States is 
l i 'kc 1 y to produce con v e rye n c ~ i 11 cat ego r y t '" o : i r i ·t. !'.:! n := cl y 
compc..:.itive r:1c ·u:::opolitu•) are:.J.s, \;./hether d oncc-co11.indnt CBL? nov1 
c on fro r. t s n u m e r o u s co '" ri et i n <.:I p l a c e s , o r LI •..,i e i\ )~ C 13 [) s t. ..i s L' s .:.1 
comi:.ba.ck, future dyna1,1ic.;s will reflC!Ct the ful.l political an ~J 
economic :-:•at.uration of outl:i· in•J o(fi.ce-comme'rci<.d centers. 
llv.J PicL·ce County sol 1.1tion is the likely outco ni e . ror h o:;-e 
1':'\ov'ng fcor:1 category OJ)e to t~vo, t11e Los Ang e l es so lu t ior. 1,,.•ill 
predornir.at.e. \,\lithin category two. ·U"le relative inte ns i t y <">f 
competition will be important ~n determining the precise sh~ [ e of 
t h e r e s u l t . I !1 r Li 0 id 1 y g row in g r e g i on s , w l 1 i c h .1 r: !:! l i k e 1 y ' o be 
t h e most competitive, the rcgio.n;:il institutions created by th~ 
CDD-le<l gover~r-tentalizing coal:i tion c.1ay be c1.i.sr:iemb0red. Hbc?r 
growth-relate<.] pressure~ are less intense, the existing r e 9 io1;-il 
inst · t ut ions 1:1uy r::main intact, though with a r~ a.'i.·· rower ~cop t.=. . 
I n co ;:-i p e t i t i v e IT\ e t r op o l i ta n a re a s , th e q o v e c n m e n ta l 
a g encies may support a limit~d progra u of priv .. 1ti~ dt.i o 11, 
it eluding ser·vices f or the. elderly and Jisableti an d l ate -
1i yll t/weei<end runs. They will not. , howt.!ver, ~(:i:;:.e the ii it i ative 
to p rivat.i.ze that which is their reason for bei n g· : the e a ·L 
pe r i od , uowntown./r..ldial lQn•) distance a11d ~xpr~ s s O L er. tion. 
The ir reluctance to Jo so c.1.0e$ not ster.i fro m l>ur eau c ra r.ic 
i n e rtia, lack of i.r:la<.:;ination, or ll generation. of t 1u.n a 1 e ri(-1.l 
decline. It is, rather, a direct reflection of :.:heir his toriccll 
a n 1 political rootedness. 
wi thdra\1in13 from tiiis arena would directly tr1rc:a t:.:!1 tht: 
loss of. political support from precisely those alliance r.c1.rtnc- rs 
t h.:1 t led t:.he gov~rnmentalization process: the COlJ co .. 1l i t i o n ; tl i 
sub u.rl>an residential dcvcloper3 who have l)ronuceu tht? I i g 1 ~ r 
income p3.trons of those lons di.<:;tnnc~ peal< per ioa service ': ··1! !'..l 
o r ga nized labor. Jettisonins these servic~s i 11 Lr .J L"t to 
conc ·~ntr.:ite on dense central c.i. t.y lines p-:ttroniz.ed pr .i rnar i. ly ~.Y 
1 ow ~~r it1cor.1e, transit depe n<lent groups would ma}~,-! th Q t r,-.i r sit 
p r orJr um extremel:; i'»lnerable politically: a pro•:1ra ro f or the i)OOr 
~s a poor progr~m.- vl 
Disug9re •0wtccl institut.ion.al, finar1cial and se r vi C!':! 
st ructur e s, th~ key innovation chara.ctei:i.st .~ c 0£ co r,,1 1 et i t ivt~ 
m e t . r o p o l i ta n a r €: .1 :;:; , vi i l l fa c i 1 i ta t e t h e;: r e - e 1H er y c n cc •1 n d 
e }: p c n s ion o E th c pr i v a t e 8 e c t. or l 11 u r b a n t r a n s i t. .J lj s a s 
r egi0 11- r,. Jid~ govern r:i e n t.al tl'::.!encie$ were a l•:ey i mple r\ient.:;;. Lio i to0l 
in i)05t \.;a r 1lo1.1Jntown reJ~veloprnent plans, p riva t i zed , lc c<?. l ly-
ori c n t _J scrvic~ \·1i l l frequently be tile we.C1pon of cho c t: f o r 
u t lyi ,g busine~;s cc n tc.i:-s in th0 co1;1petiti -it.1 fur loc .:i t.iondl 
ad vc.ntaye. 
·~he govcrnmentalization process in t ru nsiL rt-.:!f lectetl t h e 
ch ng iny structure of federa lis~ durjng the Kennedy-Johnson - Ni~on 
years, including a place ne~c the tor, of the nationc:. l a ge n rla f or 
lc:;:cse urban area concerns, <inJ an intervention s t ra t egy ocus ;~<.J 
o n c x t e nd in g t. he a o in a in o f pub l i c sect o r po \v e r . I n ·-he cc; 1 t e i{ t 
of tl'l.e R.e a.gan a d rr:inistrar:ton, given its 1jifferen t ~ocial b,,sis 
an ·'.'.l idc=ology o f g ove:r anc e , fiscal and poLitical cri~; e - a t. cn~ e 
enhat1ce- the at t r activenes~> of privat.c sr:cto1: o.J.ter"1'3.tives to 
yovc .cnmenU1 l po\'.rer anc] underw ine tl1e v i <-1b i ti t;,y o [ the all i a nce of 
bi '3 city leader5 1 organized lri.bor anr'l the national •JOVe r nnie·'l. t . 
nisaggregation will dril n nlically incrc nse t 
ex Lrcm~ pressures L•carin<J on Or::Jo..ini:teJ t::.· •. n~sit lol)or. 
·SS 
c u l :cedd y 
, he:: l l2\;.ly 
em po lH~ r e J o u t l y i n ':) cc n t e r co a l t i o o s w i 1 1 s t r on g 1 y r as i s t th c 
c01;1n1it1t1ents and protections, as well as the work rules secured ~Y 
tran!li.t. labor c!urin4 the 9ovei:-:)rnentalizalion 1Yroccss. J\s in 
other iod1..1st1-ie::; ~X?eriencing t:ie loss of the insu:re<.1 sU.itus tlrat 
buoyed tho.? labor 1:iov . .,.r1ent, transit (·.'Ot"~;cr protections will be.! 
eroded ·:::;y old n.s well d.S nelv firr.ls in the industry. Indeed, L"le 
s u cc es ~ o f p :r i v a t i z a t i on ;:;; s c:i [ i s cl\ l c r i s i s re so l u t ion s tr a t <! g y 
depenJs precisely on t~1esc c)iangcs in t11e transit. laoor pr:)cess. 
Disagyret)ation will also greatly coniplic.:tte the pl.Aoce.55 
o f o l l i an c e for rn at ion so c r u c i a l [or t '!1 e con .s t '!" u c t i on a rHl 
r.\ a i n t er. a n c e o E r e g i on a l s c Zl l e f .a c i l. i t i e s a n il s e r v i c ~ s . 0 n c e 
again, the re Lit i ve intensity of competition vii 11 Jeter Mine the 
f d t e c :: i n s t i t. u t ion ~ op c r a t i n '.> do \./ n tow n / r a U i <:i l peak pc r i o d 
express buses and rail rapid transit lines, as well as the ~xtent 
of pli..).nnec.J facilities. lihere <..::..>1t:petit:i0n is in<:ense, tl1e h:tu'fe 
of regional-seal(:') services and fucili_ties is in noubt. . 
. i\ f i n a l ca s u .:i l t j o f th e d i !, ...1 ':..; "] 'l:' c g a t i o 11 d y n .::i t:'l i c i s th c 
i<leolo0ical b~nner of the one ri<)llt r.1ct:copolitan .=orm that CdJ) 
t~llia.nce·:> pt"oudly ~)elJ aloft. The banner still w·uvcs. The co1.·1 
._.,. i n J o [ cu i71 p e t i t i on so "o u [ f e t s , i t , h o w e v e r , t h a t f e \·J s t i1 :'\ c! 
still lont_J enot.:gh to read ii:.. 
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